...is this book another self-serving attempt to place blame for individual and collective shortcomings elsewhere?

I will say right off the bat that I served under then-Colonel Sanchez when he was a mechanized brigade commander in Kansas in the mid-90's. I found him to be very interested in his leaders' knowledge, skills and abilities, but also felt that the way he went about testing his subordinates at times bordered on complete and total micromanagement. As a brand-new officer, I didn't mind that as much because it told me that he was involved and engaged in what his unit was doing. However, I know it rubbed a lot of other officers and NCOs the wrong way.

His section on brigade command leaves out some important facts about events at Fort Riley in the summer of 1995 and then the subsequent NTC train-up and rotation that I won't go into, but the way the section was written did put me on guard the rest of the way in terms of how he presented his case and what other critical details were omitted.

I will say that I respect Gen. Sanchez as a commander and know that he had his hands full as the V Corps Commander based on the observations of friends who served on his staff. I believe a lot of what he says in his book to be true: his corps was woefully under-resourced due to the belief that the war in Iraq was "over" and the lack of detailed planning for post-combat operations doomed his legacy unit to have to learn on the fly, something that rarely pays off successfully- at least early on in the game.

In Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sanchez's defense, he presided over some important victories in Iraq: namely the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of his two sons. Unfortunately for him, the Abu Ghraib scandal proved to be his undoing, no matter that the events occurred at levels well below him.

As is the case with Lt. Col. (ret.) Nathan Sassaman's memoir, I would caution readers not to take everything at face value and understand that with these autobiographies, there is always going to be a modicum of self-serving revisionism. I know that for a fact in this book because I lived through one of the sections and found that LTG (ret.) Sanchez left out a key event that I had always wanted to understand how he viewed it and how it affected him as a commander. I was disappointed that it got nary a mention and truly made me question what else he was leaving out the rest of the way. I was disappointed mainly because in my heart, I truly respected Sanchez as my brigade commander and would have followed him anywhere as a young officer who had yet to serve under anyone else. He inspired loyalty in me, and I believe him to be a good man.

In the end, I thank Gen. Sanchez for his service and believe that he tried his best. He has written a pretty interesting book about his career and life experiences. At the same time, knowledge is power. If this is the only account of the Iraq War you read, then you will come away with an incomplete picture of what happened there during that timeframe and what is occurring now at the 5 1/2 year mark.

Perhaps he was. Certainly he makes a worthwhile case, and 30-plus years of service are not to be overlooked. He's understandably wounded in pride to think that he was forced into retirement while those in our government who should be (that's my opinion, not Sanchez's, BTW) remain in power.

Pride, indeed, just might be this warrior's Achilles' heel. As other reviewers have pointed out, he comes across at times as self-serving and defensive.

But he rightly returns his focus, time after time, to the men and women he led into battle. And though he makes his love for the service quite clear (again, 30+ years), he does not spare their blushes in his assessment of mistakes made, and steps that need be taken to learn.

In the end, though perhaps it could have been edited by about 10%, this book is well worth reading.

Lt General Sanchez confirms what the few intelligent American voter suspected. The Neo-Conservatives in The White House and The Pentagon have created a mess in Irag. Now because of field commanders that are finally being shown the respect that they did not receive until General Petraes was placed in charge; there has been more military successes on the ground in Irag.The Neo-Conservatives will soon be out of power after The November Elections. Whether it's President McCain or President Obama; their priorities should be to allow the Generals on the ground control the wars in Afghanistan and Irag and to not politicize the war for their own agendas be they liberal or conservative. LT General Sanchez would make a good Secretary of Defense for either President. He has the experience,the intelligence, and the respect for the Generals on the ground. The fact that he is a Latino would also honor the many Latinos that are in harms way and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for their country. A country that has yet to accept them as equal Americans. In fact Senator McCain and Senator Obama would be wise to use him as their military adviser during their presidential campaign as soon as possible. A great book, a great public servant and a great Latino role model.

