Professor Klarman's book is a study of the interplay between Politics, Social Forces, and legal doctrine. He's searching for the links between political realities and legal rulings. How are they shaping each other? In studying the relations between the decisions of the US Supreme Court and the reality of White-Black relations in the American South, Klarman's conclusion is that the Supreme Court's opinions are very much shaped by the social and political realities. The effect of the Supreme Court's decision on the political landscape is more subtle.

Between the 1890s and the outbreak of the Second World War, judicial rulings became slowly but steadily more pro-blacks. The earlier decisions were epitomized by the Plessey case, which held that states were allowed to discriminate in public transportation. Only one Justice, former slave-owner John Marshall Harlan had dissented, and argued that the "constitution is color-blind". But even Harlan did not doubt the propriety of segregation in education, and neither he nor any other Justice did much to prevent Lynching, voter intimidation, all-white-Juries and a variety of other discriminatory practices.

In this, the Justices were very much men of their time, an era of unquestioned white supremacy. America was a white man's land; with the Civil War receding into distant memory, White Northerners, who faced increasing immigration from blacks, Asians, and East Europeans, did not feel compelled to intervene on behalf of the Blacks.

But even if the Justices were inclined to combat Jim Crow (the popular name of the racist Southern regime), there was not much they could have done. Unlike the post-World War 2 era, the Federal government was not closely engaged within Southern states. Thus the Court's decisions had to be executed by Southern Judges, Politicians, and Policemen - the very leaders of Jim Crow. Furthermore, the legal segregation and discrimination were mostly formalities. Jim Crow kept Blacks "in their place" with the hanging rope and the burning cross, with economic sanctions and social intimidation. Whether their misery was legally sanctioned or not could not have made a large difference in the daily lives of Southern Blacks.

From the outbreak of the First World War to the outbreak of the second, race relations in America slowly improved, and the Judges' decisions became increasingly, albeit subtly, black-friendly. Beaten confessions were thrown out; patently racist disenfranchising laws were declared unconstitutional. The Justices for the first time inferred discrimination in Jury selection from the fact that Juries were, de facto, always white.

But the changes were slow. Only with the creation of Roosevelt's Court, with the appointment of new Justices such as Hugo Black and William Douglas, did the Court stridently strike against segregation and Jim Crow. The shift in the Court during and after the Second World War reflected the social changes in American society, which has become more egalitarian as the economic and political power of Blacks increased, as the nation was becoming more unified, and as revulsion of Fascism translated into widespread anti-racist views. The Cold War also played its part: When America competed for the alliance of Non-Western Countries, Jim Crow has become a liability and an embarrassment.

The New Deal Justices, and their successors, were strongly committed to destroying the racist policies of the South. They ruled against segregation in higher education, against all-white political primaries, against unfair police practices. And most famously, they hit the Apartheid's system's most cherished institution. The landmark case of "Brown vs. Board of Education" barred segregation in public schools.

Brown, Klarman argues, had a paradoxical effect: It made things better by first making them worse. Brown led to desegregation of the boarder South, but not in the Deep South. There, Brown's effect was to radicalize the white population. Before "Brown", Southerners were inclined to allow Jim Crow to be chipped away - the desegregation of higher education and public accommodation caused little or no fuss, and the opposition to voting rights was hardly insurmountable. Southern politicians in the pre-Brown era downplayed the racial element and focused on common 1940s and 1950s era issues: social programs and communist-baiting.

But after Brown, moderation in the South was dead. Rallying against the Northern intervention, moderate Southern politicians either lost their job (Alabama governor Big Jim Folsom) or transformed into fire-breathing segregationist demagogues (the infamous successor of Folsom, George Wallace, who had been a relative moderate in the 1940s and early 50s, as evidenced by his refusal to follow the Dixiecrats in 1948). Accommodation was out - resistance and rebellion became the rule for Southern whites.

The growing belligerency of Southerners played right into the hand of the new generation of social activists, led by Martin Luther King. With boycotts, "Freedom Rides", sit ins, and mass demonstrations, the protestors courted Southern violence. With the flames fanned by segregationist political leadership, Southerners lashed out against schoolchildren, white liberal college students, and ordinary middle class African Americans. The national opinion, formerly weary of forced segregation, swung. Buoyed by public opinion, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson pushed through Congress a radical Civil Rights agenda. Now King and his supporters had the government on their side, and the opposition to desegregation crumbled.

Thus, Klarman argues, by striking at the heart of segregation, the Supreme Court's decision transformed the struggle for Civil Rights from a gradualist movement to a radical one. This is how, because of "Brown", Jim Crow came to an end: not in a whimper, but in a bang.

