This well-told, interesting, robust summary of Pakistan's 55 year old history is more than just the usual "run-of-the-mill country study." The author has talked to real Pakistanis, sampled their opinions, and mapped the nation's temperament and volatility back into its own desires, hopes and fears. It is a rich and dense biography of a much-troubled ally and nation.

Strategically situated at the crossroads of some of the most important of international sensitivities, and beset with enough internal problems to place it at the very top of any objective list of the world's most unstable countries, Pakistan continues to muddle through, lurching from one deep-rooted crisis to another.

Now that it has become "the first Islamic nuclear power," all of the stakes have been raised immeasurably to a whole new level. As a U.S. ally in the war on terror, it is a sobering thought that like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq, Pakistan too could conceivably turn from our number one ally into our number one enemy almost over night. It is just a roll of the dice that keeps this troubled nation afloat and upright for the moment.

It is this volatility and unpredictability that makes a deeper study of Pakistan essential for international relation watchers. Jones, a journalist who spent several years "on station" in Pakistan, brings a fresh but very "un-journalistic" approach to this national biography: It is not just another computer dump of a journalist log, but a well-told story, that unfolds chronologically and thematically; one that is linked to internal opinions as well as to the larger international picture.

This is a very impressive book. Five stars

Owen Bennet Jones was BBC's correspondent in Pakistan for three years till 2001.

His book is a wonderful way to understand Pakistan. It is not a typical chronological list of facts. It is a set of nicely grouped perspectives on the issues in Pakistan's politics: the power players - army, politicians, feudal lords; the public opinion issues - Kashmir, Bomb, Bangladesh, Muhajirs; and their impact on Pakistan so far.

The reader can pick any chapter and start with it.

It is difficult to write a book about Pakistan (or India) without leaving in the reader's mind a sense of disappointment at a biased perspective. Was partition the right thing to do? Different views may emerge based on who you ask.

It is even more difficult for a British author to keep a balanced perspective on the history of the sub-continent given the influence in his own ambience. Is Winston Churchill a wise statesman or an arrogant imperialist? Different views may emerge based on where you ask.

The author seems to have struck a fine balance between multiple views.

However, in a few instances, the author disappoints:

Pakistan does feel insecure about India's intentions. The religious divide is a thin argument since India has more Muslims than Pakistan; and they are not raring to quit India. The divide stems from a public opinion that got shaped by the shameful violence during partition; that got nurtured after the partition by the army and politicians in Pakistan as a pet hate agenda for self serving reasons. Today, no politician or general in Pakistan can take a softer friendly stand towards India and survive in Pakistan. This is true to a lesser extent for politicians in India too. Feeding a public opinon for political convenience and in turn being fed by it is the vicious cycle that Pakistan has gotten into. The author misses this point and suggests that Pakistan's insecurity stems from India responding to Pakistan's invasion in 1965 by crossing the border and coming to occupy Lahore; and from India's role in liberation of Bangaldesh. This world-view befits a public relations spin master and not a political journalist.

Pakistan's view is that Mujahideens causing mass deaths in Kashmir are "freedom fighters" and not "terrorists". This view suffers from several fallacies:
(a) Pakistan's claim as homeland to the sub continent's Muslims is not valid any more. Not after 180 million in East Pakistan walked away. Not after 200 million Muslims have stayed back in India and have played a big role in India's growth.
Pakistan has lesser Muslims, 150 million, today than either India or Bangladesh.
(b) The Mujahideen are trained and equipped by the State of Pakistan. This is low intensity proxy war. Not freedom fighting. Not terrorism.
(c) The Mujaihideen are not citizens of Kashmir. They are "outsiders" coming in for a shared religion. They sincerely believe they are fighting for the noble cause of their religion. They believe religion prevails over the State. This view raises challenges to several States. In the end this may prove to be a bigger challenge to Islamic States than other States.
The author's sympathetic description of the events in Kashmir as "tribesmen crossing the border to fight for their muslim brethren" reflects one view reasonably well; but ignores an opposite view that may have a greater dosage of wisdom.

Pakistan's army, in the words of Benazir Bhutto, has a better track record in fighting its own citizens than fighting other armies. The army's response to this potential for doubt is made up of: (a) a signature tactic of proxy war - in defeat there is a cover of deniability; and in success there is glory and (b) lack of transparency on events during the war and a "spin" that could obfuscate truth. The author is willing to be a facilitator. Did Pakistan's army lose its positions in Kargil? Or, did they walk out because Nawaz Sharif ceded to pressure from the US? The author says that Indians claim Pakistan army was dislodged in 80% of the positions before Sharif met Clinton; but "neutral" observers, relying on Pakistan sources, believe that India had dislodged Pakistan in just 12 of the 132 positions implying that the army won it and politicians lost it. Neutral observers relying on Pakistan sources? There are better neutral analyses like Arthur J Tellis' book "Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella".