As someone deeply involved in activities for the promotion of the German-American Partnership, I had the good fortune to meet Ricardo and Maria Elena Sanchez here in Germany before Ric was sent to Iraq. I was very impressed by Ric's honesty, humility, devotion to duty and his willingness, despite his unbelievably crowded schedule, to devote quality time to helping us promote cross-cultural understanding. Since he was one of the few high-ranking people that I found really impressive, I followed his subsequent career with great interest. As the tragic events in Iraq unfolded, I knew there had to be more to the story. I am extremely grateful to Ric for having the courage to write this outstanding book. Generations after us will use it as primary source material to help understand how the combination of ignorance, incompetence and hubris exhibited by the Bush administration has so severely diminished America's image in the world and inflicted damage on the country's institutions that will take decades to repair. Ric Sanchez by emphasizing the importance of truth, honesty and self-criticism in overcoming the legacy of our failures has served his country once again in an exemplary fashion.

David T. Fisher
Former President of the German-American Steuben Schurz Society

All memoirs tend to be self serving and this one fits the usual template. General Sanchez seems never to have made a mistake in his career or his life. And the bureaucratic details with their endless abbreviations and acronyms are sometimes confusing. There are minor spelling mistakes but that's the copy editor's responsibility. All that aside, this is a pretty believable story about an Hispanic guy who came out of the wilderness and rose to command an army in Iraq. The good general doesn't clobber any of his army comrades, although he insinuates, and saves his carefully expressed displeasure for the civilian leadership. Not so much Bush, who comes off as usually sincere, sometimes loony, but for Rumsfeld and the Democrats in Congress, both of whom come out looking like either lying morons (Rumsfeld) or angry but uninformed (Congressional committees). One can question some of his claims but his description of the Marine's abortive battle for Falujah is supported by a recent documentary being shown on the Military Channel. Sanchez was forced to retire and was deprived of a star for political reasons, mostly having to do with Abu Ghraib. He claims to have done the best possible job at the prison and elsewhere in Iraq, given that he was usually 60% under strength. I believed him, but you can judge for yourself.

"Wiser in Battle" made for interesting reading, but it also pointed up the soldier's dilema when faced with the conflicting objectives of politicians and the military.

Throughout the book, General Sanchez had nothing but positive things to say about results achieved under his command, but at a certain point, when it was abundantly clear that things had gone badly wrong, he finally laid the blame where it should have been in the first place: The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State, as well as Condi Rice.

For those interested in studying this phenomonem, it's worth reading. It is a pity, however, that honorable officers are put in the position he was, where he had a choice of speaking out or resigning.

If all the retired generals who are now criticizing the war had resigned en masse, perhaps we wouldn't be looking for a 100-year occupation, as the good Senator McCain suggests.

LTG Sanchez probably has a legitimate complaint as to how his retirement was handled.....but this book is a poor way to express it. He has taken great liberties with the facts and his view is not necessarily the correct one. He has written a puff piece about this poor Hispanic Texan who rose to three stars in the Army. As a minimum, he should have gotten people's names correct; among others it is "Rick" (not Ric) Brown, the CG at Ft Knox, who gave him considerable responsibility early in his career. Overall, a disappointing book. I blame the editors for allowing it to be published without some fact checking. Might have been a better book with just a little more work!

Being a retired soldier myself I can now understand how things went so wrong in Iraq. LT GEN Sanchez has identified the poor planning of our national leadership and their lack of understanding in military matters. The military is not a business and can not be ran like one. Our old Texas A&I student has served his nation well. CSM, USA Retire William R. Notz

LTG Sanchez gives a humble but totally informed view of how the war in Iraq has been managed in the years following the overwhelming battlefield victory in 2003. It is well written and never boastful. LTG Sanchez seems to give credit whenever it is due, and accepts responisiblity for the decisions that he made. It is an eye opening insider's perspective.

