Barton Biggs compresses centuries of world history, a phenomenal history of markets, and a heavy dose of investment theory into a very readable primer on how to protect your wealth in times of trouble. The book shows where losers fared ok (land kept it's value in WW2 France despite the trouble) as well as where investors did best in winning economies (example: the US). The book covers economic impacts of military decisions, where financial markets outsmarted public opinion, and where they failed. To keep the book interesting, there's a healthy dose of gossip.

The book closes with Barton's suggestions on the best means to act defensively for when the Barbarians approach the gates. He's heavy on equities, with other practical advice (buy a farm, keep your valuables at home, keep some money abroad in advance).

Is this the best history book you can find? Probably not. Is it the best investing book you can find? Again, probably not. Does the book intertwine finance, history and investing in an interesting manner? Most definitely.

It is an age-old notion. The investing public provides liquidity to the "smart money." A mainstay on every investor's bookshelf, Charles Mackay'sExtraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, argues "men ... think in herds."

Barton Biggs, former chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley before leaving in 2003 to form hedge fund Traxis Partners, questions this conventional and pejorative notion in Wealth, War & Wisdom. Using World War II as a backdrop, he shows the equity markets in the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan identified the conflict's turning points with uncanny precision.

The stock market, he argues, represents the collective conclusion of multiple motivated judgment of a diverse, independent and decentralized sample. He joins James Surowiecki in The Wisdom of Crowds and Michael Maubossian in More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places (Updated and Expanded), to plead a powerful case for paying attention to the markets' underlying message.

Biggs is no historian. He is, however, well-read and a deep thinker. He weaves military history, market action, maps and charts to illustrate his moral. Hardly radical, it is detailed and convincingly argued: A long-term strategy is the best way for ordinary investors to build and maintain wealth.

This is a book every serious investor should read and ponder. It is an original, absorbing and thought-provoking primer on wealth creation. Today's actions aggregated with others provide powerful clues to your financial future.

This is an outstanding book. If you are really interested in wealth and war, you will not be able to put this book down. I know of no other book that explains in detail what may happen to stocks and bonds in time of war, based on what did actually happen in the 21st Century. Well written and very well researched.

It took me a long time to get around to reading "Wealth, War & Wisdom." The title was the lure, but the description made me pause. The book is primarily geared to those interested in the stock market, investors and the like. As the king of the malaprops, Samuel Goldwyn, once said, "Include me out." I do not follow the stock market. I do not invest in the stock market. I do not trust the stock market. I do not know anyone who does invest in the stock market. Frankly, I consider the stock market a playground for the idle rich, and Barton Biggs' book has done nothing to convince me otherwise.

Despite my lack of interest in the stock market, "Wealth, War & Wisdom" was an interesting read. The author's focus is on World War II and how the events of that devastating global event shaped the stock market. Biggs believes there are valuable lessons to be learned from a study of that earlier era that can help investors keep and build their wealth when the next calamity occurs. In this post 9/11 world, there are plenty of doomsayers who are anticipating another cataclysmic event of global proportions that will lead to wide-scale civil disorder. Biggs, it turns out, is among them, and his final chapter pretty much recommends running for the hills (okay, a farm in a remote area) with plenty of "canned food, wine, medicine and clothes," as well as "a stash of automatic weapons that you know how to use in case roving bands of hungry barbarian brigands show up."

An alarmist? You bet, but no more than I was in my 1999 book "Surviving Y2K." But ultimately, "Wealth, War & Wisdom" has somewhat limited appeal. The first word in the title is the most significant. This is a book for the wealthy - the rich who can afford a farm in some remote area, as well as the "stash of automatic weapons" and know how to "diversify (their) fortune." I mean, really, who else but a rich guy, and a snobby one at that, would recommend "wine" as a survival item?

My own economic situation is likely to make me one of those hungry barbarians in search of Biggs' canned food (I'll take the wine, too. What the hell?) So while "Wealth, War & Wisdom" is a handy guide for those who are wealthy, it might also serve as a guide for the rest of us, the hungry barbarians who will be storming the gates of his fortress in search of those canned goods he's selfishly harboring. We know he'll have automatic weapons to defend his stash. Therefore, we know we'll need automatic weapons to take it away from him. Thank you, Mr. Biggs, for the advance warning. I appreciate it.

