Very cool book for operators (armed forces and civilian) and regular people. It shows us what we should be trying to do in the whole world. Make people safer, and they'll help you find the really bad guys (not the everyday ones). Really worth reading.

Good read. Great knowledge. I wish the authore had stayed in the army becasue he knows what he is talking about.

As the war in Iraq slides into it's fifth year I am sure most Americans are perplexed on why things remain so screwed up over there. Why can't American's just handle it and come home. This book sort of explains the why. This book is excellent. It really defines what an insurgency is. It isn't like the traditional war like WWII which we see on the history channel. Anyone who wants to get perspective on events needs to read this book.

The book has a second point too which anyone can apply. This book shows how the organizational culture can effect the ability to solve problems. The author does that in studying the British experience in Malay vs. the American experience in Vietnam. He shows how the British were adapt and could learn then apply as they go along. The LTC then shows how the American's were not flexible and paid the consequences. LTC Nagel shows how the American's were so preprogrammed in fighting a WWII type battle they couldn't grasp any other solution. The Generals were preprogrammed in Vietnam to such a degree they threw out any fact that upset the model in their mind. They may have changed the buzz words but the core way of doing business was the same throughout Vietnam for the Americans, search and destroy. While the British had a way to listen and apply the lessons learned from the bottom up. The result of such innovation was that they won their war and we didn't. Insurgencies tend to be as much of a political fight as anything else. LTC Nagel shows that in the book.

Any manager of any large organization needs to read this book because it shows how organizational culture can choke a team to death.

LTC Nagel does identify what an insurgency is but doesn't offer much remedy to fighting that war directly. He does talk about how the British did it and how some American's had theories in handling that type of war. It would be interesting to hear of his insight in the context of Iraq. However I feel that the planners in this surge probably read this book. It has a lot of similarities with the British Malay model.

Overall it is an easy read. He does get lost in the military terms a little. The material he talks about is the same concepts you read about in the newspapers. It will help the reader understand what is going on.