This was required reading for a graduate course in American history.

The question that the author posits is: does the Supreme Court actually affect society? Klarman contends that Supreme Court rulings in the 1940s, specifically when dealing with criminal procedure (as opposed to black enfranchisement), had little tangible impact on the lives of African Americans in the South. He cites four cases, Moore v. Dempsey (1923), which dealt with verdicts rendered amid mob pressure, Powell v. Alabama (1932), which dealt with the appointment of adequate counsel for felonies, Norris v. Alabama (1935), which dealt with jury selections, and Brown v. Mississippi
(1936), which dealt with confessions obtained using torture.

Klarman contends that despite these constitutional safeguard, African American rights were still trampled in the South. He cites numerous "legal loopholes" for circumventing these cases, or in some cases, just blatant disregard. For instance, many times, lawyers were appointed at most a few days before trial, and were unable to adequately prepare. He also cites the reluctance of white lawyers to take on black clients for fear of reprisal, and out of blatant racism. After the Norris ruling, African Americans were usually selected to be in the jury pool, but never on the juries. The use of torture
was always suspect, and a jury would almost always take a white sheriffs word over a black mans if he claimed he was tortured. Lynching and mob violence still permeated Southern Courts as well. Klarman maintains that there was a set of "unwritten laws" which governed the South despite the federal rulings of the Supreme Court. Klarman also contends that the Supreme Court even showed hesitance toward their professed principles. Despite passing this legislation, the Supreme Court did not always enforce their decisions. Despite obvious "miscarriages of justice," many felt that even the presence of these rulings-whether enforced or not-was a step in the right direction (although I think many African Americans would probably disagree with this). It is an argument of intention versus actuality.

He contends that Supreme Court justices are products of their time and rarely make groundbreaking decisions, instead he contends that justices are "a part of the society that they are trying to transform," and cannot truly step outside of that society. Rather, they can only "go with the flow." And this I believe to be his thesis. He cites public opinion at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Brown v. Board of Education, and that those cases were not truly revolutionary because the "tide" of public opinion was moving in that direction.

However, while Klarman denies the existence of tangible gains resulting from these cases, he does not think them futile. Instead, he posits that these cases led to intangible results for the African-American community. Namely, it gave African
Americans confidence that the oppressive system in which they lived could be changed, however slightly. All in all, Klarman believes that these verdicts, while not rendering tangible results, began the impetus to toward a higher race consciousness in the United States, and ultimately to the groundbreaking civil rights legislation of the 1960s. The
decisions showed that change was possible, and thus were relevant, but not in a conventional sense. And I believe this to a story of wider historical analysis. Events such as the civil rights movement usually do not simply "occur," they have visible, sometimes intangible; antecedents that eventually help to birth a new consensuses.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in American history, civil rights history.

This was required reading for a graduate course in American history.

The question that the author posits is: does the Supreme Court actually affect society? Klarman contends that Supreme Court rulings in the 1940s, specifically when dealing with criminal procedure (as opposed to black enfranchisement), had little tangible impact on the lives of African Americans in the South. He cites four cases, Moore v. Dempsey (1923), which dealt with verdicts rendered amid mob pressure, Powell v. Alabama (1932), which dealt with the appointment of adequate counsel for felonies, Norris v. Alabama (1935), which dealt with jury selections, and Brown v. Mississippi
(1936), which dealt with confessions obtained using torture.

Klarman contends that despite these constitutional safeguard, African American rights were still trampled in the South. He cites numerous "legal loopholes" for circumventing these cases, or in some cases, just blatant disregard. For instance, many times, lawyers were appointed at most a few days before trial, and were unable to adequately prepare. He also cites the reluctance of white lawyers to take on black clients for fear of reprisal, and out of blatant racism. After the Norris ruling, African Americans were usually selected to be in the jury pool, but never on the juries. The use of torture
was always suspect, and a jury would almost always take a white sheriffs word over a black mans if he claimed he was tortured. Lynching and mob violence still permeated Southern Courts as well. Klarman maintains that there was a set of "unwritten laws" which governed the South despite the federal rulings of the Supreme Court. Klarman also contends that the Supreme Court even showed hesitance toward their professed principles. Despite passing this legislation, the Supreme Court did not always enforce their decisions. Despite obvious "miscarriages of justice," many felt that even the presence of these rulings-whether enforced or not-was a step in the right direction (although I think many African Americans would probably disagree with this). It is an argument of intention versus actuality.

