My dad graduated from the US Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1938, just in time for the War. He commanded destroyers and destroyer escorts between 1939 and 1947. He was present for many of the famous island battles, Kwajalein, Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Phillipines, Marianas Turkey Shoot, etc. My uncles both flew fighter planes off big carriers, such as ..... I began reading about all this when I was a boy, at a time when the War was forefront in everyone's consciousness. Since then I have read hundreds of books about the War, across the whole spectrum from battle excitement to weapons engineering. It's only during the last few years that I've noted books from the Japanese side of the War. The Japanese don't write for us.

Kaigun presents an American Version of the Japanese Version.
Although written by Americans, Kaigun is about weapons technology, navy doctrine and strategy in the Japanese Navy, covering roughly the years 1875-1941. They cite Japanese sources, write about Japanese officers and staff, and they try to present the Japanese viewpoint as well as foreigners can. Americans, including me, have always found the Japanese largely impossible to understand. Even so, the authors speak Japanese, taught Japanese History, and they have worked in Japan for years. Let's give them the benefit of the doubt.

It's not a book for everyone. Most general readers will become quickly bored because there are no battles, no heroes, and the Japanese names are difficult to remember. Imagine, a book about the War in the Pacific that ends before the Pearl Harbor attack! To understand this book readers need to know their WW2 naval history, plus a little bit about naval weapons. So, this book might interest naval professionals, veterans of the Pacific War, and military historians. Perhaps engineers might like this book. They will use the book at the naval academy in Annapolis.

Some of their main themes:
1. Fixation on the climactic Fleet action. Both navies, Japanese and American, were fixated on big Fleet ideas. They expected Battleships and Heavy Cruisers ti meet in a climatic fleet action that would decide the War. Few commanders on either side could foresee the decisive role of aircraft carriers and naval air. As a result of this expectation, the Japanese built giant expensive craft, such as Kongo, Musashi and Yamato, which hardly figured in later fighting at all. This was perhaps ironic, because the big Japanese ships were faster, bigger, had more accurate guns, better trained crews, etc.

2. A Naval Arms Race. After the end of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy was obsessed with the size and composition of the larger USN. Because they could not keep up with American building, they were forced to think about doctrines to successfully fight a much larger enemy. To defeat the larger, formidable USN, the Japanese worked on their fighting doctrines for decades, and they tried to build a technologically superior, better-trained force.

3. Fractured Japanese High Command. The Japanese Army thought Japan's enemies were China, Russia, and to a lesser extent England and Holland. The Japanese Navy thought the big enemy was the United States. The Japanese never sorted out their strategic priorities because they did not have their own equivalent of our Joint Chiefs. No one, not even Hirohito could make the Army and Navy sit down together to integrate National priorities. As a result, much of the Pacific War, at least the island part, only involved the Japanese Navy. Many of the island fortresses were manned by Jap Marines, not the Japanese army, which was largely intact at the end of the War.

4. Technological Advance. Much of this book focuses on the implications of weapons and weapons advances. For example, the Japanese long lance torpedo, the range, accuracy and control of big guns, the advances in naval aviation that made carriers dangerous, night vision and night fighting.... These discussions interest me because the authors show how the hardware interacts with the doctrine and how the two of those relate to strategy. For instance, The Japanese built many good subs but too many variants to permit economies of scale in building them The Japanese subs were expected to interfere with the progress of the USN across the Pacific. But the fighting doctrine - subs versus capital ships - failed with the advent of the destroyer escort screen. Moreover, Japanese command structures did not give their commanders room to change their tactics in the heat of battle. As a result, the Japanese sub force was largely irrelevant to the course of the War.

What it all means.

To Evans and Peattie, as well as previous writers, such as H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, Empires in the Balance; for Japan to start a major war against the United States (let alone England and China) in 1941 was reckless. I can't think of an example where such a poor country, as weak as Japan, has ever fought an aggressive War against such a powerful, advanced, and well-armed defender. Even if the Japanese had destroyed everything at Pearl, the United States could have beaten Japan with one arm tied behind its back. At the War's start, America had 17 times Japan's GNP, five times Japan's steel production, seven times Japans coal production, eighty (80!) times the production capacity for motor vehicles. Besides which, Japan did not have oil or iron. During the war, the human and productive superiority of the United States quickly asserted itself. For example, the United States built 141 aircraft carriers 1941-1945 versus Japan's nine carriers! During the War, America built around 1200 warships versus Japans 167. Japan, a feather weight, was attacking a super-heavyweight.. All in all, the Japanese were mad with unrealistic dreams for empire. Emperor Hirohito should have done something to put a lid on his crazy military commanders, especially the mad-for-glory officers in his Navy Staff.