Brian W. Fairbanks

Unlike his prior books which I enjoyed, this one disappoints. It might make a good PHD thesis but fails to provide any practical advice for the investor .

Wealth, War, and Wisdom is an excellent book about the history of WWII. Author Biggs proves his thesis in just a few pages: The stock markets of the various nations involved in the war knew far better than the man on the street which way the war was really headed, often predating the good or bad news by months or even years. Ninety percent of this book is a rehash of the history at various points of the war, with ten percent given over to prove his thesis. Especially recommended for business readers who spend all their time in the here-and-now, this book will give them a new appreciation of our history and the efficiency of the world's financial markets.

This book is an interesting read, and should be of interest to a wide range of readers. With Mr. Boggs background as a market strategist, he has some interesting insights and points of view that will trigger critical thinking in many people who decide to take up this book. I recommend it.

As someone who researches military history, and invests in stock market shares, I was interested in seeing the two, laid side-by-side. Mr. Biggs is on an important and novel track by juxtaposing war/political events and securities trading; he summarizes the course of WWII (and much of the first half of the 20th Century relating to it, e.g., the Weimar economy or post-war Japan and Korea).

(As regards Weimar, Biggs notes, "The message for wealth preservation is important. Hyper-inflation occurs from time to time, and basically it is one of the Four Horsemen in drag.")

I am reviewing from an advance uncorrected-proof copy, so I can overlook the typos and the missing diagrams (which may prove to be highly useful to illuminate the discussion, once included in the first edition). Still, I hope that subsequent editions might correct some of the leaps in narrative: in one page he goes from the 1937 U.S. recession, to the 1987 stock crash, to Adm. Yamamoto's time as naval attaché in Washington - in three successive paragraphs.

To be sure, the author admits he is not a military historian, so I can accept the anecdotal parts (that is, the "war stories" about generals and political leaders), with what happened, contemporaneously, to securities markets. Still, I would have liked to have had some insight, say, into what the $3 billion gamble on Boeing's B-29 program, or Goodyear's getting drafted into building Corsair fighters, did to their value per share. Or, for that matter, I'm curious how he can talk about postwar Japanese property values (i.e., under MacArthur and later) and not talk about the Bretton Woods economic system, which was (for better or ill) one of the most decisive results of that war. I could've used less of isolated incidents like the Jervis Bay naval battle and more on British commodity shortages, which were what the enemy was trying to create by interdicting the convoys. He does, however, cover the losses of fortunes in Italy, France, Germany and Eastern Europe in some detail and insight -- even evoking, in passing, the Gone With The Wind misfortunes of the Civil War South as a comparison. Scarlett O'Hara was fortunate not to have her estate outside, say, Krakow.

Mr. Biggs is very worthwhile when he gets into how wars (and post-war periods) can create, destroy, or shelter wealth - not just securities but real property, art, gold, and cash. He shows how land can survive a war or be expropriated by the winners, and how shares can (at least overall, judging by his research) prove worthwhile over the long term. It helps, as he shows, if you don't lose a war, don't go into debt financing one, try to diversify your wealth and have an escape hatch -- your nest egg isn't worth much if you don't catch the last plane out of the capital and you wind up behind barbed wire.

His lessons on how wealth is destroyed in wartime are more and more insightful in the final chapters, and perhaps worth wading through the back-and-forth war stories. Indeed, Mr. Biggs has started a new discussion of comparative history and economics, from the viewpoint of the frontline investor, and the book's lasting value may be in sparking more research and discussion.

I found Bigg's writing style clunky and unconvincing- think college freshman's first essay. I think I understood the thesis, but that was more because of the liner notes- presumably written by an editor- than the author's elucidation in the introduction. I couldn't get past the feeling that he was so repetitive because he had a page quota to meet.

What completely lost me was his assertion that because the investors in the stock market could be assumed to be well-educated and moneyed, their group actions should, by extension, be given more weight than those of any other groups. Aside from being elitist, it seemed at odds with the "group think" he took such pains to defend as valid.

Interesting theory- someone else should give it a stab.

The number of typos in this book clearly show the proof reader had a problem staying conscious when reading this book. The worthwhile content would have easily fit into a two page magazine article. Barton, a WW enthusiast, rambles. He feels no compunction to actually back up any statements, because he's forewarned you, in fund manager small print style, he is not really an historian. He goes off topic and down lanes of thought that end up nowhere.

