In his review, R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA), unwittingly notes the cause of US animosity towards Iran as the 1979 Hostage Crisis. However, he fails to mention that the source of hostage crisis is indeed the 1953 CIA coupe against the democratically elected and legal government of Iran. In fact, it is this unwise, and shortsighted effort by CIA only a few months after a Republican was elected into the office, that set the stage for terror in the Middle East in the coming years. R. A Forczyk conveniently ignores the undeniable facts of our current history. The reality is that the Iranian Air Force outperformed their Iraqi and non-Iraqi/Arab counterparts inspite of all adversity and inspite of lack of spare part and munitions for their aircrafts. No other Air Force could have acheived the results acheieved by the Iranian Air Force. It shows the depth of creativity by Iranian Air Force personnel demonstrated and documented by this book. This a great read by a couple of informed individuals. I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the military affairs.

In his review, R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA), unwittingly notes the cause of US animosity towards Iran as the 1979 Hostage Crisis. However, he fails to mention that the source of hostage crisis is indeed the 1953 CIA coupe against the democratically elected and legal government of Iran. In fact, it is this unwise, and shortsighted effort by CIA only a few months after a Republican was elected into the office, that set the stage for terror in the Middle East in the coming years. R. A Forczyk conveniently ignores the undeniable facts of our current history. The reality is that the Iranian Air Force outperformed their Iraqi and non-Iraqi/Arab counterparts inspite of all adversity and inspite of lack of spare part and munitions for their aircrafts. No other Air Force could have acheived the results acheieved by the Iranian Air Force. It shows the depth of creativity by Iranian Air Force personnel demonstrated and documented by this book. This a great read by a couple of informed individuals. I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the military affairs.

F-14 Tomcats remain the mainstay of the IRIAF today and pose a serious challenge to anyone who plans an air strike against Iran. The book gives a nice operational record of the type in Iranian service with many photos and personal stories of heroism, triumph and sacrifice. The IRIAF of the 1980s was initially decimated by the mullahs but the F-14 fleet kept enough of its skilled personnel to give the Iraqis a bloody nose. "Shah's pilots" returned to duty en masse after the Iraqi invasion (pardoned by the revolutionary government) and used the F-14 in a most professional way scoring numerous kills. The author overturns some myths about the F-14s, like that the American technicians sabotaged the AIM-54 missiles or that the lack of spare parts reduced the number of available aircraft to a mere handful. The Iranians not only put the F-14 to use as a pure air to air fighter, but they used boldly the AWG-9/AIM-54 combination scoring kills from extreme ranges like 56, 64 and even 100 km! In one case an AIM-54 hit destroyed three (!) Iraqi jets with its blast and there were cases where single F-14s engaged eight or more enemy aircraft in dogfight and prevailed! The main problem was the TF30 engines which caused more losses than the enemy fire. Of course the lack of published records does not help to verify the total number of kills achieved by the IRIAF F-14s but they must be several dozens given the superiority of the type over the Iraqi MiGs and Mirages. It is doubtful though whether the IRIAF Tomcats remain as potent today and how many AIM-54 missiles are left in stock, but surely their pilots and technicians know the F-14 well and have even made some improvised corrections to it.

I have read this book 5 times so far and since I am from an Iranian Air Force family, I highly recommend this book to those who are still in denial and can not think of any one being better/equal than/to them.

The IRIAF F-14As saved the Iranian airspace from the Iraqi aggression while providing a mini-AWACS role for the Iranian armed services during the 8 years of war with Iraq.

If people do not know much about the Iranian F-14As, it is mostly due to the misinformation campaign going on in western societies by the media.

The trainings that Iranian technicians (HOMAFARS) got in the US in the late 1970s helped the Iranians to keep their nice birds flyable and combat ready till today!

The intelligent Iranian technicians did what American instructors couldnt believe such as installing AGM-65As on AH-1Js or installing HAWK SAMs on F-14As to give it a better performance while engaging Iraqi MiGs.

It is all written in this book for once by a European (read Neutral) author who havent gained any personal benefits by writing and researching about one of the most capable air forces of the 1980s.

