An excellent review of the origins and causes of the Vietnam conflict and a must read for the serious historian to understand the liberal, leftist viewpoint. To be fair in one's analysis however, the author's views need to be contrasted to a viewpoint from the right. A good comparative work is Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 by Phillip Davidson. Some where in between the views of these authors probably lies the truth.

This is an important book for anyone interested in how the US became inextricably involved in Vietnam. It holds pertinent lessons for the predicament in which the US now finds itself in Iraq. Unfortunately, the book requires a determined reader to plow through some 650 pages of close-spaced narrative, as the author frequently diverges on tangents that drift away from his main thesis points. A principal thrust of the book is the influence of key players on the decision-making process and their inter-personal relationships. Accordingly, there is substantial biographical information, which is interesting, but distracting. This is not a military history; very little mention is made of the operational and tactical aspects of the conflict.

I read this book for the first time over ten years ago and returned to it for the bitter relevancy it has as I reflect on our situation in Iraq today.

Despite the logorrhea, the fragments, the absolute structures, and the never-ending repetition, this book is worthwhile as the explication of a man who surrounded himself with sycophants. Americans, in general, paid a high price.

I know that this will appear to be a strange review, since I bought the book but refused to read it. I have read three other books on the Vietnam War and was looking forward to reading Halberstam's version of it, since he's such a good writer.

Recent books about Vietnam have access to documents not previously available to writers. Now, with a more factual rendering of the Vietnam War, it is easier to understand what was going on during that time. One of the things I learned was that David Halberstam, a reporter for the NY Times during the Diem period, was one of the contributors to the mess we called the Vietnam quagmire.

His reporting was far from objective, and he painted such a distorted picture of Diem because of his personal dislike of the man, that it helped in the November removal/murder of Diem. After that event, the war went downhill, and eventually US troops were injected into the war.

Basically, it seems that Halberstam was part of the problem to the point that the NY Times was going to remove him from Vietnam until Kennedy requested the removal. The Times refused, then, not wanting to appear to do something forced on them by the President.

So, why can't I read the book? If Halberstam was not objective during the war, how can I expect him to be objective after the war. He's not going to tell us how wrong he was about removing Diem, etc., and how he misreported battle results to make Diem look bad. Now available North Vietnam/Communist documents disprove most of Halberstam's battle assessments. They freely admitted to themselves that Diem's military was beating them, and that Diem was a strong President who they, the Communists, would like to see gone. Unfortunately, the US Gov't helped do that for North Vietnam...and Halberstam was one of the reporters who helped in that process. Check out President Kennedy's remarks about Halberstam if you don't believe me.

That is why I can't read his book. If anyone has read the book, agrees with my assessment, but says that Halberstam admitted his mistakes, please let me know. I'll read the book then and only then.

While a little dry sometimes this is Halberstam's definitive book. It really shows how the years of McCarthyism leading up to Kennedy's administration led to many terrible decisions about supporting Diem and trying to not look weak to the Russians. After the fiasco that was the Bay of Pigs Kennedy became even more determined to show strength. However the first tragedy among many was the assasination which while horrible in itself also came at a critical time in the course of the Vietnam policy. Halberstam theorizes that Kennedy was nearly ready to pull the plug on Vietnam when he died. Well written, incredibly well researched and an important book.

I read this book when it was first published and then found it to be an excellent description of the failures of the Kennedy-Johnson administration as it incrementally entered a war with North Vietnam. I have read it again after I read of Mr. Halberstam's death a few weeks ago.



I had been very bothered by the actions of the US in Iraq. After reading The Best and Brightest I know what was bothering me. It is a repeat although with different characters, different enemies, different locale but the same thinking process and lack of thought for the many "what ifs" that war produces. It would have been nice if a few of the planners of the Iraq fiasco could have read Halberstam's book and taken note of the mistakes that were made in 1963 before launching the war in Iraq in 2003.



Halberstam quotes Henry Kissenger as saying something to the effect of "we won't make the same mistakes . . . we'll make our own mistakes." It looks like the current planners and executors of Iraq strategy are making the same ones that were made in 1963 - and learning the same lessons about a counterinsurgency war being fought with traditional troops, equipment and strategy.



The Iraqi insurgency in Iraq will go the same way as the insurgency in Vietnam - they will wait us out but without the large scale battles that took place in Vietnam once the army of North Vietnam entered the action in large numbers.



Vietnam was disaster and tragedy for the Vietnamese as well as the Americans. What seems to be preventing the same level of disaster in the US is the fact that this war is being fought by non-draftees. That is one dissimilarity with Vietnam which has prevented the large scale protests across the nation which were seen as the presidency of Lyndon Johnson unraveled.



I recommend this book to all students of political and military strategy. It is an exceptional read and I would predict you won't come away angry - just saddened that so much talent brought forth so little in the way of return for Vietnam and the United States.

I read this book when it was first published and then found it to be an excellent description of the failures of the Kennedy-Johnson administration as it incrementally entered a war with North Vietnam. I have read it again after I read of Mr. Halberstam's death a few weeks ago.

