Mr. Segev has given readers another look into Israeli society and history. What I really liked about this book is how the author tackles the topic from all facets of Israeli society. He doesn't simply chronicle the decision making process among the leaders of Israeli society, but instead attempts to chronicle the story as seen by all Israelis. In doing so the author has written a psychological history as much as anything else.

By going through letters, diaries, newspaper headlines and combing through government archives Mr. Segev attempts to give the reader an inside look at what was happening with Israeli society before, during and immediately after the Six Day War. He uses soldiers diaries to give the reader a sense of what they were fighting for and what they thought. He uses correspondence between relatives in Israel and abroad to show the mood of the Israeli people. He writes of the elitism of
Ashkenazi and the impoverishment of the Mizrahi Jews. The feeling of gloom and failure of the Zionist dream seems almost palpable. The Zionist dream seems to have stalled after hitting the harsh realities. Israel's great leaders had gone into semi-retirement (although never really far from center stage). The recession on top of all the other real problems created a depressing mood on the eve of Israel's most resounding triumph. Mr. Segev does a great job detailing all of this, and he goes deep into the elites feelings and decision making process in the lead up to the war.

But I had some serious problems with some of the history presented here. During the lead up to war Segev paints a picture of indecision and fear among the ministers. He writes about all night ministerial cessions discussing the dangers of war. The reader gets a picture of a government besieged by their own generals demanding immediate action and enemies that surround them ready to crush Israel in a single blow. The military leaders pushing for action and insisting that every delay brings Israel that much closer to total annihilation. At the same time Israel's enemies are pushing for war. The problem I have is this is contrary to everything I have ever read on the situation, and in the book Mr. Segev gives readers hints to the false picture. He writes about a CIA man living in Israel who advises his Israeli neighbor on how to properly dig a trench in preparation for the oncoming war, but then tells the man there is no need in digging the trench since Israel will have won the war in a week anyways. He also writes about a U.S. assessment that basically gives the same time line. At one point he writes that Eshkol knew that the generals were exaggerating about the dangers they faced. Not only that but every account from Egyptian point of view I have read speaks of the fact that Nasser felt himself pushed into a war he couldn't win by the Syrians. Nasser knew he couldn't win which is why he made conciliatory offers such as allowing Israeli shipping to pass but without flying the Israeli flag.

What I don't understand is why did the U.S., Egypt and Jordan governments have intelligence assessments that had pretty good assessments of the situation but yet the Israeli government didn't. This is one problem with Segev's account. He portrays the government as indecisive and overly worried, but the military leaders are chomping at the bit to attack Egypt. I can see the near hysteria that might grip the average Israeli citizen, but why is Eshkol so worried at one moment but at the next he knows the generals are exaggerating the dangers. It makes no sense.

All in all this book is very deserving of the four stars I gave it despite some of the very real problems I had with the book. His description of the days after the Israeli victory and the euphoric feelings that swept through the Israeli nation is very good, and of the leaders almost criminal refusal to tackle the very real problems with the newly occupied territories and the people therein that has condemned future generations to constant strife is excellent . There decision to simply put off the question of how to handle these problems was negligent in the extreme.

I concur with a previous reviewer that this work has to be read in conjunction with other more comprehensive works, but this book has some strong merits of its own, and it is essential in getting a full picture of the Israeli perspective in this war. One more caveat, this was not a comprehensive work. It is written from the Israeli perspective only. This isn't a problem, but readers should be aware of this before getting into this book.

Mr. Segev has given readers another look into Israeli society and history. What I really liked about this book is how the author tackles the topic from all facets of Israeli society. He doesn't simply chronicle the decision making process among the leaders of Israeli society, but instead attempts to chronicle the story as seen by all Israelis. In doing so the author has written a psychological history as much as anything else.

By going through letters, diaries, newspaper headlines and combing through government archives Mr. Segev attempts to give the reader an inside look at what was happening with Israeli society before, during and immediately after the Six Day War. He uses soldiers diaries to give the reader a sense of what they were fighting for and what they thought. He uses correspondence between relatives in Israel and abroad to show the mood of the Israeli people. He writes of the elitism of
Ashkenazi and the impoverishment of the Mizrahi Jews. The feeling of gloom and failure of the Zionist dream seems almost palpable. The Zionist dream seems to have stalled after hitting the harsh realities. Israel's great leaders had gone into semi-retirement (although never really far from center stage). The recession on top of all the other real problems created a depressing mood on the eve of Israel's most resounding triumph. Mr. Segev does a great job detailing all of this, and he goes deep into the elites feelings and decision making process in the lead up to the war.