A scary and soobering look at the described reality of the Iraq war and our government through Lt. Gen. Regardo Sanchez's eyes.

Sanchez was the Commanding General when I was stationed with the Headquarters' Element of 1AD in Wiesbaden.
From my personal point of view, Sanchez was far from being the great leader and warrior he claimed to be. He never was a Soldier's general. Unlike General Dempsey, who cared immensely for his troops, this guy cared only about making rank.
As for his account on what went on and still goes on in Iraq take it with a grain of salt. Was the administration too much involved in the decision making process? Yes. Did Rumsfeld micromanage the military? Yes. Sanchez didn't have it easy down there, but he also didn't have it much harder than other Generals still down there. And again, his leadership style was not great and he wasn't as "down to earth" as he claims in his book.

As I was reading the book, I thought, this is not the CG I remember.

Quite readable and has some important information how the white house gang mismanaged theIraq war. Sanchez comes accross as defending himself too much and has grandiose images of himself as a great "warrior" The most disturbing revelation is Bush's cheer leader pep talk telling him to get in there and kill in Faluja

I knew General Sanchez when he commanded 1st Armored Division and wanted to see how he fared in Iraq and what he thinks of the Iraq venture.
He did not disappoint me.

The U.S. Military is a very closed-mouth society. We worked for the Army for 34 years. At one time we were in the same community with LTG Sanchez as we supported the troops. We were very interested in reading what he was able to write after taking off the uniform--and we were not disappointed.

I recommend reading this book, I was thinking that the book is talking specifically about the War in Iraq but was surprised to learn about LT Gen Sanchez's entire life and struggle throughout his career.

A very well structured book, written in Basic English that everyone can understand.

As a civilian and liberal opponent of this war, I was generally not favorably disposed to both civilian and military leaders involved in this conflict. However, I was intrigued by this book and decided to hear from the main military personality on the ground and I was not dissappointed. Not because of political affiliation, but like Cobra II, I felt this was a great addition to the historical record when years from now we would have a better perspective on the war.

I loved the narrative style. It was very easy to read and I'm not sure if this is a function of Sanchez or Phillips or both, but the writing is a credit to the book.

Sanchez tells a good story about himself and values and his military life of service. As you read through the book, sometimes you wonder why some points are belabored such as the value of integrity he learned in his community, the idea of "if God wills it," or working in the IG office, or training out in California and as a leader being "in the box," etc, and then as the story goes on, you see how the authors masterfully incorporate his life lessons into the narrative of the Iraq War.

I'm glad that he finally has had the opportunity to reveal his side of the Abu Ghraib story and his ultimate vindication. As a war opponent, I was as willing as most to paint all the leaders as guilty, but this book makes one appreciate the complexities of the situation and this is a man who did his job as best he could and he did a fine job given the circumstances.

I read some reviews of this book which chastised Sanchez for seeming to blame others and not shoulder any blame. I didn't see it that way. I think he makes his shortcomings clear, especially his underestimating of the reaction of the Sunni population when they cracked down to create a more secure environment.

The bottom line here is that we see how bad policy and politics affects and brands good people. I think Sanchez's problem is that he doesn't know how to play the media game. Overall Petraeus and Abizaid have come off as Media darlings because we've been presented with this great media narrative about them. Sanchez, I think should have paid more attention to playing the media and political game and that would have given him more leverage in dealing with politicians. I watched Sanchez give an interview regarding the book recently and it was very uninspiring and uncharismatic. I think if he could turn his media image around it would be helpful.

I was very happy to have read this book and am the wiser for it. If nothing else, as non-insiders we learn about the process and the complexities that we all don't see or get to appreciate. I completed this book on vacation in two days. It is a substant work but quite well written. I recommend it.

