On War is a great book and had Civil War Generals followed its advice, the war would have probably been over much sooner and not have lasted so long.

If you like military history, this is a must read.

I purchased the Everyman's Library edition of Von Clausewitz's On War for my husband, who is a military officer. He was deeply dissatisfied with the Penguin edition, which is awful in every respect, and so I went in search of an unabridged publication. The Everyman's library version is affordable at around twenty dollars, and expertly translated by the Princeton scholars Howard and Paret (who have a much more expensive but otherwise identical Princeton press edition published). It includes the entire unfinished work, including the books that focus on specifics of military tactics left out of the Penguin edition.
My only complaint about this excellent edition, which incidentally features a very helpful "how to read this book" section, is that it is somewhat cheaply bound and may not hold up to prolonged and intense study over the years. It would be nice to have an attractively bound copy for display in a library or office, as well. I fear we may begin to lose pages if we are not careful, but at twenty dollars, the book is replaceable. Steer clear of penguin, and go straight to Howard and Paret. You won't be sorry.

Very well written. A must have book for any student or practicioner of the Art and Strategy of War and/or the History of War.

This is one of those books where one of my immediate questions before I begin is whether or not I have enough qualifications in the subject matter to get anything useful out of the material. Some writers can be read relatively cold. Others cannot. In terms of military theory, I haven't read more than a few primary texts: The Art Of War and The Book of Five Rings.

Since Von Clausewitz spends quite a bit of time on base definitions, I found that even given my lack of background in military theory I was able to follow and engage with the material. I am sure that someone who has a better background in the subject matter would get even more. I was satisfied that it was a good use of my time.

Personally, I found myself focusing the most on the distinction that Von Clausewitz makes between strategy and tactics. It felt important, and quite applicable even off the battlefield. Even if I was only considering that theme, there would have been more than enough material for me to chew over. I was actually surprised with how much I enjoyed the book and how I never felt bored or lost.

I read the Wordsworth Library edition, which was significantly abridged. The first books are translated and published in full, with the abridgment increasing as the books progressed. This irritated me a little bit, but I may well be inclined to trust the editor's judgment that a casual reader like myself need not read the entire work. This edition had a rather blessedly clear and helpful introduction by Louise Willmot.

A virtual bible for the historian. Rather disjointed in some areas but should be in every library.

There is a reason that this is a classic. If I'm a teacher at a war college like
West Point , I can assign chapters
and test the students on the understanding of the material.
It is more in the western form of learning than Sun Tzu's classic.
Where does it fail?
Even at this time the "staff" type running of war
that defeated Napoleon was being used by joint European powers.
The running of a war has come to be viewed as like that of an effective business.
You even need a legal staff to deal with civilian complaints.
The modern mathematical approaches of games theory ( Rapoport ) for tactics and
systems theory ( Asimov ) for long range strategy are what spoil this book for me.
War as an object of nationalistic policy has been destroyed by science in our time.
The terrorists have tried to breath new life into the ancient war of faith
by killing their own people at a greater rate than they do the enemy.
Logistically that approach is destined to failure:
you just run out of soldiers fool enough to die for their god.
Carl von Clausewitz was sold on "genius" as the answer to war problems.
I think accounting ability may be as important.

There is a reason that this is a classic. If I'm a teacher at a war college like
West Point , I can assign chapters
and test the students on the understanding of the material.
It is more in the western form of learning than Sun Tzu's classic.
Where does it fail?
Even at this time the "staff" type running of war
that defeated Napoleon was being used by joint European powers.
The running of a war has come to be viewed as like that of an effective business.
You even need a legal staff to deal with civilian complaints.
The modern mathematical approaches of games theory ( Rapoport ) for tactics and
systems theory ( Asimov ) for long range strategy are what spoil this book for me.
War as an object of nationalistic policy has been destroyed by science in our time.
The terrorists have tried to breath new life into the ancient war of faith
by killing their own people at a greater rate than they do the enemy.
Logistically that approach is destined to failure:
you just run out of soldiers fool enough to die for their god.
Carl von Clausewitz was sold on "genius" as the answer to war problems.
I think accounting ability may be as important.