My dad and my uncles used to get together every Sunday after the War. They'd sit talking in our kitchen. They wanted to hang Hirohito and they were angry that MacArthur had spared the Emperor. If the Japanese had any sense they would have hanged Hirohito themselves! It's amazing to see that Japanese historians, even today, rush to the defense of Hirohito, such as Ienaga, Pacific War, and Iriye, Origins of Second World War in Asia. Last but not least, there's a good looking website with pictures, drawings, and commentary about the Japanese Navy in WW2, [...]

My dad graduated from the US Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1938, just in time for the War. He commanded destroyers and destroyer escorts between 1939 and 1947. He was present for many of the famous island battles, Kwajalein, Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Phillipines, Marianas Turkey Shoot, etc. My uncles both flew fighter planes off big carriers, such as ..... I began reading about all this when I was a boy, at a time when the War was forefront in everyone's consciousness. Since then I have read hundreds of books about the War, across the whole spectrum from battle excitement to weapons engineering. It's only during the last few years that I've noted books from the Japanese side of the War. The Japanese don't write for us.

Kaigun presents an American Version of the Japanese Version.
Although written by Americans, Kaigun is about weapons technology, navy doctrine and strategy in the Japanese Navy, covering roughly the years 1875-1941. They cite Japanese sources, write about Japanese officers and staff, and they try to present the Japanese viewpoint as well as foreigners can. Americans, including me, have always found the Japanese largely impossible to understand. Even so, the authors speak Japanese, taught Japanese History, and they have worked in Japan for years. Let's give them the benefit of the doubt.

It's not a book for everyone. Most general readers will become quickly bored because there are no battles, no heroes, and the Japanese names are difficult to remember. Imagine, a book about the War in the Pacific that ends before the Pearl Harbor attack! To understand this book readers need to know their WW2 naval history, plus a little bit about naval weapons. So, this book might interest naval professionals, veterans of the Pacific War, and military historians. Perhaps engineers might like this book. They will use the book at the naval academy in Annapolis.

Some of their main themes:
1. Fixation on the climactic Fleet action. Both navies, Japanese and American, were fixated on big Fleet ideas. They expected Battleships and Heavy Cruisers ti meet in a climatic fleet action that would decide the War. Few commanders on either side could foresee the decisive role of aircraft carriers and naval air. As a result of this expectation, the Japanese built giant expensive craft, such as Kongo, Musashi and Yamato, which hardly figured in later fighting at all. This was perhaps ironic, because the big Japanese ships were faster, bigger, had more accurate guns, better trained crews, etc.

2. A Naval Arms Race. After the end of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy was obsessed with the size and composition of the larger USN. Because they could not keep up with American building, they were forced to think about doctrines to successfully fight a much larger enemy. To defeat the larger, formidable USN, the Japanese worked on their fighting doctrines for decades, and they tried to build a technologically superior, better-trained force.

3. Fractured Japanese High Command. The Japanese Army thought Japan's enemies were China, Russia, and to a lesser extent England and Holland. The Japanese Navy thought the big enemy was the United States. The Japanese never sorted out their strategic priorities because they did not have their own equivalent of our Joint Chiefs. No one, not even Hirohito could make the Army and Navy sit down together to integrate National priorities. As a result, much of the Pacific War, at least the island part, only involved the Japanese Navy. Many of the island fortresses were manned by Jap Marines, not the Japanese army, which was largely intact at the end of the War.