I had been very bothered by the actions of the US in Iraq. After reading The Best and Brightest I know what was bothering me. It is a repeat although with different characters, different enemies, different locale but the same thinking process and lack of thought for the many "what ifs" that war produces. It would have been nice if a few of the planners of the Iraq fiasco could have read Halberstam's book and taken note of the mistakes that were made in 1963 before launching the war in Iraq in 2003.

Halberstam quotes Henry Kissenger as saying something to the effect of "we won't make the same mistakes . . . we'll make our own mistakes." It looks like the current planners and executors of Iraq strategy are making the same ones that were made in 1963 - and learning the same lessons about a counterinsurgency war being fought with traditional troops, equipment and strategy.

The Iraqi insurgency in Iraq will go the same way as the insurgency in Vietnam - they will wait us out but without the large scale battles that took place in Vietnam once the army of North Vietnam entered the action in large numbers.

Vietnam was disaster and tragedy for the Vietnamese as well as the Americans. What seems to be preventing the same level of disaster in the US is the fact that this war is being fought by non-draftees. That is one dissimilarity with Vietnam which has prevented the large scale protests across the nation which were seen as the presidency of Lyndon Johnson unraveled.

I recommend this book to all students of political and military strategy. It is an exceptional read and I would predict you won't come away angry - just saddened that so much talent brought forth so little in the way of return for Vietnam and the United States.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam interprets US Foreign Policy of the Vietnam War as delusional.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character of each individual with the politics of the day and shows how it lead to decisions that were made from inner needs and wishful thinking rather than on facts. This error in thinking started at "the creation" i.e. the end of WWII. It torpedoed the power of rational thought.

Halberstam reasons that the US perceived the Soviets to be on the verge to swallow Western Europe. This led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

In Halberstam's mind, the loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Communist Chinese invasion of Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam interprets US Foreign Policy of the Vietnam War as delusional.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character of each individual with the politics of the day and shows how it lead to decisions that were made from inner needs and wishful thinking rather than on facts. This error in thinking started at "the creation" i.e. the end of WWII. It torpedoed the power of rational thought.

Halberstam reasons that the US perceived the Soviets to be on the verge to swallow Western Europe. This led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam interprets US Foreign Policy of the Vietnam War as delusional.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character of each individual with the politics of the day and shows how it lead to decisions that were made from inner needs and wishful thinking rather than on facts. This error in thinking started at "the creation" i.e. the end of WWII. It torpedoed the power of rational thought.

Halberstam reasons that the US perceived the Soviets to be on the verge to swallow Western Europe. This led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam describes and interprets US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam War.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character development of each personality with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past starting mainly at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam describes and interprets behind the scenes US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam War.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character development of each personality with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past starting mainly at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam interprets US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam War.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

The author weaves the character development of each personality with the politics of the day and compares it with the policies of the past starting mainly at "the creation" i.e. the end of WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China to the Communists, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, and then the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam in the name of stopping Communist aggression.

Neither Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. All the leaders, especially Dean Rusk, and with the exception of George Ball, put forth the Munich analogy to justify intervention and escalation.

In Halberstam's analysis, the Vietnam War was a defeat before it even began because it was based on a faulty strategy: To stop communist aggression. The idea to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam was thought about but never acted upon.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut who used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance all the principals viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. To do otherwise was political suicide. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind about the morality of the war but got gunned down; George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam describes and interprets behind the scenes US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam war.

The author weaves the character and personalities with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past starting at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The Communist takeover of China, the Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea, McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the government, not to mention the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the continued support of France in Indochina as an ally against monolithic Communism. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and decided that we would carry the crusade against Communism. We were then perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power. The US nevertheless chose to allow France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam.

Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. Halberstam shows how neither LBJ nor JFK before him had the strength of character to do the right thing; Halberstam shows that the strategy was to neutralize criticism from the right so anything that would contradict this policy was nixed.

In Halberstam's analysis the Vietnam War was a defeat before it began because it was based on a strategy to stop communist aggression instead of one to expel the French once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut. He used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance the principals too viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam JFK was changing his mind but then got gunned down, George Ball was the hero, LBJ the looser and France the thorn in our side.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is an interpretation of behind the scenes US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam war.

The author weaves the character and personalities of those involved with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past especially starting at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The Communist takeover of China, the invasion of Korea, McCarthy and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the support of France as an ally against monolithic Communism. It appeared that the US never thought it was allowing France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and thought that we would now carry on the crusade against Communism. However, we were perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power.

Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. Halberstam shows how neither LBJ nor JFK before him had the strength of character to do the right thing; Halberstam shows that the strategy was to neutralize criticism from the right so anything that would contradict this policy was nixed.

In Halberstam's analysis the Vietnam War was a defeat before it began because it was based on a strategy to stop communist aggression instead of one to expel the Frernch once and for all and to help unify North and South Vietnam.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut. He used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance the principals too viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam George Ball was the hero and LBJ the looser.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is an interpretation of behind the scenes US Foreign Policy on the origins of the Vietnam war.

