This Was a very good book which should have been writen before the Vietnam War. Ir was needed badley.

If you are looking for a book to serve as a foundation of knowledge on counterinsurgency warfare, this is it. It provides what is essentially an executive summary of two major types of insurgencies. The author is very knowledgeable and "down-to-earth." I have spent two years in Iraq and wish that I had read this book prior to 2003. I have recommended it to all of my friends and peers who have involvement with Soldiers, NCOs, Officers, or cadets.

A classic.
I sent mine to Iraq. I wish all the Marines would read it.
And better yet, all the commanders.

This book should be on the required reading for any of the military that are in/going to Iraq and Afghanistan. Page 4 states the obvous, that only took us four years in Iraq to learn...the objective (center of gravity) is the population. The new counterinsugency manual borrows heavily from this book. Since "irregular warfare" is the new buzz in the military, the rank and file should read this to understand that you can not kill your way to victory and the indirect approach is the way to go. Quiet professionals have been saying this all along...

I will not repeat the good things said in previous reviews on this work, as they cover it well, and the credentials of the previous reviewers in several instances should also speak for themselves.

Galula's book is a very good effort for trying to look at the lessons of counterinsurgency objectively. In reading reviews and other materials on the book, as well as talking to people about it, I fear, however, that Galula's work is often taken out of its historical context, which is dangerous. Galula's essay, like Roger Trinquier's "Modern Warfare," need to be seen in the context of the French guerre revolutionnaire, developed first in Indochina between 1945-1954 (French defense journals at the time are replete with the writings of officers developing the school of guerre revolutionnaire), and carried over to Algeria between 1954-1962. The guerre revolutionnaire school argued that counterinsurgents needed to not just understand the insurgents, but fight a counterinsurgency using the tactics and strategy of insurgency. The intellectual starting point was Mao. The guerre revolutionnaire school and its intellectual heritage in the French Army goes a long way toward explaining many of the excesses and brutal tactics used in Algeria. The four generals who tried to overthrow de Gaulle in April 1961 were some of the guerre revolutionnaire's most vocal disciples.

Thus, while Galula's book is invaluable, I fear it being taken out of context of the guerre revolutionnaire school of thought in the French army during the 1950s. There is unfortunately very little on it in English as well, which is part of the problem. For anyone wishing to use Galula's precepts in counterinsurgency or to understand the nature of counterinsurgency, please make sure you learn more about the French military in Indochina and Algeria and the context from which Galula formed his ideas of counterinsurgency.

This a must read for officers, soldiers, and thinkers to understand the framework and theory of the relationship between an insurgency and its counter insurgency. A bit dated, but most of the information still appears to carry its value till today.

Having lived through the 60s and Viet Nam, I can recognize much of what is in the news today - just change the names. The type of war we now face has had many names: revolutionary war, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, guerrilla warfare, asymmetric warfare, and so on. One size does not fit all, and it would be a fool who believes that there is a one-for-one match between conflicts. It would also be a fool who ignores the practical, political, and theoretical basis for such conflicts and the extent to which they share characteristics.

This book addresses more the military end. This is not in any way a criticism. This book is very well written and well worth the reading. At the time it was written, armies were attempting to build a doctrinal base to use in such conflicts. In doing so, they also concentrated on the military. Again, this is not in any way a criticism, for doing so is their job. The political aspects of such conflicts are, properly, the job of the civilian leadership.

The Iraq conflict, and the war in Afghanistan, have brought the subject again to the world's attention. My personal opinion is that many are now busy re-inventing the wheel.

For anyone interested in the subject, many books are available. The best of the recent publications is General Sir Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. Carl von Clausewitz edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. is a given, as is Sun Tzu, and Mao Tse-Tung's, Selected Military Writings. Peking, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1966. Smith gives the best account of the need for combining all factors in a situation such as we find ourselves in now. Wesley Clark also does a good job of describing the complicated nature of modern conflicts.