He contends that Supreme Court justices are products of their time and rarely make groundbreaking decisions, instead he contends that justices are "a part of the society that they are trying to transform," and cannot truly step outside of that society. Rather, they can only "go with the flow." And this I believe to be his thesis. He cites public opinion at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Brown v. Board of Education, and that those cases were not truly revolutionary because the "tide" of public opinion was moving in that direction.

However, while Klarman denies the existence of tangible gains resulting from these cases, he does not think them futile. Instead, he posits that these cases led to intangible results for the African-American community. Namely, it gave African
Americans confidence that the oppressive system in which they lived could be changed, however slightly. All in all, Klarman believes that these verdicts, while not rendering tangible results, began the impetus to toward a higher race consciousness in the United States, and ultimately to the groundbreaking civil rights legislation of the 1960s. The
decisions showed that change was possible, and thus were relevant, but not in a conventional sense. And I believe this to a story of wider historical analysis. Events such as the civil rights movement usually do not simply "occur," they have visible, sometimes intangible; antecedents that eventually help to birth a new consensuses.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in American history, civil rights history.

This work is full of interesting, insightful, and provocative ideas that will make readers rethink the impact of the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions. I predict that the revisionist arguments in this masterpiece will some day become the orthodoxy. This book will be read by many future generations of American history and law students.

Having had the opportunity to hear Professor Klarman speak, I knew before reading the book that it would be a great work of scholarship. I was blown away. Meticulously researched, eminently readable, and full of the details necessary to support any conclusions about that troubling time in American history. It's a must read for every law student, historian, and American.

A comprehensive account not just of civil rights legal history, but also the political and social context that Klarman shows were never far in the background of court decisions regarding civil rights. The book doesn't just chronical events, but uses history to test and illustrate theories for why courts decide cases as they do.

Michael J. Klarman's book From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality is the best book written about civil rights in America in quite some time. Klarman's book is one of the few works about the civil rights movement that analyzes the significant change that occurred in racial attitudes during 1900-1954 as well as the movement itself.

Klarman's book is a revisionist account that downplays the importance of the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education case. Klarman contends that there would have been a civil rights movement even if the Supreme Court had ruled the other way in Brown. Klarman believes that the conventional history gives court rulings too much credit for effecting change in America. Essentially, Klarman believes that the federal court system is actually very weak and does not affect America much in the long run.

Klarman believes, for instance, that the White Court's civil rights rulings during the Progressive Era did nothing to help blacks. Other than the Smith case of 1944, Klarman does not believe that Supreme Court rulings helped black Americans. In the Smith case, Klarman holds that it effectively opened the door for some black participation in Southern politics.

A large part of Klarman's book is devoted to debunking the idea that the Brown ruling helped speed the civil rights movement. Klarman holds that the Brown decision did little to inspire blacks to seek redress for racial grievances. He does, however, concede that the media coverage of Brown did help raise consciousness among white folks about racial injustice in the South.

Klarman's book is a revisionist account of civil rights history. It is well-written, makes its points well and is backed up by prodigious research. It deserves a wide audience.

Michael Klarman's authoritative account of constitutional law concerning race--from the late 19th century through the 1960s--is brilliant, both as legal interpretation and as social and political history. While the book deals with a wide range of racially charged issues--criminal procedure, peonage, transportation, residential segregation, and voting rights--it focuses with especially keen insights on the "Brown v. Board of Education" case of 1954. "From Jim Crow to Civil Rights" is a magisterial accomplishment. (James T. Patterson, Bancroft prize-winning author of "Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974").

From the Publisher: "Michael Klarman's exhaustively researched study is essential reading for anyone interested in civil rights, the Supreme Court, and constitutional law. Accessible to ordinary readers, students, and scholars, Klarman's book puts into context and deflates overstated claims for the importance of the Supreme Court's work, while carefully identifying the precise contributions the Court made to race relations policy from 1896 through the 1960s." Mark Tushnet, author, "Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts".

"Pulling together a decade of truly magnificent scholarship, this extraordinary book bids fair to be the definitive legal history of perhaps the most important legal issue of the twentieth century. This is legal history at its best, and on a panoramic canvas."

From the Publisher: "From Jim Crow to Civil Rights" is a bold, carefully crafted, deeply researched, forcefully argued, lucidly written history of law and legal-change strategies in the civil rights movement from the 1880s to the 1960s, and a brilliant case study in the power and limits of law as it presents a challenging argument that places the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions in their social and political motor of social change. Among the hundreds of recent books on the history of civil rights and race relations, Klarman's is one of the most original, provocative, and illuminating, with fresh evidence and fresh insights on practically every page." --Robert W. Gordon, Yale University