In the preface to COTC, much is made of the fact that few books have been written about the greatest sea batttle in Navy history. Samuel Eliot Morison's official history is mentioned, and then dismissed, as faulty. The implication is that COTC is the answer to the gap in histories of the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

It isn't.

The most glaring gap, as others have mentioned, is that only one map is included, and that map is of such large scale to be nearly useless. Today, with computer graphics and data bases, there is no excuse for military histories not to have maps sufficient to illustrate the major themes of the work.

The structure of the text seems intended to be dramatic, pulling bits and pieces of Tillman's research into a flow that illustrates the background, buildup, and conduct of the battle. The bits and pieces seem intended for the MTV generation--they are short, choppy, and do not always relate well to each other. They are, however, entertaining if not always illuminating.

In trying to cover so many aspects of the battle, COTC flits from topic to topic, uses vignettes to illustrate larger and more complex aspects, and emphasizes drama over content. The drama is fetching, but depth and texture suffer.

In conclusion, there is still a need for a definitive history of the Mariana's Turkey Shoot, but COTC is not it.

Barrett Tillman's Clash of the Carriers is an in-depth study of the fifth -- last, and largest -- carrier battle of World War II: the Battle of the Philippine Sea or better known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot. The book was interesting from the start, read well and was hard to put down.

One of the things I liked about the book was its coverage of all aspects of the battle: war making potential, the leadership on both sides, oil, submarines, logistics, the fleet anchorages, recon floatplanes, shipboard and airborne radar, anti-aircraft guns and escort screen, the aircraft, aircraft carriers, flight deck operations, pilot and aircrew training and experience, carrier operations, what happened to the surviving ships and people, search and rescue, and the Marianas today.

The primary impression I came away with was how overmatched the Japanese were in this battle, only a year and a half distant from the Guadalcanal carrier battles of late 1942, when both sides were evenly matched in terms of aircraft, aircrew and operational quality as well as force size.

The situation was drastically different at the Marianas in June 1944. Of Task Force 58's 15 aircraft carriers, all were 1943 and early 1944 new construction except for 1942 veteran Enterprise. Task Force 58 had twice as many carrier aircraft as the IJN Mobile Fleet and its new Hellcat fighters were superior to the old Zero. American squadrons were sprinkled with combat veterans but even those with no combat experience had 500-700 hours of flight time. Spruance had such air power that he was able to gain air superiority over the Marianas on the first day - June 11, soften up Saipan with bombers prior to the invasion on June 15, temporarily detach seven carriers to beat up Iwo Jima - and then fight the major carrier battle on June 19-20. After the battle, Task Force 58 went back to Iwo Jima and beyond, illustrating the TF 58's staying power.

Furthermore, by June 1944 the U.S. Navy had perfected its air defense system. Flight directors - stock traders had been found to make the best FDOs because they were good at juggling resources quickly while under pressure -- vectored Hellcats onto "bogies" 50+ miles away from the task force by radio based on their radar plots. For close-in defense, the U.S. carriers and their battleships, cruisers and destroyers escorts were bristling with anti-aircraft guns whose fire control radar and proximity fused shells made them four times more accurate than sight-directed guns with "dumb" shells.

U.S. submarines were dominant as well, alerting Spruance that the Japanese were coming, and sinking two of the three big Japanese carriers: Taiho and Shokaku.

The Japanese brought to the fight nine carriers carrying 430 aircraft. But their Zero fighter was the same as what they started the war with - and markedly inferior to the Hellcat. Most of their experienced naval aviators had been lost in the South Pacific meat grinder. The successors had minimal training and little experience.

By this stage of the war, Japanese reconnaissance flights were near suicide missions. FDOs would see them on radar and vector Hellcats to shoot them down. However, if a recon plane didn't return, the Japanese knew there was probably a carrier in the vicinity.

On June 19th, the Japanese got in the first blow. But their attack groups were stunned to be intercepted by swarms of Hellcats 70 miles out from their target and attacked the rest of the way in. The few survivors then had to face a wall of steel from the surface escorts. Finally, the remnants were again attacked by Hellcats when they tried to land on Guam. How lopsided was the battle? The Japanese went into the battle with 430 carrier aircraft. They left with 35.

On the second day, June 20th, TF58 launched an attack on the retreating Mobile Fleet at maximum range knowing their planes would have to land in the dark. The book portrays well American planes attacking the Japanese fleet at sunset, scores of planes running out of gas and ditching, and pilots desperately trying to land on any flight deck they could find in the dark.

The hand-writing was on the wall after the battle. The Japanese knew B-29 bombers based out of the Marianas would be within range of the homeland. Their carrier air force was finished. The U.S. did not know it, though, and only a mistake at Leyte Gulf would allow the Japanese to engage the one decisive weapon they had left -- their battleships and cruisers - and come near to achieving a victory. The Japanese should have surrendered after the Marianas, but didn't, and hundreds of thousands died and Japan was bombed to rubble before the inevitable surrender.

Tillman supports Spruance's decision to stay with the transports and absorb the first strike as opposed to going after Mobile Fleet.

