Despite the professional look of the book, the writing is unorganized and amateurish. Unfortunately, I was distracted from the interesting and important subject matter of the book by typos, grammatical errors, and confusing sentence structure. The author and the editors obviously never reread the book before it was published. Having read the book, I come away with little more information than I knew before. The highest point is the chapter on Ashura, but I do not understand how it merits in-depth analysis when Hezbollah's hierarchy itself disapproves of the extent of the celebration. Especially puzzling is why this chapter is included in a book on Hezbollah while the detailed workings of the organization itself are ignored.

This book is terribly concerned with the idea most people seem to have with Hezbollah, that it is a terrorist organization. The fact that Hezbollah commits murders, kidnappings and launches random rocket attacks at civilians may have led to this unfortunate perception. The author attempts to correct this by pointing out that Hezbollah (with Iranian money) builds hospitals, educational facilities and gives aid to those Shi'a in Lebanon who are in poverty. What the author does not discuss of course is if Hezbollah did not make a habit of kidnapping and killing people who get in its way, many NGOs and the Lebanese government might be able to operate in the areas they control. Better yet, the absence of Hezbollah might go far to relieving the fear, uncertainty and poverty in South Lebanon.

And as far as Hezbollah's "good works" are concerned, the Nazis operated soup kitchens during the Great Depression. That did not make them in less the thug.

This book discusses Hezbollah and its origins in Lebanon but never really seems to get into concrete EVENTS. Even the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel is discussed in extremely vague terms. The book discusses Amal's relationship to Hezbollah without ever really saying what that relationship IS. In fact, the book has the feel of being written by someone who undoubtably has access to many of the key players in Hezbollah, Lebanon, etc. and yet is hesitant to be too forthright lest that access be taken away. Characterizing Hezbollah as "more than a terrorist organization" is one way of doing this, implying that it is a political party and public works program as well as an organization for holding people against their will or just killing them outright. By this definition, the Soviet gulag should have been called "more than a terrorist organization."

This book is terribly concerned with the idea most people seem to have with Hezbollah, that it is a terrorist organization. The fact that Hezbollah commits murders, kidnappings and launches random rocket attacks at civilians may have led to this unfortunate perception. The author attempts to correct this by pointing out that Hezbollah (with Iranian money) builds hospitals, educational facilities and gives aid to those Shi'a in Lebanon who are in poverty. What the author does not discuss of course is if Hezbollah did not make a habit of kidnapping and killing people who get in its way, many NGOs and the Lebanese government might be able to operate in the areas they control. Better yet, the absence of Hezbollah might go far to relieving the fear, uncertainty and poverty in South Lebanon.

And as far as Hezbollah's "good works" are concerned, the Nazis operated soup kitchens during the Great Depression. That did not make them in less the thug.

Richard Norton has chronicled the origins and development of the Lebanese resistance party Hezbollah, which rose to prominence as one of the major political players during Israel's occupation of Lebanon during the 1980's. This account benefits from Norton's background in anthropology which enables him to analyze the cultural and ethnic complexity of Lebanon in his discussion. However, his historical background on the political history of Lebanon is somewhat meandering and also slim.

At the same time, this book clears up some misconceptions about Hezbollah. The first of which is that Hezbollah should be regarded as a terrorist group with similar aims of other Islamic fundamentalists organizations like the Taliban and Islamic Jihad. Hezbollah is primarily a defensive organization, and it developed largely in response to Israel's aggression in Southern Lebanon. Norton also points out that the Western belief that Hezbollah was responsible for the death of over 30 U.S. Marines is false, and that that particular atrocity is probably the work of Shi militant agents working for Iran. However, Norton also clears up the misconception that Hezbollah is a "freedom-fighting" organization, and that it's tactics are legal, and that its aims are accomodationist and pluralistic. Hezbollah remains an Islamic theocratic party committed to the destruction of Israel, and it has often chosen poor military tactics with regard to Israel's borders.

This is a worthwhile, though incomplete account of a rising political force in the Middle East.

In this short, but revealing book, Norton has provided an excellent overview of the history and politics surrounding Hezbollah. The book contains chapters on the founding of the group, its internal dynamics, as well as how it operates in the regional context. Unlike some analysis of the group, Norton freely discusses both sides of the group: the side that operates and behaves like an organized and effective political party, and the side that can be characterized as a terrorist organization. Norton does this with relative ease and a clear and direct writing style. He demonstrates that the group has evolved at a rapid pace and that no one can say with absolute certainty how the group will continue to evolve.