Barton's thesis (if it really deserves such a lofty title) is that stock-markets are great predictors of world conflict victors. He believes in the "wisdom' of the crowd. The crowd is really just those who control the majority of money (ie fund managers), so this is a rather small crowd, but I guess they can afford to pay for the best information.

He's retired and clearly hasn't got anything better to do with his time, only read this if you are in a similar situation with cash to burn.

This is a review of the events of World War II (WWII) and its impact on the stock market worldwide. This work is of great interest since we live in post 9/11 era filled with conflict, threat of another world war and increasing scarcity of resources. The book chronicles the history of death, destruction and the grim realities of WWII in great detail and its impact on stock market in both losing and winning countries. Stock markets were always one step ahead of actual events in estimating, analyzing, and deciphering the economic future through changing stock prices. The author suggests that investor crowd always had a great intuitive wisdom and imagination: Stock markets are like voting machines.

There are some very interesting tales of how stock markets performed during critical stages of the war. Just before the battle of Britain in 1940 the British markets bottomed out; the German market peaked after the attack on Russia; and in October 1937 the American markets collapsed and exactly 50 years later in Oct 1987, the same fate engulfed the stock market. Part of problems in 1937 may be due to President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court and his agenda of balanced budget when the country was still reeling from Great Depression. This is quite an interesting study of history and vividly describes the strategies and attitudes of leaders like Hitler, Churchill, Stalin and President Roosevelt. Stalin's ruthlessness against his own people resulted in the loss of four-and-half million lives between 1936 and 1939. There is also an interesting tale of how President Harry Truman's letter to Washington Post music critic Paul Hume when he gave unpleasant review of his daughter's concert. President Truman's letter gave the stock market a great scare which goes to prove an apparently insignificant incident could foolishly impact the investor's decisions.

What is the take home message of this review; according to the author, diversify your fortune and anticipate troubles and pay close attention to stock markets. Equities are the place to be in the long run because of their proven ability to increase the purchasing power of capital. Another part of your diversification strategy is to own a farm or a ranch as an insurance policy. The control of food producing land is a basic instinct of mankind. Stockpiling some essentials like canned food, wine, medicine, and clothes is not a bad idea if you have learnt something from the events of WWII in Germany, Russia and elsewhere in Europe. The author is vivid in depicting the grim realities in metaphor; when Four horsemen of the Apocalypse; Pestilence, War, Famine, and Death visit this planet again. Imagine the possibilities, in fact there is a great deal to learn from the history.

1. The Great Crash 1929
2. The Stock Market Crash of 1929: Dawn of the Great Depression (American Disasters)
3. The Second Great Depression
4. The Great Depression: America 1929-1941
5. Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1940: How Americans Lived Through the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression
6. FDR's Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression
7. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (Wiley Investment Classics)
8. Rhetoric As Currency: Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Great Depression (Presidential Rhetoric Series, 4)
9. Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression 1920-1941 (Norton Twentieth Century America Series)

Barton Biggs does an excellent job of analyzing the interplay between investments and stock exchanges and events in World War II. He details the histories of countries that were victorious, as well as occupied countries and the Axis countries who were the aggressors and then the vanquished. Throughout the book he intersperses the performance of stocks and bonds as they relate to the events of the times.

His thesis is that the stock market is a great anticipator of turning points in the war. Stock prices hit their highs or lows months before conventional wisdom, the press, and even the statesmen and leaders saw a turning point. For example, British market made their lows in June 1940 whereas events were still gloomy and exceedingly pessimistic, with even the survival of Britain in doubt. On the other hand, German stocks peaked before Hitler's attack on Russia was stalled, during a time when many thought taking Russia would be a cakewalk and well before Stalingrad.

These types of correlations can only be obtained by hindsight though, and exceedingly hard for investors to catch the turning point.

The rest of the book reads like a fascinating history of World War II, the battles, the personalities, and the intrigues. Mr. Biggs also portrays the intense human sufferings, and the great loss and destroyer of wealth and livelihood that war inflicts on all its participants. In the last few chapters he gives advice on what to do to prepare for another such type of disaster in the future. Keeping a small farm stocked with food, medicine and automatic weapons that you can use; in a location easily accessible to you, but not too close to major population centers. Yet even with preparations it is unlikely for most people to escape the harm and devastation of the next major world war. If it is thermonuclear, I doubt that the farm will survive the fallout. And with transportation destroyed, you couldn't get to it anyway or fight off the people who had already arrived there ahead of you.

