Rather than posting a review, I'm writing to make readers of Steel Inferno aware of an indispensable map which will make the book more intelligible. It's the Michelin Battle of Normandy Map No.102, which is available at Amazon. It has all those tiny hamlets which figure on every page of the book. It makes the narrative much easier to follow, since the book's maps are pretty inadequate.

This book provides the most balanced and detailed review of the fighting in Normandy that I have ever read. Other books about the same subject from both German and British viewpoints often contain bias and foggy memory. The British are particulary famous for re-writing historical defeats as victories. That is why we have the "Miracle at Dunkirk" instead of the disaster in France and why Montgomery's failed initial attack in Normandy became a "holding action" with failure blamed on the Americans. Montgomery even tried to claim the disastrous "Market Garden" operation was a glorious success! This seems to be the official opinion at Sandhurst.



On the other hand, many German commanders fought in multiple theaters without significant pause and went through the trauma of American war crimes trials or endured horrible conditions in Russian prisons. They could not write anything down in prison. Years later, they tried to remember what happened in 1944 without implicating themselves in any wrongdoing. The solution? Blame Hitler for defeats and skip over details that may seem inglorius.



This book is excellently organized and includes detailed descriptions of the fighting in Normandy 1944. It is refreshingly balanced. The allies won because they had an overwhelming advantage in air power and artillery. This is a lesson that America learned well, but the Birtish still don't seem to understand. (Someone needs to write a book about this.) In hand to hand fighting, when air power and artillery could not be used, the Allies often were stopped despite a huge disparity in the number of Allied attackers versus German defenders. Many Brittish commanders made poor decisions based on rigid tactics, poor planning, and overconfidence. Germans were unable to deal with air interdiction and could not concentrate by moving into defensive positions. Rommel understood the air power threat, but von Rundstedt, Dollman, and others clearly did not. Use this book to put all the other books about Normandy into perspective.

This book provides the most balanced and detailed review of the fighting in Normandy that I have ever read. Other books about the same subject from both German and British viewpoints often contain bias and foggy memory. The British are particulary famous for re-writing historical defeats as victories. That is why we have the "Miracle at Dunkirk" instead of the disaster in France and why Montgomery's failed initial attack in Normandy became a "holding action" with failure blamed on the Americans. Montgomery even tried to claim the disastrous "Market Garden" operation was a glorious success! This seems to be the official opinion at Sandhurst.

On the other hand, many German commanders fought in multiple theaters without significant pause and went through the trauma of American war crimes trials or endured horrible conditions in Russian prisons. They could not write anything down in prison. Years later, they tried to remember what happened in 1944 without implicating themselves in any wrongdoing. The solution? Blame Hitler for defeats and skip over details that may seem inglorius.

This book is excellently organized and includes detailed descriptions of the fighting in Normandy 1944. It is refreshingly balanced. The allies won because they had an overwhelming advantage in air power and artillery. This is a lesson that America learned well, but the Birtish still don't seem to understand. (Someone needs to write a book about this.) In hand to hand fighting, when air power and artillery could not be used, the Allies often were stopped despite a huge disparity in the number of Allied attackers versus German defenders. Many Brittish commanders made poor decisions based on rigid tactics, poor planning, and overconfidence. Germans were unable to deal with air interdiction and could not concentrate by moving into defensive positions. Rommel understood the air power threat, but von Rundstedt, Dollman, and others clearly did not. Use this book to put all the other books about Normandy into perspective.

This book provides good in-depth coverage and discussion on it's subject matter; the I SS Pz Corps. I just read it as a companion to Kurt Meyer's 'Grenadiers' and found it fascinating. For those serious students of WWII this is worth the read. If you are looking for a general overview of the Normandy campaign then this is probably not the right book for you.

Michael Reynolds unapologetically recounts the role played by two famous (some might prefer infamous!)Waffen SS divisions in the post D-Day battles in Normandy.

A number of reviewers have already drawn attention to the possible inaccuracy of some of the incidents described by the author as well as the credibility of the sources. I will not add to these expect to say that, having seen active service myself, it must be nigh impossible to record and later review any battle with deadly accuracy. For any number of reasons even 'official' sources are not necessarily an accurate record of an event.

What Reynolds does do very successfully is to leave the reader with very plausible reasons as to why the German military machine functioned so effectively for so long - often against an enemy which was numerically superior in every sphere from manpower through armaments to aircraft.