The author parrots a view he heard in Pakistan army: that Pakistan army uses tribesmen in its engagement with India because the Indian army is more afraid of the tribesmen than Pakistan's regular army. Steve Coll in "Ghost wars" has a different story. Officers in Pakistan army preferred to get posted to the Western front than the Eastern front where they need to meet the tough professional army from India.

Aside from these minor biases, the author has done a very good job in portraying Pakistan's history and the issues this young nation faces.

Owen Bennet Jones was BBC's correspondent in Pakistan for three years till 2001.

His book is a wonderful way to understand Pakistan. It is not a typical chronological list of facts. It is a set of nicely grouped perspectives on the issues in Pakistan's politics: the power players - army, politicians, feudal lords; the public opinion issues - Kashmir, Bomb, Bangladesh, Muhajirs; and their impact on Pakistan so far.

The reader can pick any chapter and start with it.

It is difficult to write a book about Pakistan (or India) without leaving in the reader's mind a sense of disappointment at a biased perspective. Was partition the right thing to do? Different views may emerge based on who you ask.

It is even more difficult for a British author to keep a balanced perspective on the history of the sub-continent given the influence in his own ambience. Is Winston Churchill a wise statesman or an arrogant imperialist? Different views may emerge based on where you ask.

The author seems to have struck a fine balance between multiple views.

However, in a few instances, the author disappoints:

Pakistan does feel insecure about India's intentions. The religious divide is a thin argument since India has more Muslims than Pakistan; and they are not raring to quit India. The divide stems from a public opinion that got shaped by the shameful violence during partition; that got nurtured after the partition by the army and politicians in Pakistan as a pet hate agenda for self serving reasons. Today, no politician or general in Pakistan can take a softer friendly stand towards India and survive in Pakistan. This is true to a lesser extent for politicians in India too. Feeding a public opinon for political convenience and in turn being fed by it is the vicious cycle that Pakistan has gotten into. The author misses this point and suggests that Pakistan's insecurity stems from India responding to Pakistan's invasion in 1965 by crossing the border and coming to occupy Lahore; and from India's role in liberation of Bangaldesh. This world-view befits a public relations spin master and not a political journalist.

Pakistan's view is that Mujahideens causing mass deaths in Kashmir are "freedom fighters" and not "terrorists". This view suffers from several fallacies:
(a) Pakistan's claim as homeland to the sub continent's Muslims is not valid any more. Not after 180 million in East Pakistan walked away. Not after 200 million Muslims have stayed back in India and have played a big role in India's growth.
Pakistan has lesser Muslims, 150 million, today than either India or Bangladesh.
(b) The Mujahideen are trained and equipped by the State of Pakistan. This is low intensity proxy war. Not freedom fighting. Not terrorism.
(c) The Mujaihideen are not citizens of Kashmir. They are "outsiders" coming in for a shared religion. They sincerely believe they are fighting for the noble cause of their religion. They believe religion prevails over the State. This view raises challenges to several States. In the end this may prove to be a bigger challenge to Islamic States than other States.
The author's sympathetic description of the events in Kashmir as "tribesmen crossing the border to fight for their muslim brethren" reflects one view reasonably well; but ignores an opposite view that may have a greater dosage of wisdom.

Pakistan's army, in the words of Benazir Bhutto, has a better track record in fighting its own citizens than fighting other armies. The army's response to this potential for doubt is made up of: (a) a signature tactic of proxy war - in defeat there is a cover of deniability; and in success there is glory and (b) lack of transparency on events during the war and a "spin" that could obfuscate truth. The author is willing to be a facilitator. Did Pakistan's army lose its positions in Kargil? Or, did they walk out because Nawaz Sharif ceded to pressure from the US? The author says that Indians claim Pakistan army was dislodged in 80% of the positions before Sharif met Clinton; but "neutral" observers, relying on Pakistan sources, believe that India had dislodged Pakistan in just 12 of the 132 positions implying that the army won it and politicians lost it. Neutral observers relying on Pakistan sources? There are better neutral analyses like Arthur J Tellis' book "Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella".

The author parrots a view he heard in Pakistan army: that Pakistan army uses tribesmen in its engagement with India because the Indian army is more afraid of the tribesmen than Pakistan's regular army. Steve Coll in "Ghost wars" has a different story. Officers in Pakistan army preferred to get posted to the Western front than the Eastern front where they need to meet the tough professional army from India.

Aside from these minor biases, the author has done a very good job in portraying Pakistan's history and the issues this young nation faces.

I bought this book some three years ago and took it on a trip, finishing it over six days. The book is written very well, and journalist in Owen Bennet Jones certainly needs to be commended.