Biggs also offers advice on portfolio diversification, keeping some gold and jewelry, some farmland, as well as currency diversification. He also analyzes what worked and didn't work for survivors of World War II. Mostly it was luck, coupled with healthy paranoia. Those who didn't believe that things would get worse oftentimes stayed back and perished. They were too greedy, or reluctant to leave healthy businesses, or to sell at a loss, ended up losing everything, including their lives. In some sense this is the same behavior people face in a bear market. Only in the case of war, invasion and occupation by an enemy, history has shown that those who were willing to cut their losses and escape to a safer country, even with the loss of most of their wealth, were able to survive whereas those who dawdled or were in denial, lost everything.

From the author that pre-eminently called the dotCom tech bubble before most others comes another unqiquely qualified perspective on how the world economic paradigm was rewritten by the victory's of World War II.

With broad factoids ranging from the impacts to post war Japanese real estate market to the hidden detriments of the Marshall Plan, Biggs ties it all together in a manner that makes economics interesting.

Others have said and I also agree the writing can be choppy at times, be patient and finish the chapter if you can and you'll realize how the disjointed tangents converge to make some stellar points.

Just finished Wealth, War and Wisdom. It explores a subject worth thinking about - the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse recur with regularity throughout history and the issue of how to protect one's family and "wealth" are worth considering when thinking about the long term future. Bigg's book offers a superficial exploration of 20th Century conflicts particularly WWII - not a bad refresher on the history. However, much of his history appears derived from some quality historical fiction that he's read -often cited in his work. As far as insight on the topic ..there is little beyond - "buy a remote farm or ranch" and "keep some money offshore" -not exactly rocket-science level insight.

Unfortunately the book screams "superficial" both in the topics covered and the advice offered. It seems like the product of a typical investment manager's extrapolation of some success in the market to having real "wisdom" in other aspects of life. Perhaps the classic line of the book refers to Winston Churchill on the evening of Pearl Harbor --- here's Bigg's observation: " Great men, like investment managers, sometimes face emotionally enervating private life distractions even as they are facing life or death professional crises." Need I say more?

and knows especially little about international economic history and wartime economics.

Given that I have little or no knowledge about the topic at hand, I have no idea how accurate or real most of the stuff is in this book, but what is there is presented in a way that's easy enough to understand.

I wish I could give a better or more detailed/accurate review, but quite honestly, my knowledge is such that this book could be the most brilliant economic/historical theory on WWII international economics, or the most bloviated, inaccurate conspiratorial nincompoopery. I just don't know.

I don't feel it it is the latter, and enough of this seems to ring true and jive with what I do of other parts of WWII history though, so I think this is pretty much on the up and up. Some other reviewers here seem to disagree, and think it's not very accurate. I don't know.

But I do believe that, at least for me, it was well worth reading and opened my brain to a lot of new information, and has given me finally some kind of framework on which to start hanging more analyses of economics of the period, and to help me see America and the world in a more holistic way with the knowledge I already possessed about other aspects of history.

I'll have to see in the future, after reading other books on this topic, how this turns out in comparison to others.

I have long wanted to understand more just how economies work in wartime, especially in countries under occupation, how inflation works, how moving most industrial capacity into wartime needs and away from consumer goods, food distribution, and how a defeated country rebuilds and starts a new economy and how the world reacts to it. That kind of stuff blows my mind, and I'm glad I finally read something about it.

I'm sorry I can't be more helpful in this review, but all I can really say is this: as a person who knows very little about economic history and economic theory in general, I am glad I read this book, I was able to follow it, and it gave me a lot of new knowledge and I'm very glad I read it because it's short enough to get through, even though it is clearly not the end-all be-all treatise that this topic deserves.

I didn't follow the rhyme or reason of this book well enough. There's what seems to be excessive detail on this or that World War II battle or person, far more than would be necessary to make sense of stock market reactions. How much does on need to know about the sinking of the Bismarck? Or some of the jokes attributed to Churchill?

To what extent will World War II lessons apply to any later disruptions? There is, for example, no mention of the impact of Vietnam War events or spending on the stock markets.