4. Technological Advance. Much of this book focuses on the implications of weapons and weapons advances. For example, the Japanese long lance torpedo, the range, accuracy and control of big guns, the advances in naval aviation that made carriers dangerous, night vision and night fighting.... These discussions interest me because the authors show how the hardware interacts with the doctrine and how the two of those relate to strategy. For instance, The Japanese built many good subs but too many variants to permit economies of scale in building them The Japanese subs were expected to interfere with the progress of the USN across the Pacific. But the fighting doctrine - subs versus capital ships - failed with the advent of the destroyer escort screen. Moreover, Japanese command structures did not give their commanders room to change their tactics in the heat of battle. As a result, the Japanese sub force was largely irrelevant to the course of the War.

What it all means.

To Evans and Peattie, as well as previous writers, such as H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, Empires in the Balance; for Japan to start a major war against the United States (let alone England and China) in 1941 was reckless. I can't think of an example where such a poor country, as weak as Japan, has ever fought an aggressive War against such a powerful, advanced, and well-armed defender. Even if the Japanese had destroyed everything at Pearl, the United States could have beaten Japan with one arm tied behind its back. At the War's start, America had 17 times Japan's GNP, five times Japan's steel production, seven times Japans coal production, eighty (80!) times the production capacity for motor vehicles. Besides which, Japan did not have oil or iron. During the war, the human and productive superiority of the United States quickly asserted itself. For example, the United States built 141 aircraft carriers 1941-1945 versus Japan's nine carriers! During the War, America built around 1200 warships versus Japans 167. Japan, a feather weight, was attacking a super-heavyweight.. All in all, the Japanese were mad with unrealistic dreams for empire. Emperor Hirohito should have done something to put a lid on his crazy military commanders, especially the mad-for-glory officers in his Navy Staff.

My dad and my uncles used to get together every Sunday after the War. They'd sit talking in our kitchen. They wanted to hang Hirohito and they were angry that MacArthur had spared the Emperor. If the Japanese had any sense they would have hanged Hirohito themselves! It's amazing to see that Japanese historians, even today, rush to the defense of Hirohito, such as Ienaga, Pacific War, and Iriye, Origins of Second World War in Asia. Last but not least, there's a good looking website with pictures, drawings, and commentary about the Japanese Navy in WW2, [...]

My dad graduated from the US Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1938, just in time for the War. He commanded destroyers and destroyer escorts between 1939 and 1947. He was present for many of the famous island battles, Kwajalein, Iwo Jima, Tarawa, Phillipines, Marianas Turkey Shoot, etc. My uncles both flew fighter planes off big carriers, such as ..... I began reading about all this when I was a boy, at a time when the War was forefront in everyone's consciousness. Since then I have read hundreds of books about the War, across the whole spectrum from battle excitement to weapons engineering. It's only during the last few years that I've noted books from the Japanese side of the War. The Japanese don't write for us.

Kaigun presents an American Version of the Japanese Version.
Although written by Americans, Kaigun is about weapons technology, navy doctrine and strategy in the Japanese Navy, covering roughly the years 1875-1941. They cite Japanese sources, write about Japanese officers and staff, and they try to present the Japanese viewpoint as well as foreigners can. Americans, including me, have always found the Japanese largely impossible to understand. Even so, the authors speak Japanese, taught Japanese History, and they have worked in Japan for years. Let's give them the benefit of the doubt.

It's not a book for everyone. Most general readers will become quickly bored because there are no battles, no heroes, and the Japanese names are difficult to remember. Imagine, a book about the War in the Pacific that ends before the Pearl Harbor attack! To understand this book readers need to know their WW2 naval history, plus a little bit about naval weapons. So, this book might interest naval professionals, veterans of the Pacific War, and military historians. Perhaps engineers might like this book. They will use the book at the naval academy in Annapolis.

Some of their main themes:
1. Fixation on the climactic Fleet action. Both navies, Japanese and American, were fixated on big Fleet ideas. They expected Battleships and Heavy Cruisers ti meet in a climatic fleet action that would decide the War. Few commanders on either side could foresee the decisive role of aircraft carriers and naval air. As a result of this expectation, the Japanese built giant expensive craft, such as Kongo, Musashi and Yamato, which hardly figured in later fighting at all. This was perhaps ironic, because the big Japanese ships were faster, bigger, had more accurate guns, better trained crews, etc.

2. A Naval Arms Race. After the end of the Washington Treaty, the Japanese Navy was obsessed with the size and composition of the larger USN. Because they could not keep up with American building, they were forced to think about doctrines to successfully fight a much larger enemy. To defeat the larger, formidable USN, the Japanese worked on their fighting doctrines for decades, and they tried to build a technologically superior, better-trained force.

