These types of books are only as good as their editors make them, and unfortunately these editors didn't do a great job. With these types of books it is necessary for the editors to really give the work structure, organization and guidance and all three were lacking in this book. Because of this the contributions are isolated and do not work towards a common goal.

German, French and Great Britain's performance in WWII was covered by three separate chapters, and each contributor's essay dealt with its subject in isolation from the other contributions which gives the reader three disjointed conclusions for failure and success of each. The problem is that all three are interconnected. One cannot really discuss French failure without discussing German success because, while France's failures were profound and debilitating, German success was a major factor as well. France had failed to conceptualize and then implement a strategy that would maximize their air power in WWII which was a major factor in the total failure of its air forces, but this might not have lead to the unmitigated disaster that followed had it not been for the German success at developing a successful strategy against France. The problem with this book is that it treats each subject in isolation, so that all the reader gets is France's own failures as the reason for its poor performance in WWII, and this is not an accurate or a whole picture.

Also Great Britains eventual success was a product of lessons learned from French failure and German miscalculation and arrogance (along with the Soviet's successful strategy of giving up land for time). Had GB not learned those lessons and had Germany not decided on terror bombing and the disastrous Russian campaign (or had they simply focused production from the beginning on a long conflict) the story for GB might have been very different. Had the editors given their contributors a little guidance I think each could have contributed their own piece to create a whole picture, but instead they contributed pieces that created isolated pictures unto themselves leaving nothing but a disjointed work that feels anything but complete.

Next, much of the material isn't really new or innovative. If you are someone who has studied WWII or WWI at any depth then much of this material will be rehash you have read before. The French suffered a weak government and an old military leadership stuck in the era of trench warfare which are two major factors (although certainly not the only factors) that doomed the French. This isn't new information. This is basic stuff. While there were tidbits of information that were a little more in depth and more focused on air power than one might normally get from other histories, these tidbits were not worth the amount of pages one had to read to get them.

Lastly, the authors do not tackle some of the areas I was really hoping would be discussed. Like why air power has never been able to win a major conflict against a determined and motivated opponent. In WWII Germany had lost the air war and was being pounded daily by Allied bombing but yet it wasn't until almost all of Germany was overrun that Nazi Germany fell. Why was Allied bombing a failure in that sense. Next the authors suggest that Japan was an instance were air power brought a war to a successful conclusion, but I think that point could be argued as well given the fact that when Tito learned of the scale of destruction from the two atomic bombs he was more than prepared to continue the fighting and even suggested that the fire bombing were more destructive. These attacks certainly helped to drive home the hopeless situation facing the emperor which helped him end the war, but to say air power alone did this is a point that could certainly be argued.

There is also the case of the "shock and awe" strategy employed by the US. This has failed numerous times against determined foes in Iraq were the US enjoyed total air superiority and control (also it failed for Israel in Lebanon as well, but I wont fault the authors for not being able to write about the future). This seems to me to be a glaring omission. Why do we find that even with total air superiority it still requires land forces to actually take physical control of territory? In the early days of flight it was thought to be the weapon that would end all wars. It would be so terrible and the destruction so great that nations would fall in days due to intense bombing. The terribleness of the destruction has come to pass, but why has air power failed to bring about a conclusion to any engagement on its own? Why has air power been a strategic failure on its own without support of land based forces? These are the kind of questions I hoped would be tackled, but yet I was wholly disappointed.

This book would be great for someone just getting into air power and looking for a quick easy starter, but if you have been studying these conflicts and air power for any real length of time and in any real depth then I think you can skip this work.

This is a well organized, well written and extremely relevant book, especially at a time when the Israeli Air Force is pounding Lebanon with high-precision munitions in an attempt to wipe out a terrorist organization on its northern borders.

In "Why Air Forces Fail" editors Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris have compiled a series of historical case studies that look at the failures of various air forces in World War I, World War II (Europe, the Eastern Front and the Pacific), the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands War. It is a wide net that examines air power in Poland, France, German, Italy, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, Israel, Argentina, and the Arab nations. Each chapter is written by a specialist in the field and contains a wealth of information on the various air forces and their performance in war.

The editors divide the air forces into three groups: (1) those that never had a chance (the "dead ducks"), (2) those that had initial success, but eventually failed (the "hares" that ultimately lost the race), and (3) those that suffered initial disasters but were victorious in the end (the "phoenixes").

Higham and Harris show that by studying the defeat of air forces at war a number of patterns are discernable. The "dead ducks" were doomed because they lack the infrastructure and resources to withstand their attackers. The "phoenixes", on the other hand, had the necessities, including the resources, political environment, personalities, and strategic space, to rise again.

The editors conclude that, historically, the practitioners of airpower have only rarely achieved anything like the ideal of a quick and lasting decisiveness. Nonetheless the pernicious myth of independent air action capable of winning wars by itself persists. One has only to look at the promises made by the proponents of airpower in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and, more recently, Israel, and the aftermath of air strikes, even over the long-term, to see that even a small nation or military organization cannot be defeated by airpower alone.

"Service doctrine that is not in harmony with government policy is likely to produce circumstances in which air forces will fail," write Higham and Harris. "Government policy made in isolation of service capabilities tends to do the same. Avoiding such dissonance is not easy, even where think tanks abound."

Of course, the main lesson of the book is that the ends must match the mean in the short term and when national survival is at stake.

An extremely readable and informative work, with essays ranging from the First World War to the Falklands conflict. The essays are quite reasonable in length, if anything sometimes too short, and include sections on areas which need more research and recommended reading. I ask you my fellow history lovers- is there anything more helpful to the student of history than a good annotated bibliography?

WHY AIR FORCES FAIL: THE ANATOMY OF DEFEAT examines the reasons for catastrophic failures of the air forces not just of this country, but other nations. Air forces are divided into three categories here: forces what never had a chance, forces that began with victory but ultimately were defeated, and those which were defeated early on but rose to win. In making WHY AIR FORCES FAIL a global examination, focusing on major wars, contributors provide a range of analysis on the causes of defeat of all kinds of strategies and differing air force scenarios in a sweeping set of insights essential to understanding air force approaches.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch

Why Air Forces Fail consists of 11 scholarly essays by different authors that address the reasons for the defeat of air power in conflicts from 1914 up to the contemporary era. Unlike many essay anthologies, this book has real meat in it, not just opinions. The authors categorize three different types of defeated air forces: the `dead ducks' that never had a chance, the `hares' who won initially but lacked the ability to conduct protracted warfare and `the phoenixes' who suffered initial disasters but came back to win in the end. Why Air Forces Fail is geared for a military-academic audience, and each chapter includes notes on areas that still need more research and lengthy bibliographies. For the most part, the writing style and research that went