Bob Drogin paints a damning portrait of western intelligence gathering, but not a surprising one. We all know by now that alleged professionals in the CIA and DIA were too eager to tell the White House what they thought it wanted to hear and that the Bush administration did nothing to discourage them from presenting unvetted intel.

The usual suspects are all here: groupthink, turf wars, careerism. What makes this book refreshing is that, aside from being engagingly written, it explains at the most basic levels how American spies and policymakers got it wrong. The answer is much more complex than "Bush lied." Unfortunately, it's much less comforting: George W. Bush will soon be gone, but many of the anonymous bureaucrats who had a hand in the Curveball fiasco will keep their jobs. And George Tenet (a Clinton appointee, if you remember) can spend the rest of his days in a cushy private-sector job and polishing his Presidential Medal of Freedom (awarded to him by Bush after presiding over three unforgivably huge failures -- India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, 9/11 and the one you're reading about here).

Still, Drogin doesn't quite answer an important question: Just how much pressure did the administration put on intelligence officers? Perhaps that's because "Curveball" focuses on Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program, not on his chemical and nuclear programs or his connection to Al Qaeda. Alleged, anyway.

The book mentions, but doesn't explain, Dick Cheney's well-known visits to Langley. And then, leading up to Colin Powell's infamous U.N. speech, there's a rather comical episode in which Scooter Libby asks Powell to read a speech the V.P.'s office prepared that involved wild, completely unsubstantiated claims that Saddam Hussein was an almost Bondian super-villain employing "nuclear mujahadeen." Powell wisely tossed this speech in favor of one based on a National Intelligence Estimate written - and, he could only assume, vetted - by apolitical pros. The rest is history.

The narrative slows down for a few chapters two-thirds through as Drogin needlessly recounts in detail the numerous false positives post-invasion weapons hunters investigated before David Kay's Iraq Survey Group began to realize the ugly truth. And the bibliography is maddeningly thin.

But altogether, "Curveball" is a highly readable case study in how bureaucratic bungling can have disastrous consequences. Which is a shame because -- and call me a cynic if you must -- I have a feeling this one won't be on the next administration's required reading list.

Bob Drogin has performed a magnificent service by pulling all of the information and background into one full story about how US intelligence services and their clients... the Leadership of the US Governmen... were once again guilty of looking for intelligence to justify decisions they wanted to make. He does it with a rapid paced, but fully documented narrative. I strongly recommend this book. It is a 'must'.

It's familiar spy-thriller fodder -- little guy outwits bumbling government bureaucrats, leading to international disaster. And the writing moves along in the page-turning way of the best of the genre.

This isn't made-up stuff, though. It's the real story of how an Iraqi nobody with a good sales pitch and a glib tongue fooled enough intelligence people enough of the time to give the U.S. administration its pretext to go after Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction.

Author Bob Drogin is a veteran newspaper reporter who wrote episodes of this story for the Los Angeles Times over the past several years. His book is thoroughly (but unobtrusively) documented. Read it and you'll hope, as I do, that future Washington decision-makers have read it, too.

A well documented and fascinating account of what led to the Iraq War. Was "Curveball" really the face that launched a thousand ships? Unfortunately, the answer is "yes."

This is an excellent book that tells the story of one part of the mess that was the CIA's assessment of Iraq's WMD. It is a quick, interesting read that lays out the biases, red tape, infighting, secretiveness, incompetence and confusion that resulted in the CIA missing what they thought was a slam dunk. With the caveat that not everyone has or will tell their side of the story, this is a well researched, balanced work.

This book, rather like Caesar's Gaul, is divided into three parts. The first part explains how an Iraqi defector given the cover name `Curveball' ended up in Germany and how the German national intelligence service (BND) choose to exploit him. The second part concerns how the CIA reacted to the claims of Iraqi bio-warfare capabilities made by Curveball. The third part concerns the fruitless search for any indicators of viable Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or facilities to produce them. The book is quite well written and provides a lot of information about the whole sorry Curveball affair. Yet a word of warning is in order. Its author is a reporter not an intelligence operative, his windows into the secret world of intelligence are provided by informants who were or are on the inside of that world and who, like Curveball himself, have their own agendas. The book is enlivened by pieces of supposed dialogs and personal characterizations which may or may not be accurate. Drogin is too good a reporter not to know this, but too good a writer not to include them. They add drama and verisimilitude to his story.