There is a reason that this is a classic. If I'm a teacher at a war college like
West Point , I can assign chapters
and test the students on the understanding of the material.
It is more in the western form of learning than Sun Tzu's classic.
Where does it fail?
Even at this time the "staff" type running of war
that defeated Napoleon was being used by joint European powers.
The running of a war has come to be viewed as like that of an effective business.
You even need a legal staff to deal with civilian complaints.
The modern mathematical approaches of games theory ( Rapoport ) for tactics and
systems theory ( Asimov ) for long range strategy are what spoil this book for me.
War as an object of nationalistic policy has been destroyed by science in our time.
The terrorists have tried to breath new life into the ancient war of faith
by killing their own people at a greater rate than they do the enemy.
Logistically that approach is destined to failure:
you just run out of soldiers fool enough to die for their god.
Carl von Clausewitz was sold on "genius" as the answer to war problems.
I think accounting ability may be as important.

In a nutshell: Don't waste your money on this version.

The original version of this translation dates to just after the turn of the century, but the introduction and further editing by Anatol Rapaport (a biologist and a musician, not a political scientist or historian), make this a clumsy read at best and downright misleading at worst.

Rapaport, for being an editor of Clausewitz, was not a believer in the trinitarian system (primordial violence, non-rational actions, and rationality)- probably not a good choice for a work which owes as much as it does to the first and second Trinities (army, people, and government).

If this is the only one you can get, then live with it. The first chance you get, get the much clearer, much more straightforward Paret/Howard translation, which is the one that's actually taught at most service schools as well as in universities in their courses that use it.

A few years ago, I translated the crucial first chapter of On War's first book from German into Portuguese. The results were then discussed vis-à-vis the Paret/Howard English version in our post-graduate program. Back then, I wrote a few additional comments in English about nuances of the Paret/Howard text [otherwise, very good], which - so I believed - seemed to dilute the depth of Clausewitz' exposition at key spots. These brief comments follow below, as I still believe they can be of some interest, particularly to those who meditate the relation between war and politics, and as they touch the very heart of Clausewitz unsurpassed insight into the nature of bellic conflict.

The first sentence is the Paret/Howard quotation; the second is the original German; and the third is how I would suggest it in English.


Title 26
* All Wars Can Be Considered Acts of Policy

** Sie koennen alle als politische Handlungen betrachtet werden

*** They [the wars of the previous paragraph] can all be approached as political actions.


§ 2
* If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but - as it conventionally is - as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more `political' than the first.

** denn betrachtet man die Politik wie die Intelligenz des personifizierten Staates, so muss unter allen Konstellationen, die ihr Kalkuel aufzufassen hat, doch auch diejenige begriffen sein koennen, wo die Natur aller Verhaeltnisse einen Krieg der ersten Art bedingt. Nur insofern man unter Politik nicht eine allgemeine Einsicht, sondern der `konventionellen' Begriff einer der Gewalt abgewendeten, behutsamen, verschlagenen, auch unredlichen Klugheit versteht, koennte die letzte Art des Krieges ihr mehr angehoeren als die erstere.

*** for if one approaches politics as the intelligence of the personified state, so it ought to be possible, among all constellations that its [the personified state's] calculus must consider, to understand those [constellations] in which the nature of all relationships also determines a war of the first kind. Only if one understands politics in the conventional [depreciative italics] view - as a violence-averse, cautious, devious, and even dishonest cunning - and not as a generic discernment; only then could the last kind of war belong more to politics than the first.


§ 3
*First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently.

** Wir sehen erstens: dass wir uns den Krieg unter allen Umstaende als kein selbstaendiges Ding, sondern als ein politisches Instrument zu denken haben; und nur mit dieser Vorstellungsart ist es moeglich, nicht mit den saemtlichen Kriegsgeschichte in Widerspruch zu geraten. Sie allein schliesst das grosse Buch zu verstaendiger Einsicht auf.

