2007 sees the 25th anniversary of the Falklands War of 1982. In the UK at least, it seems as though everyone and each of our television channels is reliving that war in one way or another. Some authors and commentators are simply climbing onto the bandwagon with material which, to put it simply, is suspect. NOT SO!, with this book.



Michael Clapp was "Commodore Amphibious Warfare" during the Falklands War and co-author Ewen Southby-Tailyour was a serving Royal Marine Officer during that same conflict and whose knowledge of the waters of the Falklands was so invaluable before during and even after the landings. It was Southby-Tailyour who warned the officer in charge (Not!, the Commanding Officer I hasten to add) of the party of Welsh Guardsmen on board the "Sir Galahad" to get ashore before they were attacked and offered assistance to this end. That officer, incidentally, refused the request and the Sir Galahad was later attacked with great loss of life.



Those, then, are the credentials of the two men who have collaborated in the writing of this book. It is an important historic document.



The Captain of any ship is "Master" of that ship. He also commands all the ship's boats and is ultimately responsible for ensuring the safe embarkation and disembarkation of all on board. From ships lifeboats (even life-rafts) to assault craft, considerable training and expertise is required in getting passengers safely away and safely ashore. Never more so than when under fire from a belligerent enemy.



In early 1982, a hastily assembled Royal Navy Task Force was steaming towards the Falkland Islands which had been invaded by a foreign force. The British troops on board the various ships were tried and tested veterans of Northern Ireland but had no experience of what was to come. Worse still, apart from the Commandos, most had little or not experience in going to war by sea.



The responsibility for putting them safely ashore rested with their Royal Navy `chauffeurs' and that responsibility came down to Michael Clapp. In this book he reveals - with considerable honesty, the full story of the events that led to the resultant victory on land. In so doing he had to adopt old, forgotten methods in a bid to find common ground for all concerned. It upset some - but then nobody likes change foisted upon them, especially senior officers. Point is, it worked!



The reasons why San Carlos Water was chosen is fully explained and, with hindsight, is probably the one single factor - more than any other, that led to the eventual victory.



I can identify with a no-nonsense, straight-talking officer who cares not what feathers he may ruffle when given an important task. It says much for his style and the decisions he took that nobody - senior officer or below, has ever challenged his honesty or the importance of this book.



For those with an interest in the Falklands war of 1982, this is essential reading.



NM

(Retired British army major)

2007 sees the 25th anniversary of the Falklands War of 1982. In the UK at least, it seems as though everyone and each of our television channels is reliving that war in one way or another. Some authors and commentators are simply climbing onto the bandwagon with material which, to put it simply, is suspect. NOT SO!, with this book.

Michael Clapp was "Commodore Amphibious Warfare" during the Falklands War and co-author Ewen Southby-Tailyour was a serving Royal Marine Officer during that same conflict and whose knowledge of the waters of the Falklands was so invaluable before during and even after the landings. It was Southby-Tailyour who warned the officer in charge (Not!, the Commanding Officer I hasten to add) of the party of Welsh Guardsmen on board the "Sir Galahad" to get ashore before they were attacked and offered assistance to this end. That officer, incidentally, refused the request and the Sir Galahad was later attacked with great loss of life.

Those, then, are the credentials of the two men who have collaborated in the writing of this book. It is an important historic document.

The Captain of any ship is "Master" of that ship. He also commands all the ship's boats and is ultimately responsible for ensuring the safe embarkation and disembarkation of all on board. From ships lifeboats (even life-rafts) to assault craft, considerable training and expertise is required in getting passengers safely away and safely ashore. Never more so than when under fire from a belligerent enemy.

In early 1982, a hastily assembled Royal Navy Task Force was steaming towards the Falkland Islands which had been invaded by a foreign force. The British troops on board the various ships were tried and tested veterans of Northern Ireland but had no experience of what was to come. Worse still, apart from the Commandos, most had little or not experience in going to war by sea.

The responsibility for putting them safely ashore rested with their Royal Navy `chauffeurs' and that responsibility came down to Michael Clapp. In this book he reveals - with considerable honesty, the full story of the events that led to the resultant victory on land. In so doing he had to adopt old, forgotten methods in a bid to find common ground for all concerned. It upset some - but then nobody likes change foisted upon them, especially senior officers. Point is, it worked!

