Chapter 11 of this book is entitled "How to Get out of Iraq", but the author doesn't really offer a solution. Instead he speaks of a somewhat tenuous "three state solution"; the three states consisting of the Shiite Arabs of the south, the Sunnis of central Iraq, and the Kurds in the north.

The Iraqi constitution, which was developed with heavy American influence allows the regions a lot of control with only a few roles being relegated to the central government. The Kurdish region has been self governing and protected by the U.S. since the first Gulf War.

I agree with other reviewers that Galbraith's account is a bit unbalanced; he seems to have a special affinity for the Kurds and he is disdainful of the Bush government's lack of respect for this region that was the only U.S. ally going into the war.

Most Iraqis were glad to see the fall of Saddam, yet the American incompetence in the occupation of Iraq has turned many Iraqis against the U.S. Galbraith's answer seems to be to withdraw U.S. troops and let history take it's course. This is hardly a creative solution in ending the war, but given the circumstances it might be the only solution.

The author did a good job of presenting the history of Iraq and the Iraqi people, something he claims that the American occupying authories failed to research, but as far as offering any realistic solutions to the end of the war in Iraq, he offers none.

Title The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End
Author: Peter W. Galbraith
Rating *****
Tags iraq, george w bush, dick cheney, war, peter galbraith, kurds, sunni, shia, united states

I saw this book on the library shelf and almost passed it up, not sure if I wanted to read another book on Iraq. But I looked at the author information and saw that Peter Galbraith spent several years in the U.S. government and thought it might be an interesting perspective. And so it is. Galbraith worked for many years on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the first U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, and as a professor at the National War College, He is now the Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

In those jobs, particularly as the Senate staffer, he had a lot of contact with Iraqi matters, particularly with the Kurds, and his personal experiences make fascinating reading. He also is enough of an insider, and enough of an expert, to give a well-reasoned analysis of the U.S intervention in Iraq and the current situation in Iraq.

The single most telling piece of information about the U.S. involvement in Iraq is the meeting President Bush had with three important Iraqis, two of whom talked to Galbraith about the meeting. It was two months before the U.S. invasion. The Iraqis were discussing the situation in Iraq, and it became clear to them that Bush did not understand the terms Sunni and Shia, and the Iraqis spent most of the meeting trying to explain (p. 83). Galbraith uses this to point out the dangerous arrogance in the Bush administration: "...there was a belief that Iraq was a blank slate on which the United States believed it could impose its vision of a pluralistic democratic society. The arrogance came in the form of a belief that this could be accomplished with minimal effort and planning by the United States and that it was not important to know something about Iraq." (p. 84) And later: "Charles Freeman, who served as George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, put it this way: "We invaded not Iraq, but the Iraq of our dreams, a country that didn't exist, that we didn't understand. And it is therefore not surprising that we knocked the kaleidescope into a new pattern that we find surprising. The ignorant are always surprised." (p. 101)

Galbraith also gives a masterful depiction of why civil war in Iraq was almost inevitable once Saddam Hussein was gone: "All the ingredients for civil war existed in Iraq in 2003: Sunni Arabs bitter at their ouster from positions of power and privilege, and fearful of the future; Shiites insistent that Iraq will be ruled on their terms; a Sunni belief that Shiites are traitors bent not only on destroying the Iraq the Sunnis had built but also on handing over the country to a bitter national enemy [Iran]; a Shiite belief that many Sunni Arabs were unrepentant supporters of Saddam Hussein who would enthusiastically resume the killing of Shiites if ever again given a chance at power." (p. 175)

As for the future, Galbraith believes devolution is the best answer to the realities of an Iraq that was an unnatural pairing of religious and ethnic groups to begin with and which has suffered miserably from the cruel oppression of a minority. The autonomy of the Kurds is pretty well assured and in the future Kurdistan is almost certain to become an independent state, and even Turkey has become more resigned to that outcome. The Shiite South is also moving towards becoming a region, and may become fairly stable. The Sunni Arabs in the Sunni-dominated areas are beginning to see the wisdom in fighting the insurgents. It is in Baghdad that Galbraith sees no solution. Like many commentators, Galbraith believes the U.S. presence is harmful, not helpful, although he advocates strengthening the Kurds, our best ally in the region, and thinks a U.S. base there would be appropriate and not unwelcome to the Kurds.

The book also has a good index, and a useful appendix about the political parties in Iraq.

In sum, an excellent, highly recommended book.

Publication Simon & Schuster (2007), Edition: Reprint, Paperback, 288 pages
Publication date 2007
ISBN 0743294246 / 9780743294249

The last words in the acknowledgement, written by Peter Galbraith's father, John Kenneth Galbraith, serves as an admirable summation of the central message of this book, and that traditional human failure has been exacerbated in this case by the egregious ignorance and arrogance of the current American administration. Galbraith's book proves to be an excellent confirmation of numerous points made by Thomas Ricks' in his outstanding book on Iraq, entitled "Fiasco."

Ricks made the point that one of the chief concerns of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was to remove those individuals with actual knowledge of the Iraqi situation from the American governing process, and replace them with ideologically pure neocons. Galbraith fleshes out this contention with numerous sad examples: per Ambassador Tim Carney, the State Department's professional Arabist "weren't welcome because they didn't think Iraq could be democratic." (p 95); during a Pentagon planning meeting on Kirkuk, no one knew the ethic composition of the local police (p94); Margaret Tutwiler, a former State Department chief spokesperson had never heard of the Anfal (Hussain's ethnic cleansing of the Kurds), and told her Kurdish hosts this (p115); the hiring of six young people, with no experience to manage a $13 billion budget in Iraq solely because they had placed their resumes on the conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation's, website (p127-128); and how President Bush, in 2003, did not know there were two major sects in Islam, Sunnis and Shiites (p83). Even sadder, the above is just a sample of Galbraith's examples.

Unlike the neocon neophytes, Galbraith has been actively involved in the region for over 25 years, and personally knows many of the key political players in Iraq. Clearly his sympathies are with the Kurds, with whom he has been most deeply involved, and he is an effective advocate for their independence.

"Defer to the peoples of Iraq" (p206) is Galbraith's unsurprising, save to the Washington administration, solution to the Iraq situation. He makes the point on several occasions that trying to force the three disparate former provinces of the Ottoman Empire to function as one country, "Iraq", has been the destabilizing force in the region for 80 years. The people in the area have already established at least two highly autonomous regions, Kurdistan and "Shiastan" in the south, and dissolution of unworkable countries can be a peaceful and optimal solution, citing both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union as examples. Although it is not a point that Galbraith made, for almost 23 years the United States would not recognize the reality of one billion people in "Red China." The solution to better relations was to recognize this basic fact "on the ground." Similarly, the solution for the United States policy in Iraq is to recognize the reality and the wishes of the people in the area, and forget the ideology, that even included a "flat tax" enacted into law by Viceroy Bremmer.

The book is somewhat marred by redundancy, which could be defended as necessary in order to make the case with the current political leadership. It remains an essential read.

An exceptional work that gives a very good overview of US foreign policy with Iraq over past 28 years. Many valuable insights that helps understanding sectarian conflicts. Heavily weighted to discussion on Kurdistan and its pursuit of independence.