The concluding section of this book, to anticipate the impact of possible impending disruptions, is relatively brief: the historical war chapter on the Coral Sea and Midway, on the other hand, is much longer. This kind of uneven weighing seems common. There's a lot of information of different levels kinds (battle, personality, financial results by country) and levels of detail but it seems to lack a coordinating hand or any sign that one will be soon forthcoming. I was left with the impression that there must be better much histories of World War II, much better histories of the performances of financial markets during warfare, and much better survivalist warnings. Not that this book couldn't eventually be one or more of these but it would seem to have a long way to go before being even any one of these.

Plenty of mention of war and wealth but wisdom seems too lacking. It's hard to imagine without even considerable rewriting and editing how this book could be considered for publication anytime soon.

i found this book very interesting. the history included some details that are not easily found on the history channel. most of the historical information is included however in basic history texts and the international history channel. the tie in between historical events and finances was lacking. he kept referring to given historical events being perceived or predicted by markets. tables required elaboration. he offered suggestions to the reader on how to keep, manage, hide wealth during a crisis such as WW2. that was helpful. the advice on valuing was also helpful. he did not include information on who profited from WW2 - American, German and others ... i really wanted to see who did and how they did so ... the book tended to ramble and was not cogently tied together.

The premise of this book is an interesting and sound one, but there is a repeated failure to stay on message. Over the course of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the financial markets have been a measuring stick as to how well economies are functioning. Biggs uses historical data, both in financial markets and events to draw a correlation and argue that the group wisdom of the financial markets was an excellent predictor of the progress of wars.
In particular he cites the performance of the London markets in 1940 and 1941 and the German markets in 1942. In 1940 and 1941, England appeared doomed to defeat at the hands of the Germans. Alone and almost unarmed, she stood against the German armies that appeared unbeatable. Yet, the financial markets seemed to realize early on that ultimate victory was likely, as the London stock market started moving up in late 1940. In the late 1930's and until the Allied bombing of the major cities later in the war, the German economy was the most robust in the world. However, the German markets seemed to realize that defeat was likely in late 1942, starting a slide that never ended. Markets in other countries such as France, Italy and Japan are also mentioned.
There are several problems with the premise that financial markets were predictors of the outcome of the war. Mass psychology is cyclic and generally overreacts to serious news, either positive or negative. Therefore, if you make the reasonable assumption that the markets swung too far out of equilibrium, then the results were simply a major correction. The subsequent events simply reinforced the correction.
In the summer of 1940, the British army had fled the European continent and France was prostrate. This incredibly bad news would drive the London markets to an artificial low. Therefore, as 1940 wore on and the expected German invasion did not happen, there would be a natural return of optimism, despite the air and sea battles. Any news other than invasion and surrender had to be considered good.
From September, 1939 until December, 1941, the German armies were invincible, conquering everything in their path. This would naturally cause the German markets to react with exuberance. The first inklings of possible defeat began in the late fall of 1941, when the German forces started having to fight a sea of mud and the brutal Russian winter set in. These events, which were the chink in the aura of German invincibility, would only expand as the United States entered the war against Germany in December of 1941. The whole strategy of the German forces was to deal the Soviet Union a paralyzing defeat in 1941 and when that did not happen in 1941, all realistic people understood that the opportunity was gone. The wealthy class in Germany, as did the professional military, knew that while there might be a negotiated peace with the Soviet Union, in late 1941, total victory was no longer possible. Therefore, it was quite natural for the German markets to decline.
Biggs also spends too much ink in describing the history of the wars. Knowledge of the brutality of the Soviet Army as they invaded Germany, the actions of the German occupation authorities in the countries they overran, how steadfast Winston Churchill was and the events leading to the outbreak of the Korean war are presented in too much detail The material becomes more a lesson in military history than one of how the financial markets reacted to war news.
Finally, Biggs closes with a statement about how to protect wealth in the event of a major social upheaval. He recommends that you store your wealth in a remote safe haven. "Assume a breakdown of the civilized infrastructure. Your safe haven must be self-sufficient and capable of growing food. It should be well-stocked with seed, canned food, wine medicine, and clothes. There should be a stash of automatic weapons that you know how to use in case roving bands of hungry barbarian brigands show up." This is alarmist and neglects the historical fact that all of the instances cited in the book are due to wars between nations. He does mention Islamic extremists, but they are no threat to the survival of any Western nation.