The author weaves the character and personalities of those involved with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past especially starting at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The Communist takeover of China, the invasion of Korea, McCarthy and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors, according to Halberstam, contributed to the support of France as an ally against monolithic Communism. It appeared that the US never thought it was allowing France to regress to its former status as a colonial power over Vietnam. After Dienbienphu, we did replace the French and thought that we would now carry on the crusade against Communism. However, we were perceived by Ho Chi Minh as another western power colluding with another western but effete colonial power.

Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. Over and over again, Halberstam shows how neither LBJ nor JFK before him had the strength of character to do the right thing; Halberstam felt that the overall strategy was to neutralize criticism from the right so anything that would contradict this policy was nixed.

In Halberstam's analysis the Vietnam War was a defeat before it began because it was based on a false premise: To stop communist aggression instead of a war to expel foreigners to unify North and South Vietnam.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut. He used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance the principals too viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam George Ball was the hero and LBJ the looser.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is an interpretation of behind the scenes US Foreign Policy on the why and how the US got involved in Vietnam.

The author weaves the character and personalities of those involved with the politics of the day and compares and contrasts it with the policies of the past especially starting at "the creation" right after WWII.

According to Halberstam, the perception that the Soviets were ready to swallow Western Europe led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again.

The loss of China, the invasion of Korea, McCarthy and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated fears about world domination by the Communists. These factors according to Halberstam's view contributed to the support of France as an ally against monolithic Communism instead of a regression to colonial domination. After Dienbienphu, we replaced the French. We were perceived by Ho Chi Min as colonial imperialists.

Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy nor Johnson could show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to look for alternatives. Over and over again, Halberstam shows how neither LBJ nor JFK before him had the strength of character to do the right thing; Halberstam felt that the overall strategy was to avoid criticism from the right so anything that would contradict this policy was nixed.

In Halberstam's analysis the Vietnam War was a defeat even before it was started because it was based on a false premise: To stop communist aggression instead of a war to expel foreigners to unify North and South Vietnam.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut. He used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance the principals too viewed the war as a war against Communist hegemony; they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement to their president. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam George Ball was the hero and LBJ the looser.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is a disturbing interpretation of the why and how the US got involved in Vietnam.

The author weaves the politics, the background and the role of character formation in the shaping the policy.

To Halberstam, the loss of China to the Communists, the Communist invasion of Korea, the Communist Red scare of McCarthy and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated the paranoia about world domination by the "Monolithic" Communists. In addition, Halberstam believed it was the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe that was poised to swallow Western Europe that led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again. After Dienbienphu, we replaced the French. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson couldn't show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to do the right thing.

The principals: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland. There are others of course.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was characterized as a whiz kid with a funny haircut. He used his unbelievable grasp of statistics to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics. Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance they too viewed the war as a war against Communist expansion and they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. On the other hand, George Ball was consistent in his opposition to the war from JFK to LBJ. To Halberstam George Ball was the courageous hero and LBJ lost everything.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is a readable, comprehensive, and disturbing interpretation of the why and how the Vietnam War was fought.

The author masterfully weaves the politics, the background and the role of character formation in the shaping of policy.

According to Halberstam, the loss of China to the Communists, the communist invasion of Korea, the Communist witch-hunt of McCarthy and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated and perpetuated the paranoia about world domination by the "Monolithic" Communists. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson couldn't show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their obsession of not wanting to be viewed as weak trumped their instincts to do the right thing.

Halberstam believed it was the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe that was poised to swallow Western Europe that led the US to turn to France to provide a bastion against them. Charles De Gaulle was ready to cooperate but only if the US allowed France to seize Indochina again. After Dienbienphu, we replaced the French.

The main personalities: Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Dean Acheson, not to mention Maxwell Taylor, and General Westmoreland.

Halberstam holds the Bundy brothers along with McNamara responsible not only as instigators but the propagators of the war. McNamara was a characterized as a whiz kid with an unbelievable grasp of statistics. According to Halberstam, he was able to flim-flam the pentagon in doing his bidding. It brings to mind Mark Twain's three types of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics. There are others of course. Despite their super-education, their impeccable character, and their natural brilliance they too viewed the war as a war against communist expansion and they too could not show any hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement in the offense against it.