The book has some errors simply due to the lack of more communications with the Iranian party (again due to secrecy and protecting the lives of those officers who contributed to the book) but it is still providing misinformed readers with valueable information and data that can not be found any where else.

There is not a single book one can find in the market that is in favor of the Iranian AF but this book written by these two authors are simply giving us the truth we needed to know for too long.

It is a masterpiece overall and I believe many more people should read this book!

this book tell us about F-14 tomcat belong to IRIAF, not U.S Navy, very good book,many stories is new for me, just like shot down Tu-22 iraq by AIM -54 Phoenix.
this book highly recomended for F-14 tomcat Fans just like me.

This is a book that provided additional information on Iranian F-14s, a topic that is rarely covered. Cooper and Bishop provided perspectives from Iranian pilots, views that are essentially ignored because these neither fit general military analysis, Iraq POV, nor the official Iranian government positions. Anyone who studied or read air combat accounts knows that, there are always uncertainties on air combat records, whether it's due to propaganda or fog of war. You usually have to look at stories from different sides to get a more complete picture. Therefore, Cooper and Bishop's efforts are greatly appreciated, even if they are not verifiable or totally correct (and with obvious Iranian pilot bias - not necessarily a bad thing if you know that upfront).

Having said that, I'd like to provide some additional info in response to Mr. Forczyk's review (even though I'm not military intelligence officer like him). The attitude from Cooper stems from the fact that he and Bishop's works are often belittled and ridiculed by others, including US military aviators. This bounds to make a person unhappy, especially when there are declassified US government documents to support some of his claims. Although Mr. Forczyk raised some reasonable doubts, such as no independent verification of these accounts and no details explaination about sources, I think he forgets that this is supposed to be an original work with first-hand sources. It's hardly surprising that this account is different from the Iranian government's account, since there is politic involved (FYI, Bishop and Cooper's work appears to be banned or at least unwelcomed by Iranian government). Saying "These are the same guys who lie to the world every day about their nuclear program, isn't it?" doesn't make much sense. What does Iranian government's nuclear program and propaganda has anything to do with the words of pilots their government dislike? Having contacts with former Iranian air force pilots (some no longer in Iran) is not the same as "pretty cozy with the Iranian Government", I don't think that's a right assumption.

Furthermore, I think it is a big jump to say that F-14's superior performance in Iraq-Iran war is impossible because otherwise Iran would have won by aerial bombing. The way Iraq and Iran used air power is very different from US traditional thinking (especially the post Desert Storm type). Air power simply isn't a decisive factor in Iraqi and Iranian minds, Saddam didn't say "Air Force has never been a decisive factor in the history of wars" without reason. During the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq perfected the underground and passive defense. Able to shoot down enemy aircraft in some air combats doesn't guarantee that you have impressive SEAD capability, and Iran certainly did not have US technology advantages displayed during Desert Storm. Mr. Forczyk forgets that Iran and Iraq both used Ballistic missiles to bomb each other's cities, that didn't have any cease fire effects. So why should F-14s, F-4, and F-5 with limited load and no PGM able to achieve greater results, given the air defense threats? Given these questionable assumptions, I think Mr. Forczyk's two stars is a bit unfair to the authors.

In sum, I'd say this book is certainly worth a look for anyone interested in F-14 or Iraq/Iran war, even though you may not accept all of its views. I give this book 3.5 stars - One for stuffing a lot of interesting info in a small book, one for interesting/rare photos, one for originality and going into a relatively untouched subject, and another half star for its potential value (if most content prove to be true...)

Writing about a secretive institution like the Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force (IRIAF) and the performance of its American-built F-14 fighters in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War would probably be considered a futile exercise by most authors without access to classified information. Certainly analyzing the contradictory and often ridiculous military press releases by the Iranian and Iraqi Governments or ill-informed media accounts at that time would provide little useful material. However, aviation enthusiasts Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, armed with "excellent contacts in Iran" and with former Iranian fighter pilots abroad, feel that they have the necessary information to write an accurate history of the Iranian F-14s in the 1980-88 War. At first glance, this volume in Osprey's Combat Aircraft series seems pretty exciting, given the paucity of information upon this still-relevant aircraft. However, readers who reflect upon the lack of bona fide sources provided and the difficulty in extracting military information from a repressive society like Iran may walk away with the conclusion that something is pretty fishy here.

