I found it a fascinating of how one man could become a major dealer in nuclear technology.

The lax security in the European nuclear program allowed a Pakistani engineer Khan to steal the centrifuge designs. Khan took those designs to Pakistan to help create a nuclear bomb there. Soon Khan became the head of a major nuclear organization in Pakistan. Soon the Pakistani had developed centrifuges technology that could bypass the international controls on making nuclear bombs.

Here contrary to the writer, I am not so sure from his evidence the US atomic program for peace failed as he suggested. The appeal of Khan technology to rogue countries was they could bypass the checks here. So Khan sold this technology for large sums to Iran, Libya, North Korea and maybe one more.

Part of the problem stopping Khan was finding what was happening. Then it was his prestige in Pakistan. Plus the free world's need for Pakistani support both in the cold war and the war in Afghanistan after 911 but eventually in January 2004, under world pressure Khan was arrested and put under house arrest. So finally stopping Khan, leaving us with a problem of knowing how much damage Khan did!

Now it is a few years since the book was written. Iran is still trying to make a bomb. At best, Khan would have given it a boost. The Libyan spent much money for nothing and eventually gave up on nuclear bombs, so his contribution there was useless. North Korea appears according to recent information gave up earlier on this type of uranium enrichment technology and went back to the power reactor method. Maybe he helped with the bomb design. The last unknown country, I cannot comment.

Finally I am left wondering what happened to the money the Pakistani got from these countries? Khan lived a good life but he did not take much of the money. I suspect that it went to the Pakistan's nuclear program which I find a disturbing conclusion.

Overall if you are interested in this, you will find this a fascinating read.

I found it a fascinating of how one man could become a major dealer in nuclear technology.

The lax security in the European nuclear program allowed a Pakistani engineer Khan to steal the centrifuge designs. Khan took those designs to Pakistan to help create a nuclear bomb there. Soon Khan became the head of a major nuclear organization in Pakistan. Soon the Pakistani had developed centrifuges technology that could bypass the international controls on making nuclear bombs.

Here contrary to the writer, I am not so sure from his evidence the US atomic program for peace failed as he suggested. The appeal of Khan technology to rogue countries was they could bypass the checks here. So Khan sold this technology for large sums to Iran, Libya, North Korea and maybe one more.

Part of the problem stopping Khan was finding what was happening. Then it was his prestige in Pakistan. Plus the free world's need for Pakistani support both in the cold war and the war in Afghanistan after 911 but eventually in January 2004, under world pressure Khan was arrested and put under house arrest. So finally stopping Khan, leaving us with a problem of knowing how much damage Khan did!

Now it is a few years since the book was written. Iran is still trying to make a bomb. At best, Khan would have given it a boost. The Libyan spent much money for nothing and eventually gave up on nuclear bombs, so his contribution there was useless. North Korea appears according to recent information gave up earlier on this type of uranium enrichment technology and went back to the power reactor method. Maybe he helped with the bomb design. The last unknown country, I cannot comment.

Finally I am left wondering what happened to the money the Pakistani got from these countries? Khan lived a good life but he did not take much of the money. I suspect that it went to the Pakistan's nuclear program which I find a disturbing conclusion.

Overall if you are interested in this, you will find this a fascinating read.

George Tenet reportedly described A.Q. Khan as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." Corera adds that Khan has had greater impact on nuclear proliferation than any other individual - yet, his story begins simply as the right man in the right place. Trained as a metallurgist in Europe, he began work in '72 at a research lab in the Netherlands at the forefront of Europe's efforts to develop the latest centrifuge technology for nuclear fuel, providing independence from the U.S.

Next to the research lab was a plant holding thousands of tall, slender centrifuges connected by a maze of metal piping. Each machine only enriched the gas a tiny amount - thus, the need for a connected cascade. Each centrifuge consisted of 100 parts, many engineered to within /001 of a mm. and able to withstand very high speeds. One tiny mistake and the centrifuge spins out of control, often crashing into other machines and destroying the entire cascade.

Khan's first job at the research center was to translate documents for a new German-designed centrifuge - the P2. Security at the site was lax, and within three years Khan's co-worker became convinced Khan was a spy. Authorities were alerted, but according to most accounts, the CIA helped convince them just to watch Khan and remove his access to secret materials. Realizing he'd been found out, Khan returned to Pakistan, taking thousands of pages of documents and even discarded parts with him.