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST by David Halberstam is a deep, moving, scholarly, comprehensive, readable, and disturbing book. The actors in this book had the best of intentions, all patriots, no warmongers, or war criminals. But with the Communists in Eastern Europe, China lost to them, Korea split in two, now what? Indochina? The Soviet Union, their Army bulged into Western Europe poised to swallow it. These moves exacerbated nuclear paranoia especially after the Cuban missile crisis and the McCarthy maybe not so much a nightmare as a drama did not help either. Kennedy or Johnson couldn't show hesitation, ambivalence, or appeasement. Their American upbringing and instincts would not permit it.
France refused to be the linchpin of the European bulwark against the Red Menace that was felt would swallow Western Europe, unless the US promised Charles De Gaulle that France could again seize Vietnam. We felt we had to help the French so that they could stem the tide of communism in Europe and Indo-China. After Dienbienphu we replaced the French and the rest is history The book delves into the relevant and meaningful background of the principals: JFK, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, Dean Acheson, not to mention LBJ, Maxwell Taylor, General Westmoreland. There are others of course. The author masterfully weaves the politics, the role of character formation, and the deep hidden perhaps unconscious forces that shaped the tragic events. The fusion of their education second to none, their impeccable character, and their brilliance made them paradoxically impervious to any facts trying to wiggle into their genius minds. Anyone that tried to give the facts was ejected from what really turned out to be a quasi-totalitarian bureaucracy. With fifty-nine thousand US killed and three million Vietnamese killed maybe they were really war pigs.

This is a wonderful study of the dreadful people who committed the crime of aggression against Vietnam. It shows how they fooled themselves, and others too, that theirs was some noble mission, to save other nations from communism. In fact, it was a crime, resulting in the killing of three million innocent Vietnamese, who were killed trying to save their country from a savage, unjustified and illegal assault. So, not the best, nor the brightest.

As the current Bush Administration-directed quagmire continues in Iraq it is rather timely to look at a previous bout of American imperialist madness in Vietnam if only in order to demonstrate the similar mindsets, then and now, of the American political establishment and their hangers-on. This book, unintentionally I am sure, is a prima facie argument, against those who see Iraq (or saw Vietnam) as merely an erroneous policy of the American government that can be `fixed' by a change to a more rational imperialist policy guided by a different elite. Undeniably there are many differences between the current war and the struggle in Vietnam. Not the least of which is that in Vietnam there was a Communist-led insurgency that leftists throughout the world could identify with and were duty-bound to support.

Mr. Halberstam's well-informed study of the long history of struggle in Vietnam against outsiders, near and far, is a more than adequate primer about the history and the political issues, from the American side at least, as they came to a head in Vietnam in the early 1960's. This book is the work of a long time journalist who covered Southeast Asia from close quarters. Although over thirty years have passed since the book's publication it appears to me that he has covered all the essential elements of the dispute as well as the wrangling, again mainly on the American side , of policy makers big and small. While everyone should look at more recent material that material appears to me to be essentially more specialized analysis of the general themes presented in Halberstam's book. Or are the inevitably self-serving memoirs by those, like former Secretary of War Robert McNamara, looking to refurbish they images for the historical record.

The bulk of the book and the central story line is a study of the hubris of American imperialist policy-makers in attempting to define their powers, prerogatives and interests in the post-World War II period. The sub-text of the book, which the current inhabitants of the Bush Administration obviously have not read and in any case would willfully misunderstand, is how not to subordinate primary interests to momentary secondary interests in the scramble to preserve the Empire. Be clear that Halberstam was no vocal opponent of the war but rather sought to see it successfully completed by a more rational approach. However, apparently, commonsense and simple rationality are in short supply when one goes inside the Washington Beltway. Taking into account the differences in personality among the three main villains of the piece- Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon- the similarities of response and need to defend some sense of honor, American honor, are amazingly similar, individual rhetoric aside. There thus can be little wonder that the North Vietnamese went about their business of revolution and independence pretty much according to their plans and with little regard to the `subtleties' in American foreign policy (or military doctrine, for that matter). But, read the book and judge for yourselves. Do not be surprised if something feels awfully, awfully familiar.

As the current Bush Administration-directed quagmire continues in Iraq it is rather timely to look at a previous bout of American imperialist madness in Vietnam if only in order to demonstrate the similar mindsets, then and now, of the American political establishment and their hangers-on. This book, unintentionally I am sure, is a prima facie argument, against those who see Iraq (or saw Vietnam) as merely an erroneous policy of the American government that can be `fixed' by a change to a more rational imperialist policy guided by a different elite. Undeniably there are many differences between the current war and the struggle in Vietnam. Not the least of which is that in Vietnam there was a Communist-led insurgency that leftists throughout the world could identify with and were duty-bound to support.

Mr. Halberstam's well-informed study of the long history of struggle in Vietnam against outsiders, near and far, is a more than adequate primer about the history and the political issues, from the American side at least, as they came to a head in Vietnam in the early 1960's.This book is the work of a long time journalist who covered Southeast Asia from close quarters. Although over thirty years have passed since the book's publication it appears to me that he has covered all the essential elements of the dispute as well as the wrangling, again mainly on the American side , of policy makers big and small. While everyone should look at more recent material that material appears to me to be essentially more specialized analysis of the general themes presented in Karnow's book. Or are the inevitably self-serving memoirs by those, like former Secretary of War Robert McNamara, looking to refurbish they images for the historical record.