Unlike Harik's work on Hezbollah, Norton does a fine job of retaining some neutrality here and does not let a great deal of personal opinion seep into what should be a scholarly work. He has an impressive amount of experience working inside Lebanon and is thus very close to the subject he writes about, but this does not appear to have caused him to tilt one way or the other. His chapter on the July 2006 war with Israel is proof of that. His treatment of a highly controversial subject is remarkably balanced. He identifies what both sides were doing and thinking at the time and how it led to the outbreak of real hostilities.

The book is relatively short, but it was not meant to be a sweeping and comprehensive history. He deals with all of the important aspects of the group and the finished product should be read by all those seeking a greater understanding of Hezbollah. Anything Norton produces in the future will be essential reading for the field.

This book is entertaining, all too short and rather sloppily edited -- for example whether Israel destroyed 15000 homes (p.111) or 1500 homes (p.144) in the 2006 bombardment, as well as several typographical errors you wouldn't expect in few pages with large print. Moreover it is less about Hezbollah than about Shi'i politics in Lebanon since the 1970s. There are no interviews with Hezbollah officials and only a few quotations from public sources. This is understandable, however: I wanted a book, in 2007, that said _something_ about Hezbollah in the context of the 2006 war, and this provides it. Lebanese politics are intricate and this book doesn't seem to oversimplify matters. Plus there's a chapter that first appeared in a drama journal on the dramaturgy of Ashura. As others have implied here, the book probably assumes sympathy for the Shi'a in Lebanon, as against Israel in particular: that's fine with me, but it's obviously not fine with everyone.

I would ask Mr Norton for more detailed information about Hezbollah's connections with Iran and for some characterization of the social or class position of Hezbollah among Lebanese Shi'a, as against AMAL's, say.

Norton says that Hezbollah came about as the result of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. And he quotes Prime Minister Rabin as asking what he was supposed to do about the threat to Israeli towns anywhere near the Lebanese border. Well, I would like to ask Norton the same question. He sure does not answer it in this book.

Norton also challenges the idea that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, but I think this merely confuses the issue. Hezbollah clearly has a goal of getting rid of human rights for Levantine Jews, by violent means. And Norton says in his conclusion that he hopes that Hezbollah will play a constructive role in the future of Lebanon. But I think that is a little like saying that one hopes the National Socialists will play a constructive role in the future of Germany. I think we all ought to hope that they don't. We ought to be opposing counterproductive organizations, not hoping that they will fare well.

This book has met with a very negative review from Jonathan Schanzer in the Jerusalem Post, and I think it is worthwhile to see if that review makes some valid points.

Schanzer notes that Hezbollah "exists to further the violent aims of Iran, to demonize and attack the US and to destroy Israel." And he says that Norton "neglects to state this unequivocally and, for that reason, he should be publicly shamed." I agree. By the way, Shanzer has also pointed out that Norton and Sara Roy have written an article in which they say that there can be no Israeli peace process that excludes Hamas. Given that Hamas insists on destroying Israel, this seems to show more than a little bit of bias on Norton's (and Roy's) part as well.

There are numerous places in the book where Norton does indeed give some rationalizations for Hezbollah's violent acts, and Shanzer names some of them. And I agree with Shanzer that it would show far more academic honesty, objectivity, and integrity on Norton's part were he to show how weak some of these excuses happen to be.

There's some useful material in this book about the nature of Hezbollah, but I think we readers deserve a less biased accounting.

Norton says that Hezbollah came about as the result of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. And he quotes Prime Minister Rabin as asking what he was supposed to do about the threat to Israeli towns anywhere near the Lebanese border. Well, I would like to ask Norton the same question. He sure does not answer it in this book.

Norton also challenges the idea that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, but I think this merely confuses the issue. Hezbollah clearly has a goal of getting rid of human rights for Levantine Jews, by violent means. And Norton says in his conclusion that he hopes that Hezbollah will play a constructive role in the future of Lebanon. But I think that is a little like saying that one hopes the National Socialists will play a constructive role in the future of Germany. I think we all ought to hope that they don't. We ought to be opposing counterproductive organizations, not hoping that they will fare well.

This book has met with a very negative review from Jonathan Schanzer in the Jerusalem Post, and I think it is worthwhile to see if that review makes some valid points.

Schanzer notes that Hezbollah "exists to further the violent aims of Iran, to demonize and attack the US and to destroy Israel." And he says that Norton "neglects to state this unequivocally and, for that reason, he should be publicly shamed." I agree. By the way, Shanzer has also pointed out that Norton and Sara Roy have written an article in which they say that there can be no Israeli peace process that excludes Hamas. Given that Hamas insists on destroying Israel, this seems to show more than a little bit of bias on Norton's (and Roy's) part as well.