But I had some serious problems with some of the history presented here. During the lead up to war Segev paints a picture of indecision and fear among the ministers. He writes about all night ministerial cessions discussing the dangers of war. The reader gets a picture of a government besieged by their own generals demanding immediate action and enemies that surround them ready to crush Israel in a single blow. The military leaders pushing for action and insisting that every delay brings Israel that much closer to total annihilation. At the same time Israel's enemies are pushing for war. The problem I have is this is contrary to everything I have ever read on the situation, and in the book Mr. Segev gives readers hints to the false picture. He writes about a CIA man living in Israel who advises his Israeli neighbor on how to properly dig a trench in preparation for the oncoming war, but then tells the man there is no need in digging the trench since Israel will have won the war in a week anyways. He also writes about a U.S. assessment that basically gives the same time line. At one point he writes that Eshkol knew that the generals were exaggerating about the dangers they faced. Not only that but every account from Egyptian point of view I have read speaks of the fact that Nasser felt himself pushed into a war he couldn't win by the Syrians. Nasser knew he couldn't win which is why he made conciliatory offers such as allowing Israeli shipping to pass but without flying the Israeli flag.

What I don't understand is why did the U.S., Egypt and Jordan governments have intelligence assessments that had pretty good assessments of the situation but yet the Israeli government didn't. This is one problem with Segev's account. He portrays the government as indecisive and overly worried, but the military leaders are chomping at the bit to attack Egypt. I can see the near hysteria that might grip the average Israeli citizen, but why is Eshkol so worried at one moment but at the next he knows the generals are exaggerating the dangers. It makes no sense.

All in all this book is very deserving of the four stars I gave it despite some of the very real problems I had with the book. His description of the days after the Israeli victory and the euphoric feelings that swept through the Israeli nation is very good, and of the leaders almost criminal refusal to tackle the very real problems with the newly occupied territories and the people therein that has condemned future generations to constant strife is excellent . There decision to simply put off the question of how to handle these problems was negligent in the extreme.

I concur with a previous reviewer that this work has to be read in conjunction with other more comprehensive works, but this book has some strong merits of its own, and it is essential in getting a full picture of the Israeli perspective in this war. One more caveat, this was not a comprehensive work. It is written from the Israeli perspective only. This isn't a problem, but readers should be aware of this before getting into this book.

Rated by the Economist Magazine as one of the best books of 2007, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East provides exactly what it tries to provide, an insight into how the "Six Day War" affected Israel. I recommend this book to anyone who wants to gain a greater understanding of Israel and their view of the Middle East. This book also provides an inside look into Israeli politics now and then.

Segev is a journalist who writes history through the lens of journalism. So 1967 is an attempt to capture this spirit of journalistic history, as Segev quotes newspaper accounts, letters to the editors of various Israeli newspapers and periodicals, during the prelude, action and aftermath of the Six Day War. Segev uses a technique he perfected in One Palestine, Complete: taking certain set-historical characters, ordinary people and introducing them throughout the book at various stages. He also, as in his previous books, takes aim against Israeli leaders with characteristic venom: Eskol and Dayan, for instance, do not come out smelling like roses in 1967. As with nearly ever work about the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict, not everyone will be satisfied with Segev's conclusion (that the taking of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights did not add to Israeli's security, but detracted from it), and here, as in other places in the book, Segev may falter a bit in his historical logic.

The author of this book proves that vanity of believing one can impose his categorical opinions unto history is nothing but vanity.
This is not history, but rather his story and it's valid as such, and nothing else.

While from a historical perspective this is an excellent book, the author's prejudices and revisionist notions about the origins of the war and its consequences - largely a rehasing of leftist thoughts about the good Arabs caught by their leaders and the bad Israelis wanting war - get in the way. In the lead up to the war, he largely blames Israeli militarism for exacerbating tensions. While he gives some space to Russian meddling and misinformation through the Syrians, the author dwells on Israeli responses to Syrian incursions and sabre-rattling rather than the cause. It's sort of blaming the victim. After a while, the author becomes tedious. He does this with the capture of the Old City as well. He makes little of the bombardment of the New City of Jerusalem by the Jordanians and likes to contend that the Israelis used the war as an excuse for the capture of the West Bank. The author never mentions that the Arabs did not consider the Green Line anything more than a cease fire line existing only until the next war when they would achieve their never-ending hope of pushing the Israelis into the sea. The pro-Arab bias of the author gets so extreme that I stopped reading the book 100 pages before the end.