The book is a good read, but also supports a number of other accounts of the incredible ineptitude of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Apparently the WMD team at CIA (WINPAC) had (has?) no idea of how to transform information into intelligence. They made the leap of logic that since the second hand reports of Curveball's debriefings (codenamed the `Hortensia' series) appeared internally consistent they constituted solid intelligence. They by all accounts made no real effort to verify or enhance these reports by other means and dismissed imagery information that did not support Curveball's assertions as Iraqi denial and deception. They also made no effort to consider if Curveball's assertions really made any sense given the nature of weaponization of biological agents. Late in the game they did provide the Bechtel Corporation with reproductions of Curveball's drawing of what he claimed were mobile production facilities (18Wheeler Trucks) and were reassured that yes they could be used for that purpose. What they did not ask and Bechtel did volunteer was what else could they be used for and how practical would it be run trucks full of bio-toxins over notoriously bad road. Finally they apparently made no effort to determine if Iraq had been seeking the technologies associated with bio-toxin production (e.g. containment technologies, vaccines, or protective gear). The National Intelligence Council (NIC) that produced the infamous pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) clearly did not know the difference between information and intelligence either. This is a sorry state of affairs indeed and not likely to be improved by the cosmetic reforms that have been undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence System since 9/11.

We're still living this one. In the same gripping style of a great mystery, Curveball reveals not only whodunnit but also how he dunnit and why he dunnit. But unlike a mystery, Drogin, the author, immediately tells us the whodunnit part. The rest is history, real history. It's the compelling, can't-put-the-book-down story of how one very clever guy, code-named Curveball by his German intelligence controllers, manipulates a system and ultimately becomes one of the Bush administration's central arguments to invade Iraq. If this were fiction, you'd chuckle at the Clouseau-like bumbling of the experts. But it's not fiction and these guys are real and have titles, like Secretary of State, President of the United States, Director of the CIA...the same people who show up in the dozen other books I've read and perhaps you have too on the build-up, execution and consequences of the Iraq War. This one is a no longer invisible thread that ties the others together. A single thread but a critical one that provides understanding to how a world altering yet preventable crime can happen. And did.

Bob Drogin's "Curveball" unwinds the tragic history and consequences of our faulty intelligence on Iraq in a phenomenally engaging, riveting and deeply perceptive fashion. As only great, un-biased reportage can, Drogin answers the key questions concerning our involvement in a thrilling, meticulously documented account of how we slid down the slope of self delusion into war. Did the Iraq war need to happen? What kind of reasoning, and consequently leadership, within our intelligence community fueled the hunger for war?

Most interesting is the debate at the working level of the CIA between analysists and operatives/spies. During this debate the key rules of tradecraft were abrogated by leadership at the highest levels. As he leads us through the story of an immigrant defector in Germany to the inadequate working relationship between the German and American spy services, and on to the repression of doubt within our own intelligence community, we are forced to ask ourselves as Americans some very tough questions. Drogin's is a simple tale without explicit commentary, but these questions concerning our recent past are implicitly raised in a fashion not usually available to a citizenry until the clarity of hindsight is available to future generations.

Using impressively researched documentation from legal and government sources as well as a powerful array of interviews Drogin carefully fleshes out the picture of recent events. Without presenting any conclusions not derived from a carefully illustrated and logically derived web of facts, Drogin supplies us with the key history required for our analysis.

Drogin peripherally touches upon the roll of the Vice Presidents office, blinded by ideological zeal, pressuring the intelligence community on one end and the President on the other to step rapidly towards war without forethought or planning. Hidden between the pages is the looming question of whether our national leadership was so hungry for war that they solicited and received intentionally false proof or simply the product of an unscientifically derived false chain of evidence provided to fit conclusions which had already been reached. Did information furnished by a layer of political hacks/ideologues at the top of the intelligence community, (read George Tenet) intentionally or unintentionally supply the very fuel for misconceived ardor? Was the publicly expressed linkage between Iraq and the events of 9/11 a ruse or a misconceived monolithic mold, lumping all Arabs into a single threatening world, worthy of pre-emptive attack without the adequacy of proof required, by any intelligent competent political leadership?



This thrilling expose reads like a cross between David McCullough's "1776", and a Ken Follett spy thriller. It is a must read for any citizen who seeks not to repeat the follies of its recent history.

Rick Black
Oklahoma City

Bob Drogin's "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War" is an examination of the refugee from Iraq, code named "Curveball," who contended that he had been involved in WMD biological warfare research and development. It is also another story of serious mistakes by American intelligence in the run up to the Iraq invasion after 9/11.

In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity.

After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States.

The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported.

Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Also, was he actually the person who, as per the title, "caused a war"? It appears that the Administration had already made up its mind and Curveball's "intelligence" was simply one more argument in favor. Readers must decide if the author accurately makes his case.