Barton Briggs is a "legendary Wall Street investor" (back cover). He is a 30-year veteran of Morgan Stanley where at various times he was ranked at the number U.S. investment strategist. He was part of a 5-man team that ran Morgan Stanley from 1996-2000 and now is a co-founder of Traxis Partners. In addition to financial interests he has an amateur interest in World War Two history and so this book sets out to discover how people preserved wealth (or not) during the darkest period of upheaval in the 20th century, the five years between 1938-43 (by 1944 and 45 the Allies victory was just a matter of time). Through this historical examination he hopes to find parallels to our own time and steps to preserve wealth in the face of near-term crisis, whatever it may be.

Some of the "Wisdom" that Biggs uncovers is "Wisdom of the Crowd". He shows how stock markets during WWII transitioned from a bottom (or peak) at key historical points: in England the market bottomed out in 1940 just before the Battle of Britain; in Germany the markets peaked in December 1941 at the gates of Moscow; in the U.S. the market bottomed out in May 1942 at the key Battle of Midway. In hindsight these turnings appear obvious but at the time expert opinions and national propagandas muddied the waters, the marketplace had prescient clarity of vision where the future was headed. "This is why I argue it is so important to _listen to the market_. In other words, at crucial turning points observe what the markets do and ignore what the experts and commentators say about what is going on."

As for what to invest in during crises, Biggs analysis shows stocks to be the best performer, and index funds to be the best of all because of diversification. Gold, art, bonds, and fixed income did not do as well - they were prone to destruction, theft, or did not perform as well as stocks. He recommends keeping some money out of country and/or in other currencies and using a small portion of wealth to obtain farm land in a rural area where food can be grown - many people sat out WWII unmolested and content by growing what they needed on small farms.

Biggs ends by asking "What can you do? In simplest terms, the conclusions are to diversify your fortune both as to asset class and location, anticipate the _anticipation of trouble_, and pay attention to the message of the markets. Equities are the place to be in the long run.."

To be fair to Mr. Biggs, I am reading an advanced uncorrected proof of his book, so it may be changed to a different publication form after the writing of this review. Upon reading his book, I come to find that most of the reviews here are mistaken. Nowhere does the author ever say that he intends his book to be used a proverbial "crystal ball" to tracking future market trends using events in the past. Nor does he ever say that stock market is a perfect predictor of how future events will unfold. Such would be ludicrous for a man of Mr. Biggs' professional competence to suggest. This book, like any good piece of historical writing, is predicated on the fact that the past is to be understood as something contextual and worthy of gleaning much insight from. We don't look to the past to predict the future. Rather, we look to the past to prevent making the same mistakes others have made.

The goal of this book was not to dish out time-sensitive tips or to give hits to trend-obsessed technical analysts. If you try to read it that way, you will find his thinking appears quite haphazard and discombobulating. Some books you have to read a certain way to fully comprehend them. This book was meant to be read with a student historian-like focus on capital preservation, as viewed through the lenses of times-by-gone and present technique. For example, it shows how people survived the severe hyperinflation in times of 1920's Germany. It tells what worked and what didn't. It's not bold enough to predict the next and upcoming crisis of this kind, but it shows you what to look for that may aid you in seeing the warning signs before they lead up to a catastrophe. It uses specific events in history and what follows to fulfill this aim.

Mr. Biggs' book is not perfect. I personally wished that it focused more on the practical side of things and gave more specificity in application, but I guess a lot of that is left to one's own imagination, since making too specific recommendations would easily lead to a time-sensitive dating of this book, which is something most good historians tend to avoid. Overall, 4 of 5 stars.

It has been said in 2006 any idiot could make money from the stock market and in 2007 EVERY idiot made money from the stock market.

2008 though is a year of confusion and stress in the markets.

Biggs' book reflects on a time in the 1930's and 1940's of other confusion and stress. This book is a vital lesson for today's investor by learning from the past

Wealth, War & Wisdom by Barton Biggs sells itself with a big promise. A former Wall Street insider promises to explain to you how the stock market is able to accurately and correctly predict major world events, using World War 2 as the example. Unfortunately, it fails to deliver on its promise.

As a history, it fails both in fact and in tone. The book gets several important aspects of World War 2 wrong, to be sure. But perhaps worse that this is the tone of the book. It is written like the long dry rambling of some retirement home resident who likes to hear himself talk and who thinks his opinions are facts.