This good book is a combined political and social history of Israel before, during, and after the Six Day War. Segev presents a detailed portrait of Israeli society and politics as being in the throes of a major transition. In 1966, Israel was in something of a funk. A major recession caused considerable distress, immigration had slowed, Israeli society was having difficulty assimilating Middle Eastern immigrants, and the Ashkenazi political elite was aging.

Against this background, Segev describes the crisis with the Arab states primarily in terms of internal Israeli politics and the difficut decision to take preemptive action. Segev does well in describing the complex political dynamics of politics leading up to the war and the decision to go to war. Segev sees internal Israeli politics as the major driver of the decision to go to war. He asserts that the war was avoidable and clearly sees the Israelis as the major decision makers. These views, however, are only assertions. Segev presents no real discussion of this contentious issue. A major problem with his assertion is that there is no discussion of the war from the Arab point of view or any documentation about Arab decision making. The issue of whether or not the war was avoidable, however, is not really the focus of the book.

Segev's recurrent theme, which runs throughout the whole book and emerges most strongly in the final sections, is the internal contradictions of the Zionist ideal. The Zionists exhibited a quasi-mystical desire to possess Palestine but also wished to establish a European style democratic state. This second goal, however, conflicted with the reality that fulfillment of the Zionist project meant the involuntary displacement of Palestinian Arabs.

The best parts of the book are the later parts dealing with aftermath of the war and the initial occupation. Segev rebuts the myth that the Israeli government offered to restore the conquests in exchange for peace. His description of the beginnings of the occupation is useful for explaining the genesis of the present disastrous situation.

As a social history and description of Israeli politics, this book is very good. In terms of the genesis of the war, Segev is unconvincing because he doesn't present any real data. I recommend reading this book in conjunction with Michael Oren's Six Days in June. Oren's book is a more conventional diplomatic and political history of the war. Unlike Segev, Oren did make an effort to examine Arab sources and his conclusion is that the state of Israel faced an 'existential' threat.

This good book is a combined political and social history of Israel before, during, and after the Six Day War. Segev presents a detailed portrait of Israeli society and politics as being in the throes of a major transition. In 1966, Israel was in something of a funk. A major recession caused considerable distress, immigration had slowed, Israeli society was having difficulty assimilating Middle Eastern immigrants, and the Ashkenazi political elite was aging.
Against this background, Segev describes the crisis with the Arab states primarily in terms of internal Israeli politics and the difficut decision to take preemptive action. Segev does well in describing the complex political dynamics of politics leading up to the war and the decision to go to war. Segev sees internal Israeli politics as the major driver of the decision to go to war. He asserts that the war was avoidable and clearly sees the Israelis as the major decision makers. These views, however, are only assertions. Segev presents no real discussion of this contentious issue. A major problem with his assertion is that there is no discussion of the war from the Arab point of view or any documentation about Arab decision making.
The best parts of the book are the later parts dealing with aftermath of the war and the initial occupation. Segev rebuts the myth that the Israeli government offered to restore the conquests in exchange for peace. Segev's recurrent theme, which runs throughout the whole book and emerges most strongly in the final sections, is the internal contradictions of the Zionist ideal: the confrontation of a quasi-mystical desire to possess Palestine with the reality that fulfillment meant the displacement of Palestinian Arabs.
As a social history and description of Israeli politics, this book is very good. In terms of the genesis of the war, Segev is unconvincing because he doesn't present any real data. I recommend reading this book in conjunction with Michael Oren's Six Days in June. Oren's book is a more conventional diplomatic and political history of the war. Unlike Segev, Oren did make an effort to examine Arab sources and his conclusion is that the state of Israel faced an 'existential' threat.

Segev, Tom. "1967: Israel, War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East", Metropolitan Books, 2007.



Bringing Back Memories



Amos Lassen and Literary Pride



I moved to Israel in 1967, three days before the famous and legendary "Six Day War" began. Reading Tom Segev's monumental 671 page "1967", I realized how both I and the country changed as a result of that war. Israel and I were young back then; I had my newly granted Master of Arts degree in my hands and Israel (created in 1948) was beginning to find her place among

the nations of the world. When the war began, Israel was naïve but militarily strong and I had been the "cockeyed optimist" who had emigrated because of idealistic notions of helping to build the Jewish state. We both got slapped across the face and there was no turning back. Both of our naivetes were tested. Israel now knew that her place in the world was insecure and I knew that I had finally found the place I wanted to call home (and home it was for me for the following 30 years). The war made both of us become adults very quickly.