I was a member of 2 of Mr. Sanchez's commands. The first was in a armor unit and all we ever talked about is how he would manuever troops in front of each other and cause fratricide. (We didnt say it that politely) Another incident invloved Mr. Sanchez jumping onto my vehicle as it came to a stop, just to get his bearings, of course he could have been seriously injured boarding a combat vehicle without permission. Either speaks of his arrogance or ignorance, you be the judge. In the second command his intelligence cell had more investigators (misconduct, security violations, etc.) running around picking up the pieces than staff officers, he clearly cannot run a clean unit. Remember it was under Mr. Sanchez that he allowed Abu-Ghraib to happen.
Bottom-line: Dont buy the book, if you must read an Iraq war novel I suggest, "Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine, 1917-1948". At least this book gives an idea of how it all started.

I'm neither a veteran nor a political partisan. I don't have an axe to grind. I personally have no more use for the so-called Republicans than I do the Democrats. This is an excellent book and you should read it.

General Sanchez provides many details regarding how what we now recognize as the terrible mess in Iraq got started. The original question--should we have gone in there in the first place?--is one thing, but equally important is how did it get so screwed up once "Mission Accomplished" was declared? The General offers good insight into this.

What is so ironic is that General Sanchez had received specialized training and experience which uniquely qualified him for the position into which he was placed upon the withdrawal of General Franks. In utilizing that knowledge and expertise to point out to his Army and political superiors what was lacking in our "Phase IV" effort, he was simply applying what our Army had spent so much effort in teaching him. They chose to ignore him and then ultimately make him the scapegoat for what happened.

Whether reading The Histories by Herodotus, History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucycides, or The Gallic War and the Civil War by Julius Caesar, or any account in the interim 2,000 years, one must always consider, ultimately, whether the author is being factual, truthful, open-handed or whether his own "axe to grind" overwhelms everything else. You must ask this of Sanchez' book as well. For many reasons, I concluded that Sanchez is most likely truthful and accurate in his facts and his conclusion.

Much of the man himself and his character and integrity I believe comes through with this account. "Always tell the truth." Yes, many of us growing up here, just regular folks like myself, have been taught this and try to live by it. Probably, most people in most places in the world have been taught this. I'm not sure about America's Elite, however; though I already am pretty sure how to answer this regarding America's political Elite. By the way, don't fool yourself into thinking it makes much difference, one political party or the other. There is enormous and ample blame for them both on this and many other issues.

Read Sanchez' book. It will make you sad. So many dedicated service men and women, at all ranks and levels, trying so hard, trying to live the "service" taught them from an early age. Contrast that with the highest leaders who seem to not "...have the sense to pour pee out of a boot..." as it has been observed elsewhere in history.

It will be interesting to see what other retired generals say about this.

Good read! Worth it to see how senior military leaders develop professionally and take command decisions...and what it takes to remain working at the highest levels of the DoD...

Lt Gen Sanchez has a lot of moral courage to write this book. Every page you read brings you to respect him more.

After reading it, read Gen Franks book to get another perspective...

Gen Zinni, Gen Clark, Gen Powell, as well as Gen schwarzkopf are also good senior leader reads!

I was serving in the Green Zone during some of the period described in this book, and still recall the unimaginable confusion Sanchez writes about. When CENTCOM and the Army component commander, LTG McKeirnan, withdrew leaving the V Corps Commander in charge of all military operations, the circuit overload peaked beyond comprehension. To learn near the end of the book that Sec Def Rumsfeld claimed he never knew about Sanchez having to manage the war on the ground with only a skeleton staff makes one's gorge rise. My analysis: too many elites each running his own stovepipe, leaving Sanchez to make the best of it. Worst of all, the soldiers and marines were jerked around needlessly with predicable consequences. Sanchez makes a lot of wanting to retire with 3-stars. This may seem a little selfish, but who can fault him for keeping his pride intact?

"Wiser in Battle" begins with the story of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's early life, including what motivated him to join the Army. He then goes on to provide the inside story of events in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished," when he took over military command, up to summarily being scapegoated and relieved over Abu Ghraib, followed by retirement.