Clearly the ideology of the SS was instrumental in providing the appetite for a fight but it would seem that the genuine cameraderie between officers, NCO's and troops is what really enabled them to function so well without resorting to suicidal tactics.

Had the defending forces enjoyed anything close to parity in aircraft during this period it is highly conceivable that the invasion might have ended in a bloody and tragic failure for the Allies. Most accounts seem to convey to the interested reader that tactically they were anything but inspired.

Michael Reynolds unapologetically recounts the role played by two famous (some might prefer infamous!)Waffen SS divisions in the post D-Day battles in Normandy.

A number of reviewers have already drawn attention to the possible inaccuracy of some of the incidents described by the author as well as the credibility of the sources. I will not add to these expect to say that, having seen active service myself, it must be nigh impossible to record and later review any battle with deadly accuracy. For any number of reasons even 'official' sources are not necessarily an accurate record of an event.

What Reynolds does do very successfully is to leave the reader with very plausible reasons as to why the German military machine functioned so effectively for so long - often against an enemy which was numerically superior in every sphere from manpower through armaments to aircraft.

Clearly the ideology of the SS was instrumental in providing the appetite for a fight but it would seem that the genuine cameraderie between officers, NCO's and troops is what really enabled them to function so well without resorting to suicidal tactics.

Had the defending forces enjoyed anything close to parity in aircraft during this period it is highly conceivable that the invasion might have ended in a bloody and tragic failure for the Allies. Most accounts seem to convey to the interested reader that tactically they were anything but inspired.

The book is repleat with factual errors and misrepresentations.

Reynolds facts are often wrong, his attributed sources are fiction and his opinions are offensive - and without much foundation. This 'would be' film script ready imaginative story qualifies as an inaccurate reconstruction of the actual event and are refuted in detail by precise and detailed description written nearer the time by Capts Lindsay and Johnston in the History of the 7th Armoured Division of Sept '45. Incidentally, though Reynold's footnotes assert this book is 'unpublished', I have a copy on my bookshelf it has been there since late '45. I can also say that Brig. Hinde's personal driver (his scout car driver on june 13th 44 has not been contacted by Reynolds and does not support his 'story'.

The book is repleat with factual errors and misrepresentations.

Reynolds facts are often wrong, his attributed sources are fiction and his opinions are offensive - and without much foundation. This 'would be' film script ready imaginative story qualifies as an inaccurate reconstruction of the actual event and are refuted in detail by precise and detailed description written nearer the time by Capts Lindsay and Johnston in the History of the 7th Armoured Division of Sept '45. Incidentally, though Reynold's footnotes assert this book is 'unpublished', I have a copy on my bookshelf it has been there since late '45. I can also say that Brig. Hinde's personal driver (his scout car driver on june 13th 44 has not been contacted by Reynolds and does not support his 'story'.

After the first read-through, Reynolds book comes across as a well-researched and well-written account of the Battle for Normandy from the perspective of the I. SS-Panzer Korps.

However, the author is clearly impressed with the fighting ability of the Waffen SS divisions in Normandy and less so when it comes to the performance of the British forces. It is perhaps this fascination with his subject that has clouded his judgement on several accounts.

As an example, Reynolds conclusions on the battle for Villers-Bocage on 13.06.44 becomes distorted due to several glaring errors.

1. Reynolds claim that Brig. Hindes decision to halt his brigade group at Livry in the evening of 12/13 was "incomprehensible" and that Hinde instead of halting should have advanced "the mere 6km to Villers-Bocage". The distance is actually double that...

2. Reynolds scorns the British for using the arrival of 2. Panzerdivision on June 13th as their "excuse" for pulling out later that day: "the whole business of 2nd Panzer is a myth anyway..", "..only part of the reconnaissance and various advance parties arrived on the 13th.." and "a company of 1/7th Queesns ran into the enemy...these turned out to be a 2nd Panzer Division staff car and two motorcycle escorts - hardly the deployment of a Panzer Division advancing to contact.."

The odd thing is that Reynolds is flat out ignoring the post-war papers prepared by 2nd Panzer commander von Lýttwitz and the history of 2nd Panzer by Strauss. Both clearly states that both the divisions Panzergrenadier regiments had arrived on June 13th and commenced the attack against Villers-Bocage, Amaye-sur-Seulles and Cahagnes.

It is errors and distortions such as these that makes this reader doubt the general accuracy Reynolds account.

