From a practical standpoint: this fat book, which consists of excerpts from interviews, may invite reading or skimming by the dedicated citizen. It does not, however, invite consultation about specific subjects of interest, because it has only an index of names, and no subject index. That's just plain third rate, and difficult to justify. Maybe it was infected by the movie-making process -- hey! movies don't have indexes! -- but the world of non-fiction books expects subject indexes, for good reason.

Charles Ferguson's update of his superb film on the Bush war in Iraq captures the problems of the current White House to a tee. Ferguson gives over his book to interviews with top players and it works perfectly. Let them talk and you know the score. This is a terrific book and I recommend it highly.

This was an enjoyable and informative read. Ferguson avoids preaching to the reader; he lets the interviews speak for themselves. All of the incompetence of the occupation comes out in the book. He interviews top officials, not just low-level sniping critics. This book succeeds marvelously. Pick this up ASAP for the good of your country.

Interviews from those involved document why we didn't start planning for the occupation until two months before the invasion - and then excluded those who know the most, why we stood by and watched extensive looting, why we naively believed that an expatriate would be quickly accepted as the new leader of a fractured country, why we disbanded the Iraq Army - despite numerous warnings not to do so, why reconstruction monies disappeared by the billions, and why our troops were poorly equipped.

Bottom Line: How many lives were needlessly lost by these mistakes that should have been avoided?

Interviews from those involved document why we didn't start planning for the occupation until two months before the invasion - and then excluded those who know the most, why we stood by and watched extensive looting, why we naively believed that an expatriate would be quickly accepted as the new leader of a fractured country, why we disbanded the Iraq Army - despite numerous warnings not to do so, why reconstruction monies disappeared by the billions, and why our troops were poorly equipped.

"How many lives were needlessly lost by these mistakes?"

Interviews from those involved document why we didn't start planning for the occupation until two months before the invasion - and then excluded those who know the most, why we stood by and watched extensive looting, why we naively believed that an expatriate would be quickly accepted as the new leader of a fractured country, why we disbanded the Iraq Army - despite numerous warnings not to do so, why reconstruction monies disappeared by the billions, and why our troops were poorly equipped.

This is heartbreaking on more fronts than you can readily imagine. If you want to know why the US election in 2008 matters so much around the world, read this book. In unblinking and unbiased assessment, Ferguson details not just the imperial hubris but the brute ignorance of a samll group of capitalist exploiters looking to make one more killing on the backs of those not among the ruling class in America.
Instead of Caligula, there is Cheney, and his puppet boy President, whose track record in business and government is that he absolutely ruined financially every organization he was part of because he refused to listen to people who knew better, be it oil, baseball, the state of Texas, the US federal government...
Barbara Bodine, on the ground immediately after the fall of the Hussein government and in cahrge of getting the city of Baghdad up and running, put it best:
"There were 2 or 3 ways to get it (reconstruction) right and 500 or more to get it wrong, and we got all (500) of them."
As a consequence, the designed incompetence that has functioned as a smoke screen for Cheney and his corporate buddies put consecutive bumblers and enablers in a volatile situation and they successfully made absoluetly everything worse: Wolfowicz, Bremer and on to Petraeus. It is a gallery of very bad actors exploiting a disaster with the mentality that it's all going to hell in a hangbasket, so let's grab what we can.
The interviews speak for themselves. Rumsfeld refused to speak or comment. The White House could care less. The US is now 1 trillion in the whole and counting, and the sad prospect comes across with blunt and dismaying clarity in the final section of the book. A bloodbath seems ineveitable, unless a military coup, i.e. a controlled bloodbath, is effected by the Sunni military and their foreign backers (but not the US). Short of that, a series of civil wars destabilizing the economic tipping point of the rest of the planet has been unleashed and is all but inevitable.
Cheney, Bush, and their cadre will effect what the criminals of other wars never managed - they'll get away with it.
Regardless of who wins the Democratic nomination, it is abundantly clear that an immediate pullout is impossible. No matter who wins the general election, the prospect of staying another 100 years, as McCain suggests, is possible and would in much shorter time ruin what is left of the US.
The electorate in the US thinks that withdrawal has something to do with bringing soldiers home. Instead, as this book spells out quite intensely, it has to do with just how precariously interconnected the entire globe has become. Whether extrication is possible without intense disaster remians to be seen. If you saw the film, that tells only part of the story. This book will keep you up awake the rest of your life, tossed between extraordinary anger at the exploiters and certain dismay for the generations which follow and will pay the price, one way or another, for the evil done.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson.

You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Bodine had needed, perhaps more than others, to get things right in Baghdad. Her long career as a stateswoman had become controversial when as Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, she denied FBI agent John P. O'Neill re-entry into Yemen to continue his command of the FBI investigation into the USS Cole bombing. This was just a turf spat between State and FBI. Some scholars now believe that O'Neill would have uncovered the 9/11 plot in time to save lives, as O'Neill had already put together several important pieces of the puzzle that became 9/11. (O'Neill was subsequently investigated for losing a briefcase and many feel he was forced out of the FBI, not having recovered from losing the turf battle in Yemen. He became the head of security at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks.)

Colonel Paul Hughes' interview is very interesting. He served in the Office of Post War Planning, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. He tells about how he and his staff at the Office of Post War Planning had offices at the Pentagon but no computers or desks. He is a highly decorated former Army colonel and is a Senior Program Officer in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations in the United States Institute for Peace (whatever all that means). Some colleagues say he lost a piece of his soul in Iraq and is searching for it. Good and troubled people reclined at Documentarian Ferguson's couch.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

The Presidential Medal of Freedom is a symbolic tool used by presidents to signal favorites to the public. Normally this medal is awarded to those close to a president or to celebrities that lend support to a president. The Presidential Medal of Freedom is often thought of as the "First Ladies Medal" - it has been awarded to Nancy Reagan, Rosalyn Carter, Betty Ford and Lady Bird Johnson.