At about this same point in time the U.S. learned of Pakistan's intent to use fuel reprocessing (aided by France) to make a bomb. France as convinced to stop the program, leading Pakistan to instead focus on Khan's knowledge of centrifuges. (Other advantages of using centrifuges were that much less space and power were required than reprocessing or gaseous diffusion - making the program much easier to hide.)

Khan knew Pakistan lacked the manufacturing skills ("couldn't make a pin"), but he also knew who the component suppliers were for the research lab where he had worked. Thus, he utilized a network of Swiss, German, U.K., U.S., China (bomb design), North Korea (missile design), and Niger (yellowcake) suppliers. By 1987 Pakistan had the bomb. Soon after, Khan began marketing his/Pakistan's skills - North Korea, Libya, and Iran. Throughout this period and on to the present, the U.S. knew of Pakistan's activities but refrained from taking strong action because their cooperation was needed to help defeat the Russians in Afghanistan, and then after 9/11 in terror-reduction efforts.

An IAEA inspection in '03 found Iran with 160 cascaded P1-design centrifuges and evidence of uranium enriched to between 36 - 70%. Iran's original efforts began under the Shah in 1976, were known about in the U.S., and reportedly led Saddam Hussein in Iraq to press for his own program (began by purchasing a reactor from France). Iran, like its mentor, Pakistan, eventually also decided to go the centrifuge route after the U.S. pressed France to renege on an agreement to provide Iran with a fuel reprocessing (enrichment) plant. In addition, taking a lesson from Iraq's reactor being destroyed by Israel, Iran built its facilities in a dispersed, underground manner.

Currently it is not clear what Iran's strategy is. It may simply be building a large, legal stockpile of power-plant level fuel - ready to upgrade to weapons grade on short notice in only 20% of the time required starting from scratch. Or, it may have a parallel setup that is creating bomb-grade material at the present.

Pakistan's proliferation activities continued after 9/11 - however, dissidents in various countries provided information that led to finding enrichment centrifuges on a ship bound for Libya. Libya decided to renounce its program, and the information garnered from them and their suppliers helped prove to Pakistan's leaders that Khan and his associates were running amok.

A.Q. Khan has now been under house arrest in Pakistan for several years, unable to even use the telephone. Hopefully his proliferation activities have all been undone. However, his network suppliers have by now learned how valuable their offerings are, and it is also known that he also worked with those wanting to start a program in Saudi Arabia.

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings.



Diane C. Donovan

California Bookwatch

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch

This book is an excellent piece of work on Nuclear Proliferation. Things that I would have liked to see in this book :

*) Substantiated material with actual interviews with intelligence officers. Author uses lots of qoutes from private conversations, but how did he get access to those ? That makes me question a bit the authencity of the research.

*) The book keeps on jumping back and forth, which is an excellent case to muddy the presentation. I would have liked a chronological order maintained in the book so that thought processes can be collected and processed efficiently.

Overall it is an eye-opener.

This is a pretty good book giving a balanced view of what was known or suspected of Dr A.Q. Khan's activities. It does explain how Mr Khan got his Nuclear education and how he found his way into a nuclear program in Europe in the early 1970s. It gives some clear indications of the divisions that separate India and Pakistan which are remote from most of us who have been born in the USA, and how these may have served as a powerful motivator for Dr Kahn.

The book places many things into context and gives enough chronology that you can sort the various pieces out. There are some factual matters that can be argued with mr Corera, for example he claims Iraq had no nuclear program, despite the US having found a viable centrifuge buried in an Iraqi Scientist's garden. The book does give some idea of what the intelligence community knew and when they knew it. I personally am heartened that the intelligence comunity was able to penetrate this network when they realized this would be highly desirable. The CIA has suffered in the area of being able to recruit agents on the ground as a result of late 1970s reforms which emphasized technology approaches to the cold war as opposed to human intelligence.

The book also does a good job of bringing out the US dilemma in terms of asking an invaluable ally in Purvez Muscharev (sp?) to take down a national hero. A job that was a very delicate undertaking.

This is a pretty good book giving a balanced view of what was known or suspected of Dr A.Q. Khan's activities. It does explain how Mr Khan got his Nuclear education and how he found his way into a nuclear program in Europe in the early 1970s. It gives some clear indications of the divisions that separate India and Pakistan which are remote from most of us who have been born in the USA, and how these may have served as a powerful motivator for Dr Kahn.