For some reason, the authors leave the most telling statement until the last few pages: "It remains unclear exactly how many air-to-air kills were scored by IRIAF [Iran Air Force] F-14s between 7 September 1980 and 7 July 1988, as Air Force records were repeatedly tampered with during and after the war, mainly for political, religious or personal reasons. This has led to considerable confusion." The authors of this volume claim that Iranian F-14s had 159 "confirmed kills" during the Iran-Iraq War, but admits that a post-war conference in Tehran said that the F-14s only scored 24 "confirmed kills" with 6 other "probables." The authors also admit that other sources suggest numbers somewhere in between 30 and 150, which is a pretty huge range of discrepancy. The authors provide an appendix with a breakdown of all "confirmed" Iranian F-14 kills; according to this table, Iranian F-14s shot down 50 of Iraq's 285 fighters (17.5%) in the first three months of the war, for no loss of their own. The authors also claim that one Iranian F-14 shot down four Iraqi fighters with a single Phoenix missile! Sorry, if you want to try and make claims like that, you had better have more than "Major Ali's word on it." These are the same guys who lie to the world every day about their nuclear program, isn't it?

Throughout the volume, the authors make the repeated claim that the US military was in a state of denial about the true performance of Iranian F-14 fighters, but that they have the unvarnished truth from some unnamed, former Iranian pilots, somewhere, sometime. I kept wondering - as I'm sure many readers will - who are these authors and how did they get this information? Farzad Bishop's bio states that he is an Iranian-born aviation analyst with "unique personal experiences and encounters" and that Austrian-born Tom Cooper has established "excellent contacts with many informed sources in Iran." This means that these guys must be pretty cozy with the Iranian Government. Given the difficulty of Westerners acquiring reliable military-related information from within the Islamic Republic of Iran, these authors owe the reading public more of an explanation of how this data was acquired. Researchers will find this work virtually useless since it lacks any kind of references, other than a "wink, wink...we got this information on the sly from sources that cannot be revealed" or "Major Ali told us..." At best, this volume is more like military gossip, than military history. At worst, this volume might be a conduit for Iranian Government-sponsored disinformation.

If one accepts any of the number of kills provided, one wonders why the Iranians let the war drag on for eight grueling years if they had such an awesome weapon. If a handful of F-14s could shoot down nearly one-fifth of the Iraqi Air Force in the first few months of the war while on the defensive, what might they have accomplished on the offensive? Why didn't the IRIAF use its F-14 fighters to escort F-4 and F-5 fighter-bombers and bomb the heck out of Baghdad every day until Saddam asked for a ceasefire? While the IRIAF lacked heavy bombers, even their aircraft could carry sufficient bombs to cause considerable havoc in downtown Baghdad. Simple answer: they didn't because they couldn't.

This volume also has a subtle but considerable anti-US bias. While the authors never mention the cause of US animosity toward Iran - the 1979-1980 Hostage crisis brought about by Iran - they suggest that difficulties in acquiring spare parts for the F-14s was caused by US pique or neglect. The authors make a number of silly claims about US Navy ships assisting Iraqi air strikes that seem to come straight from the Iranian Propaganda Ministry. Furthermore, despite that fact that hundreds of American technicians were in Iran to support the F-14 program in 1976-1979, the authors seem to have made no effort to interview Americans about the performance of Iranian F-14s. The authors constantly suggest that the US military under-rated the performance and ability of Iranian F-14s, but ignore the fact that US Air Force AWACS were probably tracking most air combat over the Persian Gulf during the war and probably had as good a picture of air combat results - if not better - than the Iranians themselves. The disinformation content in this volume surfaces when readers are supposed to trust unnamed Iranian sources more than radar plots and intercepts of "cockpit chatter." When all is said and done with this volume, the actual contribution of the Iranian F-14s in the Iran-Iraq War is unclear.