Bremer quickly made drastic policy changes that contradicted all that came before, returned a year later, and before the end of that year received the nation's highest civilian award that normally only goes to the closest associates of the president and supportive celebrities. Since Bremer was neither a very close associate of the president nor a celebrity at the time, it follows that his Iraq tour met the highest loyalty standard.

In this context, it is fair to question whether Paul Bremer was merely following orders, and if so he was apparently not allowed to disclose his real mission to Ferguson's interviewees. Moreover, Ferguson explains that Bremer was considered brave in that he was under constant threat and took a lot of personal risks during his time in Iraq.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson.

You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Bodine had needed, perhaps more than others, to get things right in Baghdad. Her long career as a stateswoman had become controversial when as Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, she denied FBI agent John P. O'Neill re-entry into Yemen to continue his command of the FBI investigation into the USS Cole bombing. Some scholars now believe that O'Neill would have uncovered the 9/11 plot in time to save lives, as O'Neill already had put together some pieces of the puzzle. (O'Neill was subsequently investigated for losing a briefcase and left the FBI under a cloud. He became the head of security at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks.)

Colonel Paul Hughes played many roles including having served in the Office of Post War Planning, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. His interview is very interesting. Among other things he tells about how he and his staff at the Office of Post War Planning had offices at the Pentagon but no computers or desks.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

The Presidential Medal of Freedom is a symbolic tool used by presidents to signal favorites to the public. Normally this medal is awarded to those close to a president or to celebrities that lend support to a president. The Presidential Medal of Freedom is often thought of as the "First Ladies Medal" - it has been awarded to Nancy Reagan, Rosalyn Carter, Betty Ford and Lady Bird Johnson.

In this context, it is fair to question whether Paul Bremer was merely following orders, and if so he was apparently not allowed to disclose anything of substance to Ferguson's interviewees. Moreover, Ferguson explains that Bremer was considered brave in that he was under constant threat and took a lot of personal risks during his time in Iraq.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson.

You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Bodine had needed, perhaps more than others, to get things right in Baghdad. Her long career as a stateswoman had become controversial when as Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, she denied FBI agent John P. O'Neill re-entry into Yemen to continue his command of the FBI investigation into the USS Cole bombing. Some scholars now believe that O'Neill would have uncovered the 9/11 plot in time to save lives, as O'Neill already had put together some pieces of the puzzle. (O'Neill was subsequently investigated for losing a briefcase and left the FBI under a cloud. He became the head of security at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks.)

Colonel Paul Hughes played many roles including having served in the Office of Post War Planning, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. His interview is very interesting. Among other things he tells about how he and his staff at the Office of Post War Planning had offices at the Pentagon but no computers or desks.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

While the Presidential Medal of Freedom is often awarded for activity related to charities, it is more often than not given to individuals with close relationships to a president or to celebrities that lend support to presidential causes. This medal is sometimes thought of as the "First Ladies Medal" - it has been awarded to Nancy Reagan, Rosalyn Carter, Betty Ford and Lady Bird Johnson.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson.

You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Ambassador Bodine had needed, perhaps more than others, to get things right in Baghdad. Her long career as a stateswoman had become controversial when as Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, she denied FBI agent John P. O'Neill re-entry into Yemen to continue his command of the FBI investigation into the USS Cole bombing. Some scholars now believe that O'Neill would have uncovered the 9/11 plot in time to save lives, as O'Neill already had put together some pieces of the puzzle. (O'Neill was subsequently investigated for losing a briefcase and left the FBI under a cloud. He became the head of security at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks.)

Colonel Paul Hughes played many roles including having served in the Office of Post War Planning, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. His interview is very interesting. Among other things he tells about how he and his staff at the Office of Post War Planning had offices at the Pentagon but no computers or desks.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson. You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.

For those unfamiliar with the 2007 film by the same name, No End In Sight offers an opinion-free approach to understanding the management of the war in Iraq.

Charles Ferguson, award-winnning documentarian, obtained rare interviews with officials such as Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of the State Department. These interviews were lengthy, hours in many cases, and the documentary film version only featured a small percentage of the material. Much of the best of this material works even better in book form. The movie is no substitute for the book, which Ferguson wrote later and which benefited from a longer editing process, follow-on trips to the region, deeper and matured analysis, and even more interviews.

This is not an analysis of why the U.S. went to war. It is one of the best accounts so far on what happened once the war began. Free of political leanings, No End In Sight would probably serve as a textbook for the military academies in addition to informing us on how the big decisions were actually made.

The interviewees tell us what went wrong. One bad decision followed another, and apparently nobody wanted to risk themselves personally by going public. But time ate away at the players Ferguson interviewed. They felt a need to talk to somebody, namely Ferguson. You can feel the outrage and helplessness of Barbara Bodine, the ambassador placed in charge of the city of Baghdad by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

The cast of characters tells us how the insurgency got started. In particular, Paul Bremer replaced Jay Gardner in May 2003. Bremer was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and reported directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bremer made surprise decisions that contradicted all the meticulous planning of the U.S. experts on the ground in Iraq. He disbanded the Iraqi military and followed that up by removing Ba'ath party members from top government positions. In June 2004 Bremer transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government and returned to the U.S.

Ferguson's interviewees seem mortified that one man could do so much to shape the war in so little time. In December 2004, President Bush awarded Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

No End In Sight makes a huge contribution in our effort to understand the decision-making process in Iraq once the war actually started.