The book places many things into context and gives enough chronology that you can sort the various pieces out. There are some factual matters that can be argued with mr Corera, for example he claims Iraq had no nuclear program, despite the US having found a viable centrifuge buried in an Iraqi Scientist's garden. The book does give some idea of what the intelligence community knew and when they knew it. I personally am heartened that the intelligence comunity was able to penetrate this network when they realized this would be highly desirable. The CIA has suffered in the area of being able to recruit agents on the ground as a result of late 1970s reforms which emphasized technology approaches to the cold war as opposed to human intelligence.

The book also does a good job of bringing out the US dilemma in terms of asking an invaluable ally in Purvez Muscharev (sp?) to take down a national hero. A job that was a very delicate undertaking.

The nuclear five missed an opportunity to give up their arsenal and get everyone's covenant to stay away from the bomb. It is only natural that some states and some nations sought to avoid the "less than equal" status by joining the nuclear club overtly and covertly.

Pakistan is probably the only state that was smart enough to get the bomb but not wise enough to "control" access to technology. Individuals were more important than institutions. A Q Khan used the nation's need for a bomb to create a personal fiefdom that was beyond any institutionalized control. Benazir Bhutto, the PM of Pakistan, could not visit his laboratories and got her first glimpse of Khan's facility and work when the United States shared with her the results of their espionage!

A Q Khan used his intelligence and his ability to manage perceptions to create several myths:
(a) He was not the father of Pakistan's bomb. The bomb came from PAEC and its scientists Munir Khan and Mubarakmand. (Khan had a parallel initiative in Kahuta but did not have enough "cold test" experiences to do the honours). Khan was however the one to take the limelight and give an exaggerated impression of his role. The nation took to the flamboyant A Q K and ignored the true heroes of PAEC.
(b) He was not keeping Pakistan's interest in mind. Z A Bhutto was astute in stating that Pakistan's bomb should not take the image of an Islamic bomb. Khan ignored this, and for personal gain, in an uncontrolled manner sold technology (stolen from URENCO) to Iran, Libya and North Korea. For money. Without approval from Pakistan's policy makers.

Increasing insensitivity to oppressed causes, increasing unwillingness of majority to live with a homogenous minority, increasing conflict between nations and states have all enhanced threats from terrorism and threats from rogue states for humanity.

A Q Khan's clanedestine one stop shopping mall for nuclear technology to anyone with money (and often poor credentials) may have handed terrorists and rogue states their first chance to acquire technology that has so far been under the rigorous control of responsible States including the State of Pakistan. At relatively inexpensive prices.

A Q Khan has endangered the World and has significantly affected Pakistan's image as a responsible State.

Gordon Correra traces the history of Khan's rise and fall. The author must have worked hard to get all the facts from a very sensitive nation, on a very sensitive issue. The author continues to sustain the reader's interest and attention by an easy and narrative style. Yet the book has enough material for a serious researcher to pursue further.

And how in detail he aborted his nuclear bomb building project soon after Saddam was taken out of power in Iraq by the USA. You'll also learn interesting stuff like about how terrorist leader Gaddafi tried for over 20 years to get a nuke bomb for Libya but was happily unsuccessful.

Does the author exaggerate, take sides, or attempt to provide an accurate account?

The author is British, working for the BBC. That characterizes his style of higher accuracy and perseverance, and less inflammatory tone, than some American zealots. The author has little to gain from appealing to conservatives or liberals for future political advance. The book is well referenced, and the references are also well utilized. It is written and searched in the form of theoretical thesis on the secretive campaign of building nuclear weapons by Pakistan and Iran in the shadows of Russia, China, and North Korea.

In such theoretical context, the author has the liberty to hypothesize missing links as long as he communicates his reasoning. The author unconsciously and occasionally takes sides, especially in his empathy with the intelligence folks. For example, he claims that Barlaw's objection on the sales of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan caused unfair termination of his job and loss to intelligence, in favor of strategic politics. The author thus dismisses the highly specialized opinion of the experts that those airplanes couldn't be altered due to their complex wiring and computer system.