Other books are listed below, in no particular order. The (H) and (P) indicate if the book is hardcover or paperback.

Thompson, Sir Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency, The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pbulishers, 1966. (H)

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. (P)

McCuen, John J.. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1966. (H)

Paret, Peter and John W. Shy. Guerrillas in the 1960's, Revised Edition. New York: Frederick A. Praaeger, Publisher, 1962. (P)

Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria, The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964. (H)

Guevara, Ernesto "Che." Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961. (H)

Bern, Major H. von Dach. Total Resistance, Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1965. (H)

Guevara, Ernesto "Che". Guerrilla Warfare, A Method. Peking, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1964. (P)

Clark, General Wesley K.. Waging Modern War, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2002. (P)(Original Source)

Clark, General Wesley K.. Winning Modern Wars, Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire. New York: Public Affairs Books, 2003. (P)(Original Source)

Read this and understand the difficulties the US is encountering in Iraq.

Some things never change, like an insurgency and how to fight them effectively! And due to he complex wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Galula's classic, written based on his experiences in the Algerian war during the 1950's, has been resurrected. A French Army Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Galula lays out in pretty good detail the necessary methods and procedures for counter-insurgency operations. Galula's clearly articulates that the counter-insurgency requires a methodical approach to defeating the enemy by aggressively controlling and isolating the population, developing a good intelligence program in order to insure to the same population that they are safe from reprisal from the insurgents. Kinetic attacks; killing people and destroying places will only alienate the people that you are trying to win over. I recommend this book for all who are trying to figure out how to defeat an insurgency. If I was a young or old military or State department official I would read this book and act on it's recommendations.

Mr. Galula has captured in this small volume the essentials of counterinsurgency warfare. While dated in some respects, his book provides exacting and honest details in the difficulties of counterinsurgency---as we are witnessing in Iraq (his experience was in Algeria). Wisely, the US military is augmenting their doctrine with his sage advice. While the USMC's Small Wars Manual works well for the nuts-and-bolts of occupation and administration, Mr. Galula provides the tactical necessities and practical solutions. The success of his philosophy is, no doubt, responsible for the measured success of recent changes in US military activity of Iraq. The book is frank in describing the real challenges, and also the uncertainty of victory. The US military has been transformed over the last ten years, becoming more expeditionary and nimble---thus more capable of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare operations.
This book should be required reading for members of Congress (particularly the "cut and run" crowd) and the administration. It is only through a proper understanding of the enemy and their tactics that a military force can capably and successfully engage and gain victory. Get this book if you want to understand what our men and women in uniform are facing in the war on terror. Insightful and informative from cover to cover. Highly recommended.

David Galula's account of the lessons he learned fighting in Algeria is the single best book on counterinsurgency. It heavily influenced the writing of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency; especially important were Galula's lessons about the primacy of political over military elements of power in a COIN campaign and the incredible importance of information operations. "Counteirnsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" should be heavily highlighted and reside on the bookshelf of every counterinsurgent.

Not much more need be said. Study the old to understand the new. Superb read all the way through. Now, I only hope the people who need this book will read, study and implement this wisdom. Probably not...

David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice is as relevant today as it was when it was originally published decades ago. This is the book that every general should read. To put it more succinctly, if you are a general serving in the American armed forces today and have not read this book, then you are wrong. Galula's careful study of past revolutionary warfare is prophetic of today's conflicts across the globe especially the War in Iraq.

As part of a recent series of republished books on the subject of insurgencies, Galula's provides the important foundation from which to branch into more specific areas of conflict. I wish we had book at West Point when I was a cadet, and I recommend it to the Department of History and the Department of Military Science without reservation.

Drawing upon decades of experience participating in counter-revolutionary warfare and studying it across the globe, Galula's analysis is tempered with a strong dose of reality. I had difficulty sometimes thinking he was writing about today's wars when talking so eloquently about previous insurgencies that parallel today's realities. Galula's references are outstanding, his analysis is thorough, and his conclusions valid.