Jones starts the book with President Musharraf, and moves back to the 1999 coup which installed him. He then picks up some of the key issues which drive Pakistan's foreign policy: Kashmir, The Bomb, The Army, among others. His writing syle is such that you immediately fall in with him and start thinking alongside. This makes the book an easy read. His style leans more towards description than analysis. Though the analysis is there, it is more journalistic than professorial (such as Stephen Cohen's: The Idea of Pakistan). There are also some good illustrations and cartoons.

However, he also leaves out important aspects of Pakistan (this is perhaps justified considering the title of the book). For instance, the entire book is written from the perspective of an outsider or a diplomat who would like to deal the Pakistan state. There is little analysis of Pakistan's domestic policies or problems, except to the extent that these influence its foreign policies. There is little information on Pakistan's economy or social institutions. Relatively little space has been given to Islam, which is strange considering that many of Pakistan's policies are supposed to be derived from the religious nature of the State. This is unfortunate because Pakistan's future may be determined largely by how it interfaces with Islam and how its economy shapes up.

And there are very few insights. What drives Pakistan, what holds it toegether, what may make it fail, these are all dealt with from a foreign policy perspective, but in an analytical style. Though Jones does make some very good connections between events and identifies patterns, the insights are simply not there. Perhaps one has to turn to an Asian mind such as V. S. Naipaul for that. However, Naipaul is somewhat hostile to the subject, and therefore may merely end up reinforcing some stereotypes.

All in all, an enjoyable book, but one that you may not be able to hold for long in your mind.

This book is without a doubt the best ever book one can find on Pakistani politics. It covers every aspect in detail from the 1999 Coup, the Kashmir Crisis-Kargil, Democracy in Pakistan as well as other internal issues.

The author obviously through his decade long experience has got a great deal of insight knowledge from his experiences for reporting for the BBC for which he made the wise choice for publishing his thoughts in this book.

If you're a student or even a curious reader liking books on Asian or especially Pakistani related politics, then look no further than this book as it is the best one out there. I read it all in 3 days and still do repeatedly as I've used it for reference for many university related projects.

Pakistan's turbulent history and military rule is treated to a scholarly and in-depth analysis which describes many of the problems of modern Pakistan with an eye to probing their historical roots. Jones assesses regional conflict and influence within the country and provides an important, scholarly assessment of Pakistan's underlying foundations. College-level readers will find it involving.

From humble beginning Pakistan came to existence in 1947, for the first 55 years of its independence it was internationally regarded as an obscure muslim state and a pesky irritant neighbor to India. Only recently after September, the prevalent perception has not changed; but only with an addition that Pakistan is a frontline ally for the fight against terrorism. It is this event that caused a great desire for west to gain understanding of the region. The fight for Pakistan came from the people under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah; a dynamic savvy intellect and statesmen who placed the need for an independent muslim nation to the British colonizers. I claim Jinnah as dynamic savvy intellect not from a feeling of reverence; but more from the following two facts. Jinnah is the only leader who carved a nation peacefully without firing a bullet; also Jinnah is the only statesman to have created a nation without getting arrested. Interestingly Jinnah is an Oxford law graduate, who campaigned for Pakistan by applying British laws and customs against the British rulers and emerging with his objective.

At its inception Pakistan was faced with the following issues:
1. Defense.
2. Kashmir.
3. Economy
4. Distance between East and West Pakistan.
5. Domestic divisions.
6. Immigrants from India.

Defense and Kashmir are synonymous to the politics there; since its inception the state has felt threatened by India; lacking the strategic depth the government went all out to create a meaningful defense mechanism with its meager resources. This threat evolved the foreign policy of being a countering agent to India. Pakistan is analogous to a small puppy which to compensate its size barks at every threat. The defense of Pakistan is in a very complex way tied to the Kashmir issue; unsettled over the last 55 years. India with having more resources was able to close its differences and began a pre-partition diplomatic negotiations to gain the state of Kashmir, while Jinnah with an air of confidence would state that "Kashmir will fall in our lap" were caught off guard. This cause of contention still exists even after having fought three wars.

The integrity of Pakistan was also threatened by the distance between the East and West; causing a central government nightmare. After the creation the East Pakistan was ethically divided into Sindhi, Pukhtoon, Punjabi and each group was more keen on self-autonomy than join the nation. This over time had caused considerable dissention, especially since the muslim immigrants from India were more educated and were able to fill the void of the beau racy vacated by the British. The locals treated them with utmost suspicion and without a political clout were unable to forward their views as debate in the assembly houses. This lead to a division along ethnic lines.

Taking into perspective the lack of resources and structure prevalent at independence; Pakistan has come a long way but still further development has to be done. It still faces from a sense of insecurity from India and at present there is an irritant factor of fundamentalism.