Segev gives us an intimate look at Israel because as a sabra (native born Israeli) he had access to the files and letters about the war and he presents a vivid picture of the country in the years before the war. He examines what led to the war ad spends pages recounting all of the miscalculations that caused the war to break out. The book is not really about the nation of Israel in its entirety. Segev instead writes about the eastern-European settlers who fled war-torn Germany, Austria and Poland and settled on the kibbutzim (communal farms).

Being from eastern European family ties myself, you can see and havig settled on a kibbutz in the north of Israel, you can guess where my sympathies lie. The problem here is that those settlers only represent a tenth of the population of Israel--those nationalistic Jews who ate, drank and dreamt idealism and socialism and virtually ignores the other 90% of the population which comprise a group of a dozen or so languages and who came from over 50 various countries. Nevertheless this is an intense and readable look at the country biased as it may be. It is an examination of almost every aspect of life and deals with the culture and lifestyles of the citizens of the new country who face war just as we face peace.

The Arab nations who went to war with Israel in 1967 had been begging for a war to break out--their hatred of the Jewish state was that intense. They were sure, without a shadow of a doubt, that they could defeat the tiny country. Segev maintains that the war was not inevitable (the view held by most is that the war had to happen to secure Israel's place in the world). He states, quite empathically, that if the Ashkenazi Jews (those Eastern European settlers) had just ignored the Egyptian military build-up in the Sinai Peninsula, the blockade and the exit of the United Nations, the war could have been prevented. Looking back now, that is an easy assumption to make. If we look at the time when the war was on the verge of breaking, that does not seem to be the case at all. Segev's thesis is one-sided and with that said let's look at what the book is really about.

Segev carefully looks at the way the war changed the cultural ethos of Israel. Many of the taboos of the new nation came into being as a result of the war. The Israeli felt as if he had matured with the end of the war and the brilliant victory brought the country a false sense of security. Israel felt that now she was unbeatable militarily and society began the process of maturation from adolescent to adulthood. New venues opened all over and the people of Israel developed a new cultural awakening and all those aspects of modern life came into being. Some of these included the advent of an automobile industry, the flourishing of coffee houses and the creations of new industries and ways of life. The gay movement began to become visible, music and the other arts flourished and Israel began to develop an entire culture which included the sexual revolution and pornography and prostitution. It was a new age for Israel and all those aspects of life began to emerge, even those that were not particularly wanted.

For this reason the book is a delight. We read about the life of a nation that is a cosmopolitan nation living in an area where other nations rely on religious tradition to develop the culture of their countries. The founder of the concept of Zionism (the nationalistic movement that brought about the creation of the state of Israel) stated once that we would know that Israel was indeed a nation when the mailmen, plumbers, bus drivers and prostitutes were Jewish and could take their places next to the intelligentsia of the nation. Israel indeed came of age in 1967 and although the war brought a lot of pain to the country, it also created a pride that has yet to be duplicated.

The book and its author plays on his ability to manufacture an 'intimacy' with Israel by claiming he both represents the country as a member of the 1967 generation and by pretending that as a native Hebrew reader he thus 'understands' all the ins and outs of the country and the war. He does a good job painting a picture of the lead up to the Six Day War, the so-called 'miscalculations' that led to the conflict. But this book is a book about Israel and really its about a tiny part of Israel. Its not about the Druze in the war or the Mizrachim or the Sephardim or women, or the religious Jews. Its about the Ashkenazi elite and their friends from the Kibbutz.

This means that the point of view expressed here, even though it shows there were many shades to this point of view, was held by the top 10% of a vibrant and diverse society that encompassed a dozen language groups and people from fifty countries.

Of course the point of view and intimacy with the Arab feelings regarding the war(Euphoria before hand and 'humiliation' after), is ignored because there is an attempt to cover up the fact that the masses and elites of Egypt and Syria yearned for war and the people begged for it, believing they would win.

The major contribution, and fabrication, is that the war wasn't inevitable, that it could have been avoided if the generals and the Ashkenazi cultural elites had simply ignored the Egyptian army massing in Sinai, the blockade and the departure of the U.N. That's easy to say from retrospect. Its like saying from retrospect that Saddam Hussein wouldn't use gas in the Gulf War. It wasn't so easy on June 1st, 1967 and that is the major flaw. The intimacy is used to cover up true understanding and sympathy.

Instead a series of claims are made that are patently false and a fake sense of 'this was the way it was' is given through massive numbers of anecdotes and quotes. Not one Arab archive is used or Arab newspaper, not one speech by Nasser is fully explored. Not one Nasser radio broadcast. That's pretty one sided.

Seth J. Frantzman