There are numerous places in the book where Norton does indeed give some rationalizations for Hezbollah's violent acts, and Shanzer names some of them. And I agree with Shanzer that it would show far more academic honesty, objectivity, and integrity on Norton's part were he to show how weak some of these excuses happen to be.

There's some useful material in this book about the nature of Hezbollah, but I think we readers deserve a less biased accounting.

Norton says that Hezbollah came about as the result of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. And he quotes Prime Minister Rabin as asking what he was supposed to do about the threat to Israeli towns anywhere near the Lebanese border. Well, I would like to ask Norton the same question. He sure does not answer it in this book.

Norton also challenges the idea that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, but I think this merely confuses the issue. Hezbollah clearly has a goal of getting rid of human rights for Levantine Jews, by violent means. And Norton says in his conclusion that he hopes that Hezbollah will play a constructive role in the future of Lebanon. But I think that is a little like saying that one hopes the National Socialists will play a constructive role in the future of Germany. I think we all ought to hope that they don't. We ought to be opposing counterproductive organizations, not hoping that they will fare well.

This book has met with a very negative review from Jonathan Schanzer in the Jerusalem Post, and I think it is worthwhile to see if that review makes some valid points.

Schanzer notes that Hezbollah (or Hizbulah if you prefer) "exists to further the violent aims of Iran, to demonize and attack the US and to destroy Israel." And he says that Norton "neglects to state this unequivocally and, for that reason, he should be publicly shamed." I agree. By the way, Shanzer has also pointed out that Norton and Sara Roy have written an article in which they say that there can be no Israeli peace process that excludes Hamas. Given that Hamas insists on destroying Israel, this seems to show more than a little bit of bias on Norton's (and Roy's) part as well.

There are numerous places in the book where Norton does indeed give some rationalizations for Hezbollah's violent acts, and Shanzer names some of them. And I agree with Shanzer that it would show far more academic honesty, objectivity, and integrity on Norton's part were he to show how weak some of these excuses happen to be.

There's some useful material in this book about the nature of Hezbollah, but I think we readers deserve a less biased accounting.

Dr. Norton's short history of Hezbollah provides a nice introduction to the birth, development, and evolution of this complex organization for American (and other English speaking) readers. The US media almost always portrays Hezbollah as an anti-Semitic, Islamofascist, terrorist organization that is opposed to Israel, America, and freedom because they are `evil'. The reality is, of course, much more complex. If you are tired of reading the US media's propaganda about Hezbollah and want to learn a bit more about reality, this is a good place to start.

There are several strengths to this book, and in particular, there are several key points that Norton addresses that I feel are especially significant. First, I think that the reader who is relatively new to Hezbollah and/or Lebanese history and politics in general will better understand the complexities and non-linearities amongst the various confessional groups. The relationships, both internal and external, between the various actors in Lebanon CANNOT be simply understood in terms of the Arab/Israeli, Shi'ite/Sunni, Muslim/Christian, and pro/anti Syrian forces. The alliances among all the major players inside Lebanon (e.g. Hezbollah, AMAL, the various Maronite and Orthodox groups, etc.) as well as with the outside players (primarily Syria, the US, France, and Israel) are constantly changing. Second, I think that the centrality of the Palestinian issue will become clearer to most readers. There are hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees living as non-citizens in Lebanon, and this was the most important (but certainly not only) cause of the disintegration of the Lebanese govt in the mid-70s. This problem still hangs over everything else in Lebanon. Any permanent resolution of the internal problems in Lebanon MUST be part of a larger Arab/Israeli (i.e. Palestinian/Israeli) settlement. Third, this book explores some of the religious and ideological underpinnings of the revolutionary worldview of Hezbollah. The nature of this worldview is widely misunderstood by Western observers, and Norton attempts to explain some of the underpinnings of this world view. Fourth, Hezbollah has always claimed that its existence is necessary to defend Lebanon from Israel. Norton discusses this point at length and presents in detail the opposing view that Israel would have left Lebanon long before 2000 and would not have bombed Lebanon in 2006 if Hezbollah disarmed. We'll never know what would have happened if Hezbollah had disarmed after the 1989 peace agreement, but my personal feeling is that the Israelis would today be draining the water from the Litani river to fill the swimming pools of their settlers without Hezbollah. Finally a significant fraction of the book is devoted to the build up and events of the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006. Dr. Norton presents an informative and balanced view of events here in my opinion (in spite of what Mr. Frantzman writes in his review).