The bulk of the book and the central story line, however, is a study of the hubris of American imperialist policy-makers in attempting to define their powers, prerogatives and interests in the post-World War II period. The sub-title of the book, which the current inhabitants of the Bush Administration obviously have not read and in any case would willfully misunderstand, is how not to subordinate primary interests to momentary secondary interests in the scramble to preserve the Empire. Apparently, commonsense and simple rationality are in short supply when one goes inside the Washington Beltway. Taking into account the differences in personality among the three main villains of the piece- Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon- the similarities of response and need to defend some sense of honor, American honor, are amazingly similar, individual rhetoric aside. There thus can be little wonder the North Vietnamese went about their business of revolution and independence pretty much according to their plans and with little regard to `subtleties' in American diplomacy. But, read the book and judge for yourselves. Do not be surprised if something feels awfully, awfully familiar.

"The Best and the Brightest"
By David Halberstam (1934-2007)
Reviewed by Philip Henry

David Halberstam survived wars, literal and figurative landmines, popular acclaim, political opponents and the Fifties and Vietnam. Ironically, after all of that he was killed in a car crash near San Francisco April 23, 2007. Characteristically, he was on his way to an interview for a new book.
Halberstam was one of the pioneers in Vietnam reporting (along with Neil Sheehan)--posted there several times in the `60's by The Times. His `The Making of a Quagmire " accurately forecast the course of an unwinnable war. "The Best and the Brightest" focused on the irony of well-qualified but ill-advised policy makers in a thicket of foreign policy.

Halberstam didn't confine himself to one area or one period: he was equally at home with major league baseball and high-level foreign policy debates. Like George Will, his ideological antithesis, he appreciated a good story, a good ballgame, and had an infallible nose for lies and evasion.

Halberstam received 20 Honorary degrees, spoke at many college commencements, and received the Pulitzer in 1964 at the age of 30 for his Vietnam reporting for the Times. Five of his 15 bestsellers have been about sports, and it reflects the breadth of his work and the public's response to it that both The Best and The Brightest and Summer of '49 (on an epic pennant race between the Yankees and the Red Sox), were #1 New York Times bestsellers.
If one were to replace "Vietnam" with "Iraq"; "President Lyndon Johnson" with "George Bush'; and Robert McNamara with Donald Rumsfeld, one would read exactly the same facts into the current fiasco in Iraq. If there is one book that all Presidents and Candidates should be required to read, it's "The Best and The Brightest." That would be Halberstam's greatest tribute.

In the 1970's, I was an enlisted man serving with American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN). One of my assignments was to record and report on the daily briefings by MACOI ( Military Assistance Command Vietnam/ Office of Information) Briefers. The idea was to give the troops the Pablum from the Command; not the truth, which would have been counter-productive to the political objectives of the administration.
Thankfully, Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, George Esper (AP Saigon Bureau Chief);
John Laurence (CBS News) and others were there to refute the official line. David
Halberstam was a role model, a true professional, and an American Institution.
*I nominate Halberstam for the Baseball Writers' Hall of Fame. That would be appropriate.


*****

"The Best and the Brightest"
By David Halberstam (1934-2007)
Reviewed by Philip Henry

David Halberstam survived wars, political landmines, popular acclaim, political opponents and the Fifties and Vietnam. Ironically, after all of that he was killed in a car crash near San Francisco April 23, 2007. Characteristically, he was on his way to an interview for a new book.
Halberstam was one of the pioneers in Vietnam reporting (along with Neil Sheehan)--posted there several times in the `60's by The Times. His `The Making of a Quagmire " accurately forecast the course of an unwinnable war. "The Best and the Brightest" focused on the irony of well-qualified but ill-advised policy makers in a thicket of foreign policy.

Halberstam didn't confine himself to one area or one period: he was equally at home with major league baseball and high-level foreign policy debates. Like George Will, his ideological antithesis, he appreciated a good story, a good ballgame, and had an infallible nose for lies and evasion.

Halberstam received 20 Honorary degrees, spoke at many college commencements, and received the Pulitzer in 1964 at the age of 30 for his Vietnam reporting for the Times. Five of his 15 bestsellers have been about sports, and it reflects the breadth of his work and the public's response to it that both The Best and The Brightest and Summer of '49 (on an epic pennant race between the Yankees and the Red Sox), were #1 New York Times bestsellers.
If one were to replace "Vietnam" with "Iraq"; "President Lyndon Johnson" with "George Bush'; and Robert McNamara with Donald Rumsfeld, one would read exactly the same facts into the current fiasco. If there is one book that all Presidents and Candidates should be required to read, it's "The Best and The Brightest." That would be Halberstam's greatest tribute.

In the 1970's, I was an enlisted man serving with American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN). One of my assignments was to record and report on the daily briefings by MACOI ( Military Assistance Command Vietnam/ Office of Information) Briefers. The idea was to give the troops the Pablum from the Command; not the truth, which would have been counter-productive to the political objectives of the administration.
Thankfully, Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, George Esper (AP Saigon Bureau Chief);
John Laurence (CBS News) and others were there to refute the official line. David
Halberstam was a role model, a true professional, and an American Institution.
*I nominate Halberstam for the Baseball Writers' Hall of Fame. That would be appropriate.