3. Fractured Japanese High Command. The Japanese Army thought Japan's enemies were China, Russia, and to a lesser extent England and Holland. The Japanese Navy thought the big enemy was the United States. The Japanese never sorted out their strategic priorities because they did not have their own equivalent of our Joint Chiefs. No one, not even Hirohito could make the Army and Navy sit down together to integrate National priorities. As a result, much of the Pacific War, at least the island part, only involved the Japanese Navy. Many of the island fortresses were manned by Jap Marines, not the Japanese army, which was largely intact at the end of the War.

4. Technological Advance. Much of this book focuses on the implications of weapons and weapons advances. For example, the Japanese long lance torpedo, the range, accuracy and control of big guns, the advances in naval aviation that made carriers dangerous, night vision and night fighting.... These discussions interest me because the authors show how the hardware interacts with the doctrine and how the two of those relate to strategy. For instance, The Japanese built many good subs but too many variants to permit economies of scale in building them The Japanese subs were expected to interfere with the progress of the USN across the Pacific. But the fighting doctrine - subs versus capital ships - failed with the advent of the destroyer escort screen. Moreover, Japanese command structures did not give their commanders room to change their tactics in the heat of battle. As a result, the Japanese sub force was largely irrelevant to the course of the War.

What it all means.

To Evans and Peattie, as well as previous writers, such as H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, Empires in the Balance; for Japan to start a major war against the United States (let alone England and China) in 1941 was reckless. I can't think of an example where such a poor country, as weak as Japan, has ever fought an aggressive War against such a powerful, advanced, and well-armed defender. Even if the Japanese had destroyed everything at Pearl, the United States could have beaten Japan with one arm tied behind its back. At the War's start, America had 17 times Japan's GNP, five times Japan's steel production, seven times Japans coal production, eighty (80!) times the production capacity for motor vehicles. Besides which, Japan did not have oil or iron. During the war, the human and productive superiority of the United States quickly asserted itself. For example, the United States built 141 aircraft carriers 1941-1945 versus Japan's nine carriers! During the War, America built around 1200 warships versus Japans 167. Japan, a feather weight, was attacking a super-heavyweight.. All in all, the Japanese were mad with unrealistic dreams for empire. Emperor Hirohito should have done something to put a lid on his crazy military commanders, especially the mad-for-glory officers in his Navy Staff.

My dad and my uncles used to get together every Sunday after the War. They'd sit talking in our kitchen. They wanted to hang Hirohito and they were angry that MacArthur had spared the Emperor. If the Japanese had any sense they would have hanged Hirohito themselves! It's amazing to see that Japanese historians, even today, rush to the defense of Hirohito, such as Ienaga, Pacific War, and Iriye, Origins of Second World War in Asia. Last but not least, there's a good looking website with pictures, drawings, and commentary about the Japanese Navy in WW2, [...]

A few years ago I read a short book on the Pacific War written by H.P. Wilmott. For those who don't know of him, Wilmott taught at Sandhurst for many years, and is probably one of the top two or three historians of the Pacific War. At the end of the book there was an annotated bibliography. I always like this, as opposed to a regular bibliography, because the annotations tell you what the author thinks of various sources, and that in turn tells you something about his thinking. But sometimes the recommendation is more direct: you trust the author, and he tells you something is worthwhile. In this instance, he said that he wasn't sure how Pacific War historians got along before the book Kaigun was published. Needless to say I went out and got one. It's not a cheap book, there aren't used copies cheaper, there's no paperback available. It's still worth every penny, and I will tell you below why you need it.

There are, of course, a bushel and a half of books about the war in the Pacific during World War II. Many of them note that the Japanese fought the war in an unusual fashion, and most note differences in technology, strategy, tactics, and philosophy. Some of these things are vaguely explained by the differences in Western and Japanese society, but at best the explanations are vague. This leaves a huge gap in the history of the Pacific War.

Kaigun fills this gap. The authors basically explain every question of this type involving the Japanese Navy in World War II, from why their cruisers had long ranged torpedoes to why their navy's intelligence was so poor to why they insisted in planning as if the American Navy would act in particular ways (even after it had demonstrated that it would act in other ways). Much of the differences between the Japanese and American Navies stemmed from the fact that the Japanese had to modernize so quickly. This circumstance had background in that Japan had little naval tradition, and no ships really on which to base a modern navy. While this meant that Japanese Naval modernization had many pitfalls, it also had advantages, notably a lack of old traditions and hoary rivalries that plagued other nations' Naval modernization programs.

The authors spend a considerable length of time discussing Japan's wars with first China and then Russia in the early stages of their modernization. China proved little challenge in a Naval sense, but Russia was a much more formidable opponent, though the Japanese defeated them decisively. While the war itself is discussed at some length, a great deal of time is also spent discussing the aftermath, and the war's influence on Japan's strategy, tactics, and philosophy in future wars. As far as the authors are concerned, Tsushima was the principle reason the Japanese Navy spent most of the thirties planning for a major confrontation between the U.S. Navy and their own combined fleet. The latter confrontation was apparently modeled rather closely on Tsushima, which was pretty much the same strategically, though the directions and the scale were of course different.

This book is full of information, much of it not available elsewhere in English. Frankly, if you are interested in the War in the Pacific, I agree with Wilmott, adding my faint echo to his endorsement: this book is invaluable. It's also, as a side note, very well written. Highly recommended.

A few years ago I read a short book on the Pacific War written by H.P. Wilmott. For those who don't know of him, Wilmott taught at Sandhurst for many years, and is probably one of the top two or three historians of the Pacific War. At the end of the book there was an annotated bibliography. I always like this, as opposed to a regular bibliography, because the annotations tell you what the author thinks of various sources, and that in turn tells you something about his thinking. But sometimes the recommendation is more direct: you trust the author, and he tells you something is worthwhile. In this instance, he said that he wasn't sure how Pacific War historians got along before the book Kaigun was published. Needless to say I went out and got one. It's not a cheap book, there aren't used copies cheaper, there's no paperback available. It's still worth every penny, and I will tell you below why you need it.

There are, of course, a bushel and a half of books about the war in the Pacific during World War II. Many of them note that the Japanese fought the war in an unusual fashion, and most note differences in technology, strategy, tactics, and philosophy. Some of these things are vaguely explained by the differences in Western and Japanese society, but at best the explanations are vague. This leaves a huge gap in the history of the Pacific War.

Kaigun fills this gap. The authors basically explain every question of this type involving the Japanese Navy in World War II, from why their cruisers had long ranged torpedoes to why their navy's intelligence was so poor to why they insisted in planning as if the American Navy would act in particular ways (even after it had demonstrated that it would act in other ways). Much of the differences between the Japanese and American Navies stemmed from the fact that the Japanese had to modernize so quickly. This circumstance had background in that Japan had little naval tradition, and no ships really on which to base a modern navy. While this meant that Japanese Naval modernization had many pitfalls, it also had advantages, notably a lack of old traditions and hoary rivalries that plagued other nations' Naval modernization programs.

The authors spend a considerable length of time discussing Japan's wars with first China and then Russia in the early stages of their modernization. China proved little challenge in a Naval sense, but Russia was a much more formidable opponent, though the Japanese defeated them decisively. While the war itself is discussed at some length, a great deal of time is also spent discussing the aftermath, and the war's influence on Japan's strategy, tactics, and philosophy in future wars. As far as the authors are concerned, Tsushima was the principle reason the Japanese Navy spent most of the thirties planning for a major confrontation between the U.S. Navy and their own combined fleet. The latter confrontation was apparently modeled rather closely on Tsushima, which was pretty much the same strategically, though the directions and the scale were of course different.

This book is full of information, much of it not available elsewhere in English. Frankly, if you are interested in the War in the Pacific, I agree with Wilmott, adding my faint echo to his endorsement: this book is invaluable. It's also, as a side note, very well written. Highly recommended.

This is a solid, comprehensively researched explication of strategic naval decisions that led Japan to WWII. It dispels the notion that Japan went to war against interest because of "victory disease" and "war fever." It corrects the idea that the navy was less culpable than the army, and documents the role that posturing for appropriations played in the decisions that led to Pearl Harbor. It repeats familiar ironies, such as the fact that Japan would have obtained its goals if it had not attacked the U.S. But there are unfamiliar ironies, too--for example, Japan went to war to obtain oil, primarily for its navy, but diverted so much new construction into building its navy (70%) that it had little capacity to transport oil from Sumatra back to Japan. The book covers major failures in Japan's preparations--failure to put research on a war footing, to subject army and navy to central command, to use photo intelligence, to adjust strategy, to avoid a war of attrition with a foe more capable of carrying on such a war, to solve supply and logistics problems, and to use submarines effectively. It also notes Japanese successes--night torpedo attack, optics. It's scholarly: Who uses "inter alia" anymore, even in print? Nonetheless, its style, voluminous footnotes and extensive bibliography make it useful to those with armchair and scholarly interests alike. This book pulls many loose threads together; for that reason, it will be most useful to those who have read many other books about WWII in the Pacific.

Gentleman, in one word Japan lost the war because of: No Money. By that I mean they don't have the resources or vision to fight a protracted war. That explains why the vaulted Zero is so lightly built in becauae they can't afford a high power engine. They don't have the money to finance the infra structure, like a fleet of bulldozers to build airstrips faster, so they have to be light to fly much longer distance to compensate for the lack of facilities. There is also not enough resource to exploit the technolgy on the horizon, like radar so their surface fighting vessels have to rely on the romantic and gallant (in their minds) night fighting skills to address the material imbalance. It is like an Indian who is skilled in shooting arrows on horseback but fails to adapt to the rapidly evolving battle scene. They fought a poor man's war against the comparatively lavishly equipped US Navy, of course the outcoming is to no one's surprise. If you ask any Japanese born before the war, most of them would maintain they lost the war on the material front, not giving an inch in their fighting spirit and prowness (maybe so). Yes they are too proud to admit or blind to the concept that Imperial Japan's intent is vile, nothing more than brutal slavery to the people in their new found colonies.

Gentleman, in one word Japan lost the war because of: No Money. By that I mean they don't have the resources or vision to fight a protracted war. That explains why the vaulted Zero is so lightly built in becauae they can't afford a high power engine. They don't have the money to finance the infra structure, like a fleet of bulldozers to build airstrips faster, so they have to be light to fly much longer distance to compensate for the lack of facilities. There is also not enough resource to exploit the technolgy on the horizon, like radar so their surface fighting vessels have to rely on the romantic and gallant (in their minds) night fighting skills to address the material imbalance. It is like an Indian who is skilled in shooting arrows on horseback but fails to adapt to the rapidly evolving battle scene. They fought a poor man's war against the comparatively lavishly equipped US Navy, of course the outcoming is to no one's surprise. If you ask any Japanese born before the war, most of them would maintain they lost the war on the material front, not giving an inch in their fighting spirit and prowness (maybe so). Yes they are too proud to admit or blind to the concept that Imperial Japan's intent is vile, nothing more than brutal slavery to the people in their new found colonies.

Kaigun sets the stage of the Pacific war and essentially ends when the curtain rises in December of 1941 . It provides the context required to understand the actions of Japanese commanders and their weapons during subsequent naval battles .
The book is a wonderful blend of doctrinal and technical development . One is left with a clear understanding of advancements in technology and how they would be utilized in a naval conflict . The Japanese view of America as it's potential foe was extremely significant and can be seen as the dangers of a "self fulfilling prophecy" .
I loved the technical history and found it to be comprehensive without getting mired in too much depth or detail . A very readable book that is a vital resource to any fan of naval history in general or the Imperial Japanese Navy in particular .

In this day of asymmetric warfare, the history of the Japanese navy hardly seems relevant, but this book is so well-written it should be read by all strategists. It very effortlessly opens the eyes of the reader to the transformative processes that brought Japan out of the shadows of an antiquated feudal system into the forefront of military prowess in the span of less than 100 years. That alone merits the read of this book. But it clearly shows how Japan's military intellectuals adapted western thought and technology and fused western military and political rules with the classic ideals of Asian military strategy. There is a lot to be learned from seeing how the process worked in Japan. And in our ever-changing world, there is always a lot to be learned from the successes of others in adaptation and fusion of ideas and strategies.