The major negative comment that I have about this work is that it is too short. I know that this is supposed to be a `short history', but I think that the astute reader will readily discern that an enormous amount of detail has been swept under the rug. In the end, the interested reader will be left wanting more, and will only start to understand some of the complexities of Hezbollah. Bottom line though is that whether you support Hezbollah, view them as a terrorist organization, or have no opinion and simply want to learn more, I think that Dr. Norton's work is well balanced introduction into the complexities of Hezbollah.

This book bills itself as a history of Hezbullah but the cover migth begin to betray the viewpoint expressed within. It is an exact copy of the Hezbullah flag, as if this were in fact a Hezbullah official document. In fact this is mostly a pro-Hezbullah story about an 'indigenous' organization of 'resistence' that grew up after the 1976 Lebanon Civil war and in the wake of the Syrian and Israeli invasions of Lebanon. As a Shia movement it was not unique, Amal existed before, but as a fighting organization it became perticularly brutal and strong, evnetually forming a Shia mini-state in Southern Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawel of 2000. Minorities disappeared from thin its midst and it had pretensions to run Lebanon as the Shia birthrate is the highest in the country. It thus became opposed by the Druze, Maronites and Sunnis.

But in 2006 it launched a war against Israel, pretending that it was fighitng to 'defend Lebanon' or to get back Shaba farms or for 'prisoners' but in reality it wanted to provoke a war that would bring it to power and make Lebanese think that it was neccesary.

This book tries to prove that Hezbullah is not a 'terrorist' organization and that it really is a defensive resistence movement aimed at waiting in case Israel "decides to re-ignite the war." It is supposedly given legitimacy because of the Shia backing it has, but this is an illogical statement, many countries have minorities, it doesnt mean they should have their own minority malitias? This book doesnt give any blame to Hezbullah for starting the war in 2006 or give any critique of Hezbullah methods. This is too bad and makes this a very biased account.

Seth J. Frantzman

This book is too quick a survey to debate the pros and cons of Hezbollah. The author's bottom line is that Hezbollah does not qualify to be an international terrorist organization and that its rank and file is made of Lebanese militants. Norton quotes Nasrallah as telling late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri that the Hezbollah members were born in Lebanon, were living in Lebanon and would die in Lebanon. The Lebanese nature of the party is granted, the problem remains in the political agenda and affiliations of the group.
Under Syrian patronage, Hezbollah was allowed to create its own state within the Lebanese state. Hezbollah has its own budget, maintains its own militia and has its own foreign policy as it decides when to go to war with Israel or not. All of these functions should be reserved for the Lebanese state only.
After the Syrian withdrawal, and as a payback for the Syrian regime's favors, Hezbollah tried to extend the Syrian mandate over Lebanon by coercing all other groups into accepting Syrian dictates, now offered in a Hezbollah wrap. While many Lebanese groups expressed their opposition to the Hezbollah mandates, the group proved to be inexperience in politics as it went around bullying everybody else especially the Lebanese government.
It would have been better for Norton had he argued whether Hezbollah is willing to give up on its loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khaminei. Even though Hezbollah was created a quarter century back, it only got engaged in Lebanese politics after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. The first Hezbollah ministers to enter the cabinet did so after the Syrian withdrawal. This should tell us something. No one in Lebanon is disputing Hezbollah's Lebanese-ness or the lack of it. Everyone is contending, however, the willingness of this group to give up on its mini state and enter in partnership with other Lebanese groups as part of the national Lebanese state. This Norton fails to notice or discuss.

Lumped into the one size fits all portrayal of terror groups popularized by the media and the government, the author performs a valuable public service in removing Hezbollah from this fog of uncertainty and falsehood, portraying it accurately amid the context of radicalization and growing awareness within the Shia community in the 70's and early 80's. Norton highlights the inherent conflict within Hezbollah between pragmatism and dedication to the founding tenets of the organization.
It is the resolution of this conflict that will determine the fate of Lebanon amid the power struggles ongoing in the aftermath of the summer 2006 conflict that the author says split Lebanon into two groups; those who support the goals of the Cedar Revolution and those who feel victimized by the corrupt government and elites, seeking to share power at the expense of the Sunni power structure.
The pragmatism of Hezbollah seems without limits, whether cooperating with Communist or Christian groups in political parlays or in adhering to the "rules of the game" devised by them and the Israelis during the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. It is this pragmatism that sets Hezbollah apart from other Islamist political organizations and Norton does a fine job of exploring it in detail.
A fascinating look that could have been far longer and examined far more but remains one of the best on the subject.