*****

this book is a national treasure, an honest unflinching look at one of the most one of the most controversial events in u.s. history, the vietnam war. what sets halberstam's book above so many others are the insightful finely wrought portraits of american leaders at the time, ranging from kennedy to lbj to mcnamara and others.

David Halberstam's "The Best And The Brightest" stands the test of time as a superbly readable account of how the United States involvement in Vietnam was transformed from a limited engagement into a major war that threatened to unravel not only the U.S. committment to the Cold War but also U.S. society itself. The Vietnam War experience continues to overshadow U.S. foreign policy to this day.

Completed in 1969, this now dated book is not the last word in scholarship on the subject, but it is an account of almost literary quality of a profound human tragedy in which bright and well-intentioned American public servants implemented poor policy by half-measures, not least as a result of the personalties of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Halberstam's account is exhausting if not exhaustive. With the good jouralist's gift for capturing the moment, Halberstam profiles the series of U.S. actors who as members of the Cold War foreign policy "establishment" misunderstood what was essentially a civil war in Vietnam as a showdown between communism and capitalism. The narrative is also an exploration of how the conflict with Communism framed and often warped policy choices outside Southeast Asia.

Looming over the narrative is the outsized figure of President Lyndon Johnson, driven by his need for power and control and a series of poor choices in both advisors and policy into a seemingly endless war. Halberstam illustrates how Johnson's dominant personality tended to smother legitimate doubts on Vietnam policy and avoid crucial honest discussions of ends versus means in the conflict.

This book is highly recommended to students of the era and for those looking for a cautionary tale on the limits of policy and policy-making.

I had heard great things about this book, but after beginning my copy I wasn't sure what to think. The first few dozen pages are very slippery. The acts are dim, the messages subtle. Halberstam uses odd language here and there, slipping between hard-nosed reporting and glossy editorializing. The first act in the book revolves around a conversation that by itself seems only one of thousands at the national governing level, a chat that gently draws us into a cloudy and cloudier picture, which Halberstam to his credit clears for us page after page after page.

Halberstam gives us characterizations that clearly define the players we are dealing with. In so many instances it feels like we are back in 1960s America, speaking with the principals, knowing their psyches and professional backgrounds and the probable reasons for their decisions. A long book indeed, but lean, actually concise, painting a picture that never fails to amaze, puzzle and anger. Halberstam roots out the subtleties and sustains a very complicated chronology in a very readable text. Of all the sustained histories I have ever read, especially one in a single volume, this has to get my vote for one of America's best examples.

Few events have divided America as the Vietnam War. One of the most nagging questions regarding this topic is how and why America became involved in it. David Halberstam gives us his answer in this comprehensive and well written book; "The Best and the Brightest". The title of this book refers to the various officials in the executive branch of the US federal government that came to office with JFK, but stayed on after his death. This group of officials played major roles in LBJ's administration, and in fits and starts, convinced the Texan to devote more and more of his efforts and the nation's blood and treasure to a little country called Vietnam. LBJ, like Nixon after him, was perpetually haunted of the Kennedy name and legacy, and reacted by wholeheartedly following the advice of Kennedy's advisers regarding Vietnam against his own better judgement. These advisers included Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Dean Acheson, etc... All of them had more foreign policy experience than LBJ, and all were associated with the Kennedy name. Yet none of them had every won elected office.

By listening to their advice instead of his own hard-earned experience and judgement, LBJ would slowly lead America, step by step, into the Vietnam War, to the point that he did not or could not extract this nation from it. The author, David Halberstam, was a young reporter at this time, and worked both in Vietnam and at the home front, reporting on the conflict. His inside view, and later his connections with those higher up, allowed him to write this insightful book on the most controversial of wars. After reading it, I got the impression that LBJ never quite had the confidence to stand on his own two feet when it came to foreign policy. The buck is supposed to stop with him, as commander-in-chief, yet he allowed members of the Best and the Brightest, to make decisions for him. If there is one moral to take out of this book, it is to stand up for yourself and make your own decisions.

All in all, a great book. I highly recommend it for any fan or student of history.

Have enjoyed later books by author and enjoyed them immensely. Historical perspective from this book was excellent, but, I found it tremendously laborious to read. Author went into overabundant detail in what I thought were insignificant areas. Just one man's opinion.

Among the many lessons of this great and wise book--a book that is all the more unsettling because of its wisdom--is that the timidity and indecisiveness in our planning for escalation in Vietnam reflected a recognition that the cause was neither just nor noble. No such qualm existed in WWII or the American Revolution, and that it did exist in the Vietnam war rooms and more recently in Iraq, where we again deployed forces too small to meet the unforeseen immensity of the task (sound familiar?), should have told the planners something about the wisdom of the war.