The author repeats the same sympathetic stand, with Barlaw, in his arrest to a Pakistani agent pursuing the purchase of maraging steel, by dismissing the fact that Barlaw did not have definitive proof that the pursued marag steel was specifically intended for the rotors of the centrifuges. The author even exaggerates by claiming that the Pakistani agent was so dumb to admit that the steel was going to Kahuta's plant. Then there is an unexplained account of how an American convoy that visited Kahuta to explore the Khan's clandestine laboratory, could not find what they were looking for, despite traveling on land and in Jeeps in the secretive town. One ridiculous account made by the author is the arrest of one of Khan's past colleagues for carrying an oscilloscope in his luggage in a trip to Pakistan. As if the oscilloscope were a high tech military ware.

Despite the author's admission that the story is far from being totally known, he interjects many accounts to extrapolate events and fill gaps in situations where evidence lacks. The author's difficulty is apparent in realizing or recognizing the great depth of theoretical capabilities of the third world scientists. Attributing the design of the centrifuges or the bombs to the Chinese or European source is weakly supported, in view of the advances made by Khan's team in other military applications. Blue-prints of highly technical matters do not do good to someone without deep knowledge on how to compile and modify it.

The theme of the book centers on how Khan was exposed to the idea of the feasibility of accomplishing esoteric results out of radioisotope separation by gas centrifuge. It then proceeded to claim his spying and stealth of the European design of the centrifuge. That led to avoiding the Plutonium route, which is detectable, expensive, and subject to international pressure. That Khan's experience with the U235 enrichment offered Pakistan the clandestine and cheap access to fissile fuel. With the cheap and resourceful pool of scientists, Khan was able to build a prosperous laboratory, find the finance, and expand his science to other applications.

Khan's life-long pursuit for living in a country, safe from genocide, let him seek all means to accomplish his goal. His early childhood's memory of genocide, during the independence of Pakistan in 1948, had been ingrained into his psyche. The 1972's defeat of Pakistan by its old enemy renewed his traumatic memories of genocide. Hadn't lived in Holland and worked in a laboratory of centrifuges, he might have never followed the nuclear trail. Here, Khan found a parallel in the empowerment of western nations by nuclear weapon, which could fulfill his hope.

Why did Khan succeed when others failed?

1- Pakistan is country with its own language, race, limited space and population (in terms of Asian standards). Despite its Islamic beliefs, it is separate from Arab and Persian races and confronts massive Indian power.
2- The long occupation by Great Britain, followed by the rise of India and threat of expansion of communistic Russia to the South, towards the warm oceans, all make Pakistan insecure and vulnerable. That justified to Khan his endeavor for his nation's survival.
3- Israel's success for deceiving the world and possessing the bomb gave hope to a greater Pakistan to do the same.
4- Long before the Nuclear age, Western colonialists had imposed on their colonies restraints on the size of armies and owning heavy weapons. Only guns, pistols, and horses were allowed in order to deprive the occupied people from seeking independence. That hardened the mistrust of newly independent nations towards greater powers.
5- Whether the European suppliers of high tech were fooled by Khan or were smarter to sell technology that might never be used, is questionable. They got the money, Khan get the security. The F-16' have never been used to drop the bomb as Barlaw theorized and thus politicians prevailed.

One might wander of how human civilization has endured those millions of years without the nuclear deterrent? Had overpopulation or scarcity of energy sources been the driving force for conflicts, wouldn't nuclear energy diminish that drive, instead of amplifying it?

Unfortunately ghosts like Slobodan Malosovitch, Kim Il Sung, Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler have greatly diminished mankind's trust in playing with the atom. The book thus sets to search global security through published literature on the Pakistani scientist without have inside knowledge on the exact means of his accomplishments.

Mohamed F. El-Hewie
Author of
Essentials of Weightlifting and Strength Training

Whoever was responsible for proofreading this book should be sentenced to house arrest. It's hard to believe this defective product was released by the Oxford Press. The frequent grammar and spelling mistakes naturally lead the reader to question whether the facts of the story have been thrown together with the same careless abandon. As far as the story goes, you already know it. Profits, Politics, Power, and Greed combined to facilitate the proliferation of nuclear technology, especially centrifuge technology and chinese bomb design, to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and, of course, Pakistan. No need to spend your money on this book. The Publisher certainly has not earned your business with the release of this shoddy, unprofessional work.

Does the author exaggerate, take sides, or attempt to provide an accurate account?

The author is British, working for the BBC. That characterizes his style of higher accuracy and perseverance, and less inflammatory tone, than some American zealots. The author has little to gain from appealing to conservatives or liberals for future political advance. The book is well referenced, and the references are also well utilized. It is written and searched in the form of theoretical thesis on the secretive campaign of building nuclear weapons by Pakistan and Iran in the shadows of Russia, China, and North Korea.