The reasons why San Carlos Water was chosen is fully explained and, with hindsight, is probably the one single factor - more than any other, that led to the eventual victory.

I can identify with a no-nonsense, straight-talking officer who cares not what feathers he may ruffle when given an important task. It says much for his style and the decisions he took that nobody - senior officer or below, has ever challenged his honesty or the importance of this book.

For those with an interest in the Falklands war of 1982, this is essential reading.

NM
(Retired British army major)

1. I had read this book about two years ago and liked it great deal....Falkland war was a unique war in many respects. It was a war fought on doorsteps of adversary by a nation thousands of miles away. To regain a piece of land (or should I say an island) captured by not so weak enemy, whose logistics train was much much shorter was per-se a military operation, but in true sense it was first of all a major logistics exercise to make that military might reach that far from UK and then make that military might fight the battle. Operations actually were a much smaller part of the whole game.

2. Commodore Michael Clapp, was Commander of Amphibious Task Force of Royal Navy. He was the man at the most happening part of the war. It was very easy for him to push all the shortcomings and problems under the carpet and brag about the successes, which were by no means small. The virtues of the Victor are generally remembered and the vices forgotten. One must however remember that the ones who do not learn from history (past lessons) soon themselves become history. Commodore Clapp has been forthright in his approach and has very systematically brought out the chaos and problems of such operations. In the fog of war confusion and chaos would reign, but a side that minimises it, generally fares better.

3. He has highlighted as to how the then strategic perspective of UK had resulted into cutting of forces. How a maritime nation had become land centric and was reducing its naval forces. In such circumstances, it received a jolt at Falklands, which was contrary to the perception prevailing at that time. This jolt forced an ill prepared nation to gather itself and brace up for war. What was achieved in such a short span was commendable, but Cmde Clapp has done an essential service by putting the preparations and the war in correct perspective. Highlighting the plus and the minus dispassionately. Britain won the war, but few set backs due to logistics problems would have turned the tables. When at war one must fight whole-heartedly, but an analysis in retrospect is always very important to learn from them and not to repeat the same mistakes next time. Cmde Clapp deserves praise for doing that essential task, though it might have been unpleasant to do so.

4. A must read for those having interest in maritime affairs in general and in amphibious operations in particular.

1. I had read this book about two years ago and liked it great deal....Falkland war was a unique war in many respects. It was a war fought on doorsteps of adversary by a nation thousands of miles away. To regain a piece of land (or should I say an island) captured by not so weak enemy, whose logistics train was much much shorter was per-se a military operation, but in true sense it was first of all a major logistics exercise to make that military might reach that far from UK and then make that military might fight the battle. Operations actually were a much smaller part of the whole game.

2. Commodore Michael Clapp, was Commander of Amphibious Task Force of Royal Navy. He was the man at the most happening part of the war. It was very easy for him to push all the shortcomings and problems under the carpet and brag about the successes, which were by no means small. The virtues of the Victor are generally remembered and the vices forgotten. One must however remember that the ones who do not learn from history (past lessons) soon themselves become history. Commodore Clapp has been forthright in his approach and has very systematically brought out the chaos and problems of such operations. In the fog of war confusion and chaos would reign, but a side that minimises it, generally fares better.

3. He has highlighted as to how the then strategic perspective of UK had resulted into cutting of forces. How a maritime nation had become land centric and was reducing its naval forces. In such circumstances, it received a jolt at Falklands, which was contrary to the perception prevailing at that time. This jolt forced an ill prepared nation to gather itself and brace up for war. What was achieved in such a short span was commendable, but Cmde Clapp has done an essential service by putting the preparations and the war in correct perspective. Highlighting the plus and the minus dispassionately. Britain won the war, but few set backs due to logistics problems would have turned the tables. When at war one must fight whole-heartedly, but an analysis in retrospect is always very important to learn from them and not to repeat the same mistakes next time. Cmde Clapp deserves praise for doing that essential task, though it might have been unpleasant to do so.

4. A must read for those having interest in maritime affairs in general and in amphibious operations in particular.