When faced with a decision to go to war, we should either go with absolutely everything we've got to ensure as swift and decisive a victory as possible or we should not go at all. While Curtis LeMay's military instincts were correct when he continually called for massive force as debate over the nature of the anticipated escalation ensued, he was wrong on 'Nam because the war was wrong. If any one golden rule is to be taken from this book and its disturbingly contemporary relevance, it is this: whenever there is reticence to deploy, it is because the cause is questionable, and when the cause is questionable, there should be no war.

The sad pattern Halberstam's book illuminates is this: when we screw up with the increasingly popular but inherently contradictory notion of "limited war"--a concept that is always doomed to failure and has not once succeeded in any conflict during or since Vietnam--it wounds the pride of very proud men, necessitating even more disastrous escalation when it is too late and on grounds that have become even more irrational. General Ridgway understood this as early as 1954, and General Taylor continued to advise this even as Westmoreland took command and hardly anyone was listening. There is a lot of talk about hurt pride in this book: France's hurt pride after it failed in its colonial exploits in 'Nam, Mac Bundy's hurt pride after the Vietcong bombed Pleiku, JFK's hurt pride after his first disastrous meeting with Khrushchev, encouraging Kennedy to seriously consider escalation in 'Nam just so that we would not look "weak". The saga of wounded pride went on and on, and took many lives with it along the way.

"These things, set in motion, were much harder to stop and turn around than anyone had imagined," Halberstam writes. It is a lesson we're learning all over again. This has nothing to do with whether one supports or abhors the war in Iraq; this is about the disturbing precision with which the ambiguity of the exit strategy in Iraq resembles the failures, naivete and arrogance that turned Vietnam into such an international shame. Many are convinced that Iraq has already become that kind of shame, but I prefer to refrain from such judgments here lest political diatribe distract from the significance of this book, which is its abundance of lessons from a recent and eerily similar episode in American history that we are still yet to learn. How long will it take?

The similarities are endless. How can one read Halberstam's conclusion that "the civilians were naive about what the military could accomplish" and not recall Cheney and Rumsfeld assuring audiences that Iraqis would greet us with flowers and homage of appreciation for liberating them? How can one read that "Hanoi would never capitulate, never negotiate in the face of bombing pressure" and not consider the unrelenting insurgency in Iraq that continues to kill American troops despite ongoing American military operations? (I am writing this review shortly after learning that 5 more Marines have died in Iraq within the past 24 hours). How can one read that the American military "tended to underestimate . . . the resilience and the political dynamic which fed the indigenous force they were fighting" without again considering that same insurgency?

Time and again in Halberstam's book we learn that what happened then is happening now: the military's infiltration of American media with false optimism that fails to accurately portray sobering realities, the arrogant belief in American might that blinded us to the ability and commitment of an unorganized and surreptitious insurgency, the Johnson administration's public preference for the phrase "victory strategy" that resurfaced in response to journalists who asked about an "exit strategy", the calculated drum beat of fear assuring the American people that a threatening political ideology will sweep across the globe if we do not act now in a country thousands of miles away, a country which, as Halberstam reports, was viewed as "a land with vital resources" in Washington at the time. The list of similarities is seemingly endless.

It is easier to hear that Vietnam was fought for all the wrong reasons and nod your head in agreement than it is to read it in this book, which confirms in often infuriating detail that many of the decisions that led to escalation in 'Nam were made out of political expediency with little regard for the human tragedy involved. Late in the book, Halberstam's "good example of how the Army system worked" portrays a "staff intuitively protecting the commander from things he didn't want to see and din't want to hear, never coming up with information which might challenge what a commander wanted to do at a given moment." Exactly the opposite ought to be true when thousands of lives are on the line, but "the best and the brightest" chose their egos and their careers over concerns for the families of strangers whose lives they willingly sacrificed for a cause that is as poorly defined today as it was in 1965. I've got a bridge in San Francisco to sell to anyone who denies that history is repeating itself right before our eyes.

This is a well written epic that chronicles in great detail the American decision to go to war in S.E. Asia. One thing that strikes me is that this is a non-partisan work which is refereshing given the recent series of books (left and right)on Iraq. I have read about 20 books on the subject of Vietnam and this is by far the best.

This book is about the Vietnam war. But it is not just about Vietnam.

This is a book about the US political system and how it can be highjacked by a President wanting to do so. It shows how McCarthy made Washington scared of truth. And so started the delusions about China and then Vietnam. And the President could take the nation to war without sharing it with the Congress, Senate, and the people. This book is about how fragile the US presidential form of Government is, and how few checks and balance actually work.

This is also a book about careerists, blinded by success in the 'system', devoid of moral compasses. There are many in that era who had doubts. But they refused to sacrifice their careers for the sake of their doubts. This book shows how dangerous rationalists like McNamara and Bundy, the 'best and brightest' can be, if devoid of an anchor of values and ethics.

This is also a book about how narrow the US Government perspective was. Narrow in space where Vietnam was 'no match' to the superiority of American soldiers and technology. Narrow also in time where lessons from history were brushed aside.

This is also a book about lack of humility. It is full of 'can-do' characters full of optimism. And anyone who wants to think of contingencies is considered soft at best, at worst a traitor. Halberstam shows how lack of humility leads to final humiliation.