Throughout "Wiser in Battle" Sanchez makes clear that Rumsfeld's micromanagement created confusion and frustration due to constant changes. Further, Sanchez believes Bush's declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable opened the door for gross negligence via subsequent failure to publish new standards, and ignoring the lessons of prisoner abuses at Bagram in Afghanistan. (Sanchez also declared the Geneva Conventions in force almost immediately after taking over in Iraq; unfortunately, his command did not extend to the CIA and special operations people involved there.)

Directly after taking over in Baghdad, Sanchez addressed the looting and fires, with his leaders identifying 350-500 sites to protect. Securing the innumerable ammunition dumps, as staffed, was estimated as requiring 3-5 years, so Pentagon leaders outsourced the job. Bremer arrived just in time to reverse plans to use Iraqi Army and some of its leaders in managing Iraq. Sanchez also highlights the confusion caused by landing in the midst of orders to send Gen. Franks' troops home, as well as suddenly releasing Sanchez's men who had been "stop-lossed." Sanchez pulls no punches - clearly stating that the resulting problems cost billions as well as many American soldiers lives.

LG Wallace's sudden reassignment for an off-hand comment about not planning to fight a potential insurgency (actually we had no plans at all) didn't help any-one's confidence in taking charge either. (Sanchez also references Gen. Shinseki's being slapped down for his honest response to a Congressional question.) Bremer also took over police training that Army personnel were beginning the job; ultimately the job was given to Bernie Kerik who accomplished little other than endanger U.S. troops by his failure to coordinate with them.

Additional problems included lack of effective police, sporadic fuel and electricity, banks not being open, a non-existent judicial system, the Army's refusal to send lawyers to help with interrogation issues, severe restrictions on the use of foreign troops and the U.S. failure to provide promised trucks etc., unnecessarily stirring up Shiites by closing Sadr's newspaper and capturing one of his deputies, and unclarity of the relationship between Bremer and Sanchez. The latter became especially clear when Bremer ordered Sanchez to withdraw the Marines from Fallujah due to concern about affecting Bush's 2004 re-election - Sanchez refused, then settled for a unilateral cease-fire; later the battle was refought at a much higher cost.

The final pages were very eye-opening. Sanchez was visiting a new school named for him and caught sight of a childhood friend. The friend had left school to pursue migrant field work while Sanchez pursued JROTC. The friend was now the new school janitor, and Sanchez a three-star general! I'm left wondering how many others' lives have derailed?

Bottom Line: Investigations into Abu Ghraib found fault with Sanchez' leadership. On the other hand, he was burdened by poor underlying prison leadership and an incredibly fractured line of authority over the prison. My opinion is that we would all be better off with Sanchez, and others like him, still in the military.

"Wiser in Battle" begins with the story of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's early life, including what motivated him to join the Army. He then goes on to provide the inside story of events in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished," when he took over military command, up to summarily being scapegoated and relieved over Abu Ghraib, followed by retirement.

Throughout "Wiser in Battle" Sanchez makes clear that Rumsfeld's micromanagement created confusion and frustration due to constant changes. Further, Sanchez believes Bush's declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable opened the door for gross negligence via subsequent failure to publish new standards, and ignoring the lessons of prisoner abuses at Bagram in Afghanistan. (Sanchez also declared the Geneva Conventions in force almost immediately after taking over in Iraq; unfortunately, his command did not extend to the CIA and special operations people involved there.)

Directly after taking over in Baghdad, Sanchez addressed the looting and fires, with his leaders identifying 350-500 sites to protect. Securing the innumerable ammunition dumps, as staffed, was estimated as requiring 3-5 years, so Pentagon leaders outsourced the job. Bremer arrived just in time to reverse plans to use Iraqi Army and some of its leaders in managing Iraq. Sanchez also highlights the confusion caused by landing in the midst of orders to send Gen. Franks' troops home, as well as suddenly releasing Sanchez's men who had been "stop-lossed." Sanchez pulls no punches - clearly stating that the resulting problems cost billions as well as many American soldiers lives.