Steel Inferno is Michael Reynolds' second book detailing the Waffen-SS, this time in France during the Normandy fighting. Like his book on the Battle of the Bulge, General Reynolds examines the tactics, personalities, and strategy of the German forces involved, this time the 1st SS Panzer Korps. The outstanding fighting formation of the German forces during the battles in France was the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" and General Reynolds devotes much of the book to this unit, which is justified since the 12th SS was involved in the fighting throughout the beginning.

The Hitlerjugend Divisuion proved itself throughout the fighting, due in no small part to Kurt "Panzer" Meyer, who was one of the regimental commanders and later the commanding officer of the Division after the death of Fritz Witt, the Hitlerjugend's first commander. General Reynolds quites extensively from the book Grenadiers (see my Amazon review of this book) and other German sources. General Reynolds is also even-handed in his examination of the alleged atrocities commited by members of the Hitlerjugend and also shows examples of Allied execution of German prisoners, particularly by Canadian troops (most of the documented execution of German prisoners by the Western Allies were commited by Canadians). General Reynolds is adamant in condemning all such incidents and is to be praised for being impartial.

All in all, a good book, since most of the politics in the Peiper book were avioded, although Genral Reynolds' characterization of Panzermeyer being an ardent Nazi may be an exageration, since Kurt Meyer was praised by many Wehrmacht generals, most of them who were unlikely to be friendly to Waffen-SS officers. Gen. Reynolds mentions Wehrmacht General Heinz Eberbach in his book. General Eberbach had the 1st SS Korps under his command and praised Kurt Meyer (and I think he also testified on behalf of Kurt Meyer during his trial).

In his second book Michael Reynolds gives an excellent acount of the hard battles in the Caen/Falaise sector just after D-Day. First he starts with a short history, the organisation and the tactics used by I SS Pz Corps (consisting of the 1st SS Pz Div "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 12th SS Pz Div "Hitlerjugend"). After that Reynolds gives a very detailed account (including unit designations, commanders, equipment and losses) of the desperate battle fought by this corps against a numerical superior unit. Along the way Reynolds destroys some myths surrounding the Waffen SS. Eyewitness-accounts make the story very graphic and give an idea what the fighting must have been like. The maps used are adequate and make it easier to follow the fluid battle for the tiny villages, forests and ridges.

My conclusion of the battle: The German Waffen SS was far superior in fighting spirit and tactics. The commanders, from NCO to the highest officers really knew how to lead and inspire their men. They lost because they were numerical not as strong as the allies and could not make up for lost personnel and equipment.

On the whole the book is easy to read and - in my humble opinion - not to dry or academic (as some reviewers have suggested). I would recommend this book to every amateur historician interested in WW-II and every NCO and officer, especially if he trains to lead people in combat.

Reynolds display with vivid colors how the fight was on Caen-Falaise sector of the Normandy Battle. Unlike most WWII books, the advance of each Corps, Division, Regiment or battalion is not described as color lines moving on a map, but as a town to town, village to village, hill to hill fight between opposing Companies or even opposing platoons. Very real and well researched, although the origins of the 1st SS Division Liebstandarte and her younger-sister 12th SS Hitlerjugend are not detailed described. Only brieflly. Nevertheless,we can see how their skills and performance are fantastic when compared with their opponents on the Western Front. This book and "The Devil's Adjutant" (also by Reynolds) are on my list of top five books about WWII. And I read a lot about this subject. Can't wait for the next one : "Men of Steel : I SS Panzer Corps in the Ardennes and on the Eastern Front, 1944-45", also by Reynolds

This book is a very dry, textbook-like telling of the SS Divisions in Normandy. Lots of unit numbers, geographic references, and the like.

A very enjoyable read. You felt that you really understood the tatics of the 2 waffen ss divisions. Whilst Reynolds writing style is very factual the narrative flows well (better than his first book) Anyone interested in Normandy (particularly the battle of Caen) should read

The hardcover edition I received is the most slovenly and incompetently produced book I have ever had the misfortune to spend money on. And I spend a lot of money on history books. The first third of the book was completely unreadable because an intermitant series of pages had not been printed. I wonder how many reviewers actually read the book, considering that they fail to report this glaring and incomprehensible defect. If the publishers had any pride and decency, they would have pulped this edition and reprinted it. Selling rubbish like this is a disgrace. I want my money back.