And as for providing useful information on how market shifts signal major historical shifts, it fails as well. To paraphrase Milton Friedman, the only way to know when a market shift has occured is after it is over. Biggs offers no technique or skill that would allow us to use the collective wisdom of the market as a crystal ball for predicting the future. It is only after the fact, once the events have occured, that we are able to link them to market performance, and poorly at that.

A very in depth analysis of market prescience in time of turmoil. A very brief analysis of what to do with that data or if we are seeing any beacons today. If you are close enough to the market to get the view that Biggs has, then perhaps the analysis is of use to you.

Not for the casual reader. If you are looking for "survival" advice: (from Biggs): 5% of your net worth in a safe haven (ie different country); 5% of your net worth in a sustainable farm; 10-15% in TIPS - Treasury Inflation Protected Securites; and the remainder - 75% - in equities. That's in Chapter 16 - next to the last page.

This book mostly comes at you like a fireside chat with Alan Greenspan or Warren Buffet over brandy, as Barton Biggs has a nonchalant and sometimes witty way of weaving his tale in mostly anecdotal and educated asides that have been gleaned from his years of personal experience within the market place.

While he makes some grand statements that might land on your lap like an old fishing story, it fits just fine within the meat and pace of the book. It's a worthy read, even if flawed.

This book has kind of been lambasted for its naiveté, its use of facts and its opinions, but overall it succeeds in areas where others fail. Primarily bringing credibility to alarmist speculation on past market behavior to speak to possible future market reaction. This seems to be the main thesis within the book and Biggs does a fine job at giving you his side of the story, even if at times, you might either question it (which is fine) or find that the information just isn't relevant to your everyday life.

Barton Biggs has lately been making the rounds with Wealth, War & Wisdom on the book and talk show circuit and has even found himself being applauded by the Apocalypse Watchers of the world who seem to love to quote a specific section of the book that talks about moving onto a self-sustaining ranch, buying firearms and canned food and hoping that you'll be able to wait it out with MRE's and Caviar, Beethoven and a good book.

Biggs has an engaging and entertaining writing style that keeps your face in the book, which is a compliment as the information sometimes comes across as dry as a dehydrated Chicken ala King MRE.

Mr. Biggs you've done it again. I loved the book. I'm sharing it with all the guys at the office. We lost a great mind when you left Morgan Stanley. I'm glad that you addressed these issues since I can't find anyone who has already. I had a feeling after reading Hedgehogging that you would add to the story of the man in Hong Kong who lived off of selling jewelry during the Japanese occupation. I must say that the quotes from Churchill and the story of the 10,000 canaries were my favorite parts of the book. Interesting how the French economy did better under German occupation in the early years.

In "Wealth, War & Wisdom" Barton Biggs wants to posit that the stock markets are somewhat omniscient in predicting world events. To that end, he takes us (largely) to World War II era and analyzes specific markets and the response to specific events. For example, he looks at the US Stock market before and after the Battle of Midway or the German stock market during Operation Barbarossa. He posits that the markets senses the applicable turning points in these events (i.e. that the Battle of Midway was a turning point for America and the market after bottoming out began to climb). He then goes on to categorically state that the markets were particularly omniscient about these events as turning points while the "experts" were not.

At this point, Biggs' analysis suffers from two difficulties: (1) he never identifies these "experts" who had it wrong and, specifically how they had it wrong and; (2) the lack of omniscience of the French stock market runs counter to his argument.

More interesting though is Biggs' analysis of preserving wealth in times of wealth destruction (mainly wars). Biggs analyzes different means of preserving wealth in the different nations during the World War II era and concludes that, for the most part, public stocks and equities performed well while art masterpieces and physical property performed poorly. His advice, "diversify!"

As for Biggs' prose, it is, at times, stunted and too colloquial. Though he repeatedly disclaims that he is not an historian, he does a fair job with laying out the history of the World War II era. For example, he harps upon the disaster of Pearl Harbor and emphasizes that it was a "military" disaster. It wasn't. It WAS a political disaster and a military inconvenience since (as Biggs does point out) all but one of the ships that were sunk in Pearl Harbor were salvaged, repaired and back in service within a year and the Japanese failed to attack the submarine pens or the fuel depot.

"Wealth, War and Wisdom" is interesting as an analysis of how to preserve wealth in a time of wealth destruction but not very persuasive on the premise of market omniscience.