In such theoretical context, the author has the liberty to hypothesize missing links as long as he communicates his reasoning. The author unconsciously and occasionally takes sides, especially in his empathy with the intelligence folks. For example, he claims that Barlaw's objection on the sales of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan caused unfair termination of his job and loss to intelligence, in favor of strategic politics. The author thus dismisses the highly specialized opinion of the experts that those airplanes couldn't be altered due to their complex wiring and computer system.

The author repeats the same sympathetic stand, with Barlaw, in his arrest to a Pakistani agent pursuing the purchase of maraging steel, by dismissing the fact that Barlaw did not have definitive proof that the pursued marag steel was specifically intended for the rotors of the centrifuges. The author even exaggerates by claiming that the Pakistani agent was so dumb to admit that the steel was going to Kahuta's plant. Then there is an unexplained account of how an American convoy that visited Kahuta to explore the Khan's clandestine laboratory, could not find what they were looking for, despite traveling on land and in Jeeps in the secretive town. One ridiculous account made by the author is the arrest of one of Khan's past colleagues for carrying an oscilloscope in his luggage in a trip to Pakistan. As if the oscilloscope were a high tech military ware.

Despite the author's admission that the story is far from being totally known, he interjects many accounts to extrapolate events and fill gaps in situations where evidence lacks. The author's difficulty is apparent in realizing or recognizing the great depth of theoretical capabilities of the third world scientists. Attributing the design of the centrifuges or the bombs to the Chinese or European source is weakly supported, in view of the advances made by Khan's team in other military applications. Blue-prints of highly technical matters do not do good to someone without deep knowledge on how to compile and modify it.

The theme of the book centers on how Khan was exposed to the idea of the feasibility of accomplishing esoteric results out of radioisotope separation by gas centrifuge. It then proceeded to claim his spying and stealth of the European design of the centrifuge. That led to avoiding the Plutonium route, which is detectable, expensive, and subject to international pressure. That Khan's experience with the U235 enrichment offered Pakistan the clandestine and cheap access to fissile fuel. With the cheap and resourceful pool of scientists, Khan was able to build a prosperous laboratory, find the finance, and expand his science to other applications.

Khan's life-long pursuit for living in a country, safe from genocide, let him seek all means to accomplish his goal. His early childhood's memory of genocide, during the independence of Pakistan in 1948, had been ingrained into his psyche. The 1972's defeat of Pakistan by its old enemy renewed his traumatic memories of genocide. Hadn't lived in Holland and worked in a laboratory of centrifuges, he might have never followed the nuclear trail. Here, Khan found a parallel in the empowerment of western nations by nuclear weapon, which could fulfill his hope.

Why did Khan succeed when others failed?

1- Pakistan is country with its own language, race, limited space and population (in terms of Asian standards). Despite its Islamic beliefs, it is separate from Arab and Persian races and confronts massive Indian power.
2- The long occupation by Great Britain, followed by the rise of India and threat of expansion of communistic Russia to the South, towards the warm oceans, all make Pakistan insecure and vulnerable. That justified to Khan his endeavor for his nation's survival.
3- Israel's success for deceiving the world and possessing the bomb gave hope to a greater Pakistan to do the same.
4- Long before the Nuclear age, Western colonialists had imposed on their colonies restraints on the size of armies and owning heavy weapons. Only guns, pistols, and horses were allowed in order to deprive the occupied people from seeking independence. That hardened the mistrust of newly independent nations towards greater powers.
5- Whether the European suppliers of high tech were fooled by Khan or were smarter to sell technology that might never be used, is questionable. They got the money, Khan get the security. The F-16' have never been used to drop the bomb as Barlaw theorized and thus politicians prevailed.

One might wander of how human civilization has endured those millions of years without the nuclear deterrent? Had overpopulation or scarcity of energy sources been the driving force for conflicts, wouldn't nuclear energy diminish that drive, instead of amplifying it?

Unfortunately ghosts like Slobodan Malosovitch, Kim Il Sung, Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler have greatly diminished mankind's trust in playing with the atom. The book thus sets to search global security through published literature on the Pakistani scientist without have inside knowledge on the exact means of his accomplishments.

Mohamed F. El-Hewie
Author of
Essentials of Weightlifting and Strength Training