*** First, therefore, we see that we ought always to think of war as a political instrument, and by no means as an autonomous thing. And only with this kind of conception we will not contradict the entire history of war. It [this kind of conception] alone [my italics] opens the great book of proper understanding.


101 § 1
* ... a paradoxical trinity...

** ... eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit...

*** ... an amazing trinity...


§2
* The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

** Die erste dieser drei Seiten ist mehr dem Volke, die zweite mehr dem Feldherrn und seinem Heer, die dritte mehr der Regierung zugewendet.

*** The first of these three dimensions is directed more to the people; the second, more to the commander and his army; the third, more to the government.


§3
* These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.

** Diese drei Tendenzen, die als ebenso viele verschiedene Gesetzgebungen erscheinen, sind tief in der Natur des Gegenstandes gegruendet und zugleich von veraendlicher Groesse.

*** These three tendencies, which appear just like many different codes of law, have their foundation laid deep in the nature of the object and, at the same time, may acquire variable magnitudes.

My final suggestion is that the name of Clausewitz' book in English should be "Of War", instead of "On War". This is not only a picky nuance: there is a wide and deep gulf between "Of" (`Von', `De') and "On" (`Über', `Super'), a gulf which has been overlooked even by the best philosophers - but not by Clausewitz. Everyday language makes us used to mistakes such as "speak on something", "reflect on something", and truly, these things do not happen. We speak something, meditate/mediate a thought. Clausewitz speaks of war, and certainly not ON war; Jomini speaks on war: he is actually sitting ontop of it, and, really, knows too little to speak OF it.

If you are going into politics this book is for you. It is very abstract and rambles on for thousands of words in order to get to a single point.

If you are like me I read it, hoping to find great ideas about strategy, and how to best understand ways for armies to maneuver and defeat an enemy. Clauswitz, however, really did not fulfill my needs.

After reading other books titled "The Art of War" there are two that are better than Clauswitz, regarding operational strategy. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini's "The Art of War," and Sun Tzu's "The Art of War." These go straight to the point. Jomini's was written in the same era of Clauswitz. Like Clauswitz it discusses the principles and lessons of the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Unlike Clauswitz, Jomini discusses how commanders can best use specific strategies in battles, like flank attacks, the oblique order, convex order, etc.--Fun Stuff!

Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" is like reading Psalms (only with military themes)--it is most concise; with fewer words each passage inspires one's mind with creativity in understanding important principles of strategy (there was not much space anyway on bamboo for ancient Chinese philosophers to write long treatises, like that of Clauswitz!)

Much of the philosophies of Clauswitz are viable, but there is a foolish one that I must give criticism to. It is well known in military studies that the generals of World War I studied this book extensively. In "On War," Chapter XI, the author states, "Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then it is a ground for paying more respect for war...." World War I commanders must have really taken this to heart, because the Western Front must have been the most wasteful and unproductive meat grinder in the history of warfare. For example, Falkenhayn wanted to bleed the French white in the Battle of Verdun. He got his wish--a total of a million people died. What positive result did it get anyone? NOTHING! (I guess you can say there WAS more respect for the horrors of war, but what good did that do for millions of families which lost loved ones!) This Clauswitzian theme for bloodshed proved moot when in World War II armies followed a different theme: fight with as little casualties as possible.

-Everyone expressing a erudite opinion about Clausewitz or "ON WAR" has completely missed the point here.
-The question is NOT whether Clausewitz or "On War" is an essential read for everyone interested in military hsitory or military affairs. THAT is a moot piont to the Nth Degree.

-The REAL question IS - WHY would you pay $595.oo for a book that has the same identical information as another book for $30.oo ?!?!?!?
-That is the ONLY question regarding THIS particular version of "ON WAR".
-Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!

Subject book arrived well within prescribed time frame; was well packed and in perfect condition. This volume is a valued edition to my library and I thank you very much for your perfect packing and timely shipment.

Thanx