One of the other reviewers has taken umbrage at the notion in this book that the western allies were fighting for capitalism in WWII.

Umbrage noted, but semantic games aren't really to the point. In the sense understood in the Anglophone world, practiced at the exchanges of London and NY, capitalism certainly was at stake, just as it was at stake again, or still, in the Cold War that followed.

Indeed, the data in the book shows us that the markets recognized this. The London exchange hit a historic low in June 1940, returning to its 1932 level.

What this book tells us that is new (at least to me) and important (in validating the rational expectations model) is that the exchange, as measured by the FTI, actually made dramatic turnaround before that month was done. There was no obvious reason for optimism yet, and Churchill has said that his time of greatest pessimism came two months later, when it appeared a German effort at an amphibious landing was imminent.

So ... why the earlier turnaround in market value? Because, reasonable people may conclude, markets are efficient. They're much better at processing information than their individual participants. The market as a whole had discounted the bad news already, and rationally expected that the English-speaking world would rally successfully, saving those markets from the threat posed across the channel.

The content in this book about how wealthy people might protect themselves during war times and economic disasters could have easily been put into a small essay. The rest of the book describes Barton Biggs' views of World War I, the great depression, World War II, and the Korean War. That backdrop is provided so that he can demonstrate that national stock markets typically bottomed around the time when the course of a war turned in favor of the eventual victors (or a stalemate as in the case of Korea).

Mr. Biggs makes sweeping statements about the nature of conflicts that he never proves. He mostly recounts from other books when not expressing unsupported opinions.

In addition, the book is repetitive and not well organized.

In my opinion, no one needs to read this book. If Mr. Biggs will skinny it down into a 2,000 word essay, that essay would be worth reading if your liquid net worth is over a million dollars.

This is a really in-depth book. Much of it is quite depressing, with endless tales of war, which makes me question the humanity as a whole; however, some wisdom, as the title entails, can be found in the relation between stock markets and times of war, as the author also confirms. I have enjoyed reading this book and learning more about history at the same time that I am learning about money.

I don't really have anything negative to say about this book except that I found many typographical errors in it, and at times, the author writes in a semi-awkward manner. This author needs an editor. I don't mean to sound offensive, as Mr. Biggs does seem like quite an intelligent man, but sometimes even intelligent people make such errors.

This book has many interesting points. The parts on the markets reaction to the second world war are very interesting. Hindsight is of course 20/20, but the author gives us a very complete hindsight view of this and other instances; albeit influenced by his own opinions.

That having been said, the usefulness of this book is limited due to the lack of structure, an overarching theme, or even a key point. We are presented a plethora of information that while intriguing, fails to deliver much useful application.

The book is left without a specific category. It's not a history book, as the author makes very clear from the beginning. It makes some effort at predicting the future by "cycles", but doesn't overtly and clearly present or back up any of these cycles. It could potentially pass as a sort of memoir, but not a very good one. Instead it seems like someone told Biggs to write a book, and he did so based on whatever popped into his mind.

The author notes that financial markets seem to be a pretty good predictor of shifts in history. His examples are mainly from World War II, but it would interesting to apply the theory to modern times as well. All in all a fascinating, thought provoking book.

This book is a fascinating view of World War II from the perspective of economic investment. However, this is not a technical book in the sense that it is full of charts and graphs. The author, Barton Biggs, is able to fashion his story in an interesting and compelling way that takes us through a compressed telling of the war in Europe and the Pacific while also showing us what it did to the markets here at home and abroad.

Yes, there are charts and graphs, but the text is so compelling that they don't get in the way of those who aren't technically minded, but really help those of us who want to look at the data see the economic impact in the images the author provides.

One of the problems every individual faces in the crushing periods of war is how to preserve and move one's wealth. Barton shows us how people did that in the countries being demolished during the war, as well as in the victorious nations. There is also the problem that nations and politicians face in needing supplies, but wanting to keep individuals and companies from exploiting the war for outsized personal gain.

Of course, while history is interesting in itself, there are also lessons to be learned in how turbulent markets behave and what investors, politicians, and regular folks are likely to do in reacting to the violent and tumultuous changes. Heaven forbid we should ever see such times again, but history's guide informs us that the storms will come again in some guise. This valuable book is worth having and reading for enjoyment, background, and for thinking about today and the future.

Reviewed by Craig Matteson, Ann Arbor, MI