The Curveball saga is a watershed in the history of the American Intelligence Community. Despite multiple blinking warning signs about the credibility of this "source," the IC wound up using the "intelligence" provided by him with the end result of the IC looking very, very foolish.

Drogin's book is a pretty good recounting of that sad little saga. He sheds particularly interesting light on how the Germans handled Curveball and the poisonous relations between the CIA and the Bundesnachrichtungdienst (German Federal Intelligence Service).

Beyond that, Drogin's book does not tell much more than what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the WMD Commission reports (issued in 2004 and 2005 respectively) do. Both of those reports are available on the Internet and are written with remarkable clarity.

In my opinion, the book suffers from the fact that Drogin has only talked with some of the players in this particular fiasco ...namely David Kay and Tyler Drumheller. Both of them are out of government and have some axes to grind. In contrast, some of the people who they locked horns with are still in government and would find themselves in deep trouble if they went on record with Drogin.

I also think that Drogin's book suffers from a remarkable flaw given the fact that it is such a devastating critique of the IC's inept use of sources. He doesn't document his own research very well in the book. For example, there is a twelve-page section of the book that doesn't have a single endnote (he uses endnotes instead of footnotes or chapter notes). There are many other parts of the book where I found myself wondering where Drogin got a particular piece of information or interpretation and found the endnotes singularly unhelpful. Now, I suppose some of this is because Drogin is protecting sources "that must remain anonymous," but why not say that instead of leaving the reader scratching his or her head? I work in the IC, and in the aftermath of the Iraq WMD debacle, failure to source one's analysis (which is what Drogin is guilty of in many cases) is simply unacceptable.

I also think that Drogin and some of the reviewers of this book are too eager to blame the Curveball fiasco on Bush and the top tier of the administration. My feeling is that Curveball got into the system and got upheld because of faults within the bureaucratic layers of the IC, not because of political machinations at the top.

This being said: it's a good read, and I think that people will learn from it. But they ought to take the hard lesson that the IC learned from this sorry episode to heart when evaluating some of the author's un-sourced stuff: namely, just because it sounds good doesn't mean it's true.

Bob Drogin's "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War" is an examination of the refugee from Iraq, code named "Curveball," who contended that he had been involved in WMD biological warfare research and development. It is also another story of serious mistakes by American intelligence in the run up to the Iraq invasion after 9/11.

In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity.

After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States.

The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported.

Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Readers must decide if he accurately makes his case.

Curveball doesn't presume to tell the complete story of how the US came to invade Iraq--but it does the best job of it of the books I've read. It shows how the intelligence supporting the decision to go to war was a house of cards built on an extremely shaky foundation and how the process of intelligence analysis and assessment was distorted by the desire of the intelligence community to tell the nation's leaders what they wanted to hear.

The book is extraordinarily well written and engaging, but doesn't sacrifice its integrity by oversimplifying what happened. The easier path in a book about a colossal failure is to make it a simple, viscerally satisfying, story of actors who are stupid or evil. No question that Curveball tells the story of a colossal failure and that those responsible did stupid things and, in some cases, acted without the best of motives. What distinguishes this book is that it shows how real people who should have known better came to deceive themselves, the country and much of the world into believing that there was solid information that Saddam Hussein's Iraq possessed biological and other weapons of mass destruction. There's culpability here from top to bottom--with heroes mixed in who tried to make things right but were willfully ignored, suppressed and dismissed. That isn't to say this lets the President and Vice-President off the hook. They played their roles in the intelligence failure and the President has the ultimate responsibility for the decision to go to war--and no one can know whether better intelligence on WMD would have given him pause. But this is not a simple story of "the President lied" or "the CIA was incompetent"--and for that it's a book that squares well with how things like this really come to happen.

As for the writing . . . this was the best written book of non-fiction I've read in many years. The story is complicated but it doesn't feel that way reading the book. It's genuinely as hard to put down as a well-crafted spy novel or mystery.

For all kinds of reasons--penetrating research, narrative flow, nifty phrases, occasional gentle wisecracks, helpful appendices-- 'Curveball" is a remarkable achievement. Equally appealing is the tone: Drogin leaves the reader to ponder the many complexities rather than arguing his own views. Even the footnotes are fascinating. The book also cleared up a disturbing concern of mine going back to CIA chief George Tenet's February 2004 Georgetown speech, a chunk of which I happened to catch on CSpan. He came across as a policy advocate, not the detached collector and evaluator of intelligence that's needed in the job. "Curveball" provides a context that helps explains this dangerous man. Of course, the book does a lot more than that, describing, much like a business school case review. how the "intelligence community" leadership can abandon common sense in favor of catering to the White House or competing with other agencies. One wonders if the same thing is going on today with respect to Iran.