LG Wallace's sudden reassignment for an off-hand comment about not planning to fight a potential insurgency (actually we had no plans at all) didn't help any-one's confidence in taking charge either. (Sanchez also references Gen. Shinseki's being slapped down for his honest response to a Congressional question.) Bremer also took over police training that Army personnel were beginning the job; ultimately the job was given to Bernie Kerik who accomplished little other than endanger U.S. troops by his failure to coordinate with them.

Additional problems included lack of effective police, sporadic fuel and electricity, banks not being open, a non-existent judicial system, the Army's refusal to send lawyers to help with interrogation issues, severe restrictions on the use of foreign troops and the U.S. failure to provide promised trucks etc., unnecessarily stirring up Shiites by closing Sadr's newspaper and capturing one of his deputies, and unclarity of the relationship between Bremer and Sanchez. The latter became especially clear when Bremer ordered Sanchez to withdraw the Marines from Fallujah due to concern about affecting Bush's 2004 re-election - Sanchez refused, then settled for a unilateral cease-fire; later the battle was refought at a much higher cost.

Bottom Line: Investigations into Abu Ghraib found fault with Sanchez' leadership. On the other hand, he was burdened by poor underlying prison leadership and an incredibly fractured line of authority over the prison. My opinion is that we would all be better off with Sanchez, and others like him, still in the military.

"Wiser in Battle" begins with the story of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's early life, including what motivated him to join the Army. He then goes on to provide the inside story of events in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished," when he took over military command, up to summarily being scapegoated and relieved over Abu Gharib, followed by retirement.

Throughout "Wiser in Battle" Sanchez makes clear that Rumsfeld's micromanagement created confusion and frustration due to constant changes. Further, Sanchez believes Bush's declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable opened the door for gross negligence via subsequent failure to publish new standards, and ignoring the lessons of prisoner abuses at Bagram in Afghanistan. (Sanchez also declared the Geneva Conventions in force almost immediately after taking over in Iraq; unfortunately, his command did not extend to the CIA and special operations people involved there.)

Directly after taking over in Baghdad, Sanchez addressed the looting and fires, with his leaders identifying 350-500 sites to protect. Securing the innumerable ammunition dumps, as staffed, was estimated as requiring 3-5 years, so Pentagon leaders outsourced the job. Bremer arrived just in time to reverse plans to use Iraqi Army and some of its leaders in managing Iraq. Sanchez also highlights the confusion caused by landing in the midst of orders to send Gen. Franks' troops home, as well as suddenly releasing Sanchez's men who had been "stop-lossed." Sanchez pulls no punches - clearly stating that the resulting problems cost billions as well as many American soliders lives.

LG Wallace's sudden reassignment for an off-hand comment about not planning to fight a potential insurgency (actually we had no plans at all) didn't help any-one's confidence in taking charge either. (Sanchez also references Gen. Shinseki's being slapped down for his honest response to a Congressional question.) Bremer also took over police training that Army personnel were beginning the job; ultimately the job was given to Bernie Kerik who accomplished little other than endanger U.S. troops by his failure to coordinate with them.

Additional problems included lack of effective police, sporadic fuel and electricity, banks not being open, a non-existent judicial system, the Army's refusal to send lawyers to help with interrogation issues, and unclarity of the relationship between Bremer and Sanchez. The latter became especially clear when Bremer ordered Sanchez to withdraw the Marines from Fallujah due to concern about affecting Bush's 2004 re-election - Sanchez refused, then settled for a unlilateral cease-fire; later the battle was refought at a much higher cost.

Bottom Line: We would all be better off with Sanchez, and others like him, still in the military.