Professor David Kennedy's book is a ground-breaking study for strategic theorists since he opens to theory the operational level dimension of law in war.

"War is still the continuation of politics by other means. In broader terms, modern war reflects modern political life. In large measure, our modern politics is legal politics: the terms of engagement are legal, the players are legal institutions, their powers expanded and limited by law. . . to understand modern war, we must understand the global and national context within which the politics of power and war are waged." Page 14.

Kennedy bases his study on Clausewitzian theory, that is war being a continuation of politics by other (organized violent) means. Also modern war is very much a "dialogue" that takes place among elites in which the actual nature of the specific war in question in defined. Not only humanitarian institutions, but also the military have an interest in establishing a legal framework in which military activity can operate and thus gain "legitimacy". This was not always the case as Kennedy shows in his discussion of how our view of war and law have changed over the last 200 years.

I do find several weaknesses to this otherwise strong argument however. First, this operational view of war is very much US-centric having to do with 21st Century American society and how we look at the world. The importance of this operational level is thus connected with the place of the US on the geo-strategic stage, a weakening of US power/influence would thus affect this level as well.

Second, existing at the operational level means that it can be "trumped" so to speak at the higher or strategic level, that is this level is very much tied to a strategy of attrition. By achieving strategic success by way of a strategy of annihilation one can neutralize this legal operational level, that is rapid success on the ground and attaining strategic success quickly can preclude this element having much influence. Witness the recent conflict in Georgia in this regard.

Finally, as Kennedy points out the trend is that legal operations do not enhance legitimacy for one side or the other but over time tend to favor the weaker side. The very relevance of the level of legal operations rests on the assumption of credibility and legitimacy, but legal operations, especially done by powerful states to mask what their actual political (and economic) objectives are, only tend to discredit the question of legality of their resorting to war in general.

In all this is a very interesting and groundbreaking work especially for strategic theorists who are not use to thinking about war in this way.

In this short book, David Kennedy refers to what military commanders call "lawfare", the use of law, particularly humanitarian law, as a shield and a sword, by organized militaries, partisans, insurgents, and terrorists alike. In a much longer but less effective book, the Shield of Achilles Phillip Bobbitt has recently written in different terms on the mutual relation between law and strategy. In the realm of emergency, the distinction between the two becomes relatively thin. Bobbitt's book demonstrates that at certain times, strategic "imperatives" have generated legal regimes. A point that Bobbit has overlooked, however, is the use of law as a strategic instrument. This is what might be called, not so much the instrumentalization, but the "weaponization" of law, and a focus on this is Kennedy's contribution to contemporary discussions on law and strategy.