Curveball is one of the most comprehensive pieces of investigative reporting of our time. Bob Drogin pieces together tangible details to document that that the Bush administration was hellbent on sending our kids to war, facts be damned. This book shows the pattern of willful deceit, a road map tracing how officials hid their shallow decisions behind a veil of so-called intelligence findings, hoping to hide their mistakes behind a "top secret" classification. Curveball provides concrete proof that the war in Iraq was not created by a failure of intelligence but rather by a failure of character at the highest levels of government.

Bob Drogin's Curveball is a truly outstanding achievement in reporting. Why should readers care? James Madison put it this way: "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."

If only it weren't all true. I read a lot of non-fiction and this book really grabbed it. It made clear how a single life can hav a disasterous global effect. Great for political junkies as well as anyone looking for an interesting perspective into our situation in Iraq. It was a little too long for me, but the end really came together nicely. I highly recommend it.

My hat is off to Bob Drogan for providing a concrete, well researched and authentic review of the case of Curveball. Though the title is provacative (Curveball obviously didn't cause the war in Iraq), the material he provided BND and subsequently DIA/CIA, Powel, Cheney and Bush .. helped the Bush Administration provide a justification for war. The book underscorse the fact that the case for WAR was completely rushed, was built on a house cards based on extremly thin and self-indulgent logic that was (as we now see in the book but could have discerned prior to going to war in Iraq if anyone had really wanted to) ultimately completely flawed. The reports stemming from Curveball scared the crap out of the people that read them and they provided (even though unvetted) the kind of information [at the right time and place] that was exactly what our politicians and masters wanted to hear. Now .. in hindsight we understand the flaws of that information and the very ill advised decision to go to war based on Iraq's [virtually non-existent] WMD capabilities. What should be much clearer is that those flaws were actually evident when the decision was made for war, flawed intelligence made Bush/Cheney's case for them and provided almost unprecendented support from both sides of the aisle in congress. And it also convinced an already scared and fragile electorate (see 9/11, anthrax and sniper) The flaws in Curveball based intelligence were there for all to see but were willfully ignored and in my book that is negligant, criminal and fraudulent. The American people should be even more outraged at the Bush Administration than before Bob's book came out .. and they've been pretty down on Bush/Cheny anyway for good reason.

People need to wake up .. the Bush Administration is trying to do it again in Iran and in this case there just might be real WMD and real consequences for the entire world not just our soldiers and the people of Iraq.

A great job by Bob Drogan .. congratulations and many thanks.

Americans have slowly come to accept that we went to war in Iraq without proper thought, planning or justification. Curveball Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War lays bare, in gripping and damning detail, how ego and arrogance led us to war -- and in the process, how the same ego and arrogance alienated nations with whom we've been friends for years. Drogin has done a great service to the reading public, both in presenting the book like a very well written spy novel and by letting the facts themselves speak so dramatically about the state of our national security.

I've read the book and would give it unfortunately one star. The reader is poorly served as the author unsuccessfully attempts to factually and comprehensively detail the post-Saddam counterproliferation collection efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and the Iraq Survey Group from 2003 until 2004. His characterization of critical personnel and specific exploitation activities are distorted and slanted to a handful of sources--some with a known public axe to grind. I know this because I was in Baghdad, as a Department of Defense member on the 75th Exploitation Task Force and later the Iraq Survey Group, participating in the activities the author writes about and worked closely with his key characters. Drogin's sources are simply engaging in public mud-slinging to cover their own performance failures and inadequacies, during this period. Counter to the author's claims, key CIA analysts in leadership positions brought well-needed sanity to a chaotic multi-government investigation, skillfully coordinating and synchronizing the highly disparate efforts of the UK Secret Intelligence Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Special Operations Command. Drogin laments that CIA analysts often pushed too hard to go "outside the wire" too often. What Drogin does not realize is that their invaluable utility on-target, especially in pro-Saddam Sunni neighborhoods, to expertly and quickly 'separate the wheat from the chaff' reduced a DoD exploitation team's time-on-target when under fire. On a daily basis, analyst-assisted teams departed on high-risk missions and often flexed to other targets, based upon vital information that was gained--and not analyst-wedded theories. Those who chose to deploy and risk their lives to seek and uncover "ground truth" should be treated with the utmost respect and admiration of the entire world. Bottom-line: Drogin's book provides a distorted, incomplete picture to the reader of the ISG's critical activities and salaciously denigrates key personnel, who poured their very best to investigate a very messy and still murky issue.