And finally, this book is about today, about another country in Asia. While reading this I almost felt that I was reading about the Iraq war. Doubtful basis for entry. Faith in limited, short term war, and then a tiger that is easy to mount but tough to get off. If we do not learn from History, we are doomed to repeat it. And we are doing it.

The Best and the Brightest is an incredible read about a politically and ideologically confused America. Halberstam makes an outstanding attempt at uncluttering the mess that was the U.S. government during the 60s. He also demythifizes the Kennedy team; a team that was comprised of the best and the brightest our country had to offer. Or were they? As described by Halberstam, though many were bright, they obviously weren't the best for the job. Even McNamara, who Halberstam glorifies for his ability to put together a sound system, seems to not be the right man for the job. The generals, particularly Westmoreland, were caught up in their own political/career minded shenaningans, that ultimately brought them down.

Halberstam's description of the Johnson administration is just down right scary. How any man could lead a nation such as the United States in such a foolhearty way, is unbelievable. According to Halberstam, Johnson didn't know which way was up, and like a fool, he could only fall down. And fall he did, like a drunk to a bar room floor.

The best part of the book is the in depth analysis of all the character's involved, and Halberstam pulls no punches. According to the generals, the South Vietnamese were cowards. Is that true? Or is it more likely that they were no more eager to kill their own country men than Union/Confederate soldiers were eager to kill their own countrymen? According to Halberstam Kennedy knew practically nothing about what was going on in South Vietnam, and worried continuously about what he was hearing. Is that true? All evidence as presented in the book, says it is. According to Halberstam, the entire war effort was no more than a sham put on by virtually everybody involved. Is that true? I am afraid that I believe that it is.

I highly recommend this book. I read the 20th Anniversary Edition, and I found it to be compelling and irressistable reading.

The title of Halberstam's book should clue the reader in to his focus. The Best and the Brightest's focus is on the the American Political and Military Leadership in the 1960's. The backdrop of the book is the Vietnam war and it is against this particularly tumultous backdrop that Halberstam weaves his story about the men of the American political establishment. This book should not really be counted as a history book, for the focus is less on the events than on the people who made the decisions which led to these events. Perhaps better classified as political science, the book is most valuable in providing an insight to the personalities, aspirations, fears and humanity of the leaders who are often presented in cardboard fashion by the news media.

In fact I would recommend against reading this book as a first primer on Vietnam. Halberstam leaps from place to place and he casually mentions events and names that the reader must be familiar with as to not be lost. However, once a solid understanding of the history is in place, Halberstam's book provides a deeper analysis of the decisions that led to the war. Often times, history describes what has happened, but rarely is the answer of why something happened answered or even approached. We all know that America became involved in Vietnam, but why? What were the policy makers thinking when they decided to escalate the war?

Halberstam's book is a insicive look at the operation and function of the government beauracracy that runs our nation. Behind the idealism, the proclaimations, the showy patriotism, lies men with the failings of frailties of each and everyone of us. The fear of rejection, the need to please a superior drove the decisions that led to Vietnam more than policy or strategy. It is scary to know and realize that in our day of computers, technology and trillion dollar defense budgets, that the decisions made on war and peace are still up to only a few men controled by the same human tendencies as the rest of us. Even the most rational man of the Kennedy era were not beyond human fears and hopes.

In summary, read this book not to understand the history of the Vietnam war, but to understand the America political system.

David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" is a mostly angry, but occasionally sympathetic book about the can-do activists of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. I think this is one of the best books written about the Vietnam War. If you read it today, you will think about Iraq and feel very sad.

In a way, this is a book in search of a hero and there was perhaps no one in the country with more power than Kennedy to influence the way Americans saw Vietnam and Communism. He had made a speech at American University where he asked Americans and Soviets alike to reexamine their attitude towards each other, but that kind of talk was rare, and it was a speech, Halberstam suggests, that would not have happened had Kennedy not proven his toughness during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy, of course had enormous doubts about Vietnam; they were based in large part on his reading of history and his own experiences. But those doubts existed during a time of unreal pressures. The culprit is the Korean War and the fall of China to Communism. The fall of China, in particular, would have a profound effect on the American people. It would spark a great debate about who had lost China, and while there was no consensus (some believed that China was never ours to lose and that those events were beyond our control), the State Department and the Democratic Party would take most of the blame. According to Halberstam, the result of all of this was devastating. From then on, U.S. Presidents would find themselves under enormous pressure to not lose any more countries.

"If there were problems", writes Halberstam "the Administration would somehow glide around them, letting time rather than political candor or courage do the healing. It was a belief that if there were scars from the period (and both the Democratic party and the Department of State were deeply scarred), they were by now secret scars, and if there were victims, they were invisible victims. If one looked away and did not talk about them, somehow they would go away. Yet the truth was altogether different: the scars and victims were real and the McCarthy period had frozen American policies on China and Asia. The Kennedy administration wou