All in all, the book does a great job of informing the reader on all aspects of the largest carrier battle ever fought: the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Barrett Tillman's Clash of the Carriers is an in-depth study of the fifth -- last, and largest -- carrier battle of World War II: the Battle of the Philippine Sea or better known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot. The book was interesting from the start, read well and was hard to put down.

One of the things I liked about the book was its coverage of all aspects of the battle: war making potential, the leadership on both sides, oil, submarines, logistics, the fleet anchorages, recon floatplanes, shipboard and airborne radar, anti-aircraft guns and escort screen, the aircraft, aircraft carriers, flight deck operations, pilot and aircrew training and experience, carrier operations, what happened to the surviving ships and people, search and rescue, and the Marianas today.

The primary impression I came away with was how overmatched the Japanese were in this battle, only a year and a half distant from the Guadalcanal carrier battles of late 1942, when both sides were evenly matched in terms of aircraft, aircrew and operational quality as well as force size.

The situation was drastically different at the Marianas in June 1944. Of Task Force 58's 15 aircraft carriers, all were 1943 and early 1944 new construction except for 1942 veteran Enterprise. Task Force 58 had twice as many carrier aircraft as the IJN Mobile Fleet and its new Hellcat fighters were superior to the old Zero. American squadrons were sprinkled with combat veterans but even those with no combat experience had 500-700 hours of flight time. Spruance had such air power that he was able to gain air superiority over the Marianas on the first day - June 11, soften up Saipan with bombers prior to the invasion on June 15, temporarily detach seven carriers to beat up Iwo Jima - and then fight the major carrier battle on June 19-20. After the battle, Task Force 58 went back to Iwo Jima and beyond, illustrating the staying power of the TF 58's massive force.

Furthermore, by June 1944 the U.S. Navy had perfected its air defense system. Flight directors - stock traders had been found to make the best FDOs because they were good at juggling resources quickly while under pressure -- vectored Hellcats onto "bogies" 50+ miles away from the task force by radio based on their radar plots. For close-in defense, the U.S. carriers and their battleships, cruisers and destroyers escorts were bristling with anti-aircraft guns whose fire control radar and proximity fused shells made them four times more accurate that sight-directed guns with "dumb" shells.

U.S. submarines were dominant as well, alerting Spruance that the Japanese were coming, and sinking two of the three big Japanese carriers: Taiho and Shokaku.

The Japanese brought to the fight nine carriers carrying 430 aircraft. But their Zero fighter was the same as what they started the war with - and markedly inferior to the Hellcat. Most of their experienced naval aviators had been lost in the South Pacific meat grinder. The successors had minimal training and little experience.

By this stage of the war, Japanese reconnaissance flights were near suicide missions. FDOs would see them on radar and vector Hellcats to shoot them down. However, if a recon plane didn't return, the Japanese knew there was probably a carrier in the vicinity.

On June 19th, the Japanese got in the first strike. But their attack groups were stunned to be intercepted by swarms of Hellcats 70 miles out from their target and attacked the rest of the way in. The few survivors then had to face a wall of steel from the surface escorts. Finally, the remnants were again attacked by Hellcats when they tried to land on Guam. How lopsided was the battle? The Japanese went into the battle with 430 carrier aircraft. They left with 35.

On the second day, June 20th, TF58 launched an attack on the retreating Mobile Fleet at maximum range knowing their planes would have to land in the dark. The book portrays well American planes attacking the Japanese fleet at sunset, scores of planes running out of gas and ditching, and pilots desperately trying to land on any flight deck they could find in the dark.

The hand-writing was on the wall after the battle. The Japanese knew B-29 bombers based out of the Marianas would be within range of the homeland. Their carrier air force was finished. The U.S. did not know it, though, and only a mistake at Leyte Gulf would allow the Japanese to engage the one decisive weapon they had left -- their battleships and cruisers - and come near to achieving a victory. The Japanese should have surrendered after the Marianas, but didn't, and hundreds of thousands died and Japan bombed to rubble before the inevitable surrender.

Tillman supports Spruance's decision to stay with the transport and absorb the first strike as opposed to going after Mobile Fleet.

All in all, the book does a great job of informing the reader on all aspects of the largest carrier battle ever fought: the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

This book is a fantastic read. There are two points that make it very interesting. The first is that you can see the agony of decision at every level. The second is the fair portrayal of the courage and determination of the Japanese Navy. As names and equipment parade thru the book, it is loaded with details. You will enjoy this book from front to back. Remember, this book is not simply a recitation of facts. It's a picture of a time and place where carriers clashed.

Maybe I went in with unrealistic expectations. Tillman's writing style is very dry and dare I say it, boring. That may be due to his subject matter. I can't fault the awesome compilation of facts and detailed information here. It's obvious he researched the subject thoroughly, but I wish his writing was more kinetic and lively in nature. For example, I like the presentation of 'Flags of our Fathers' and 'A Bridge Too Far' much better than this. And, as other reviewers have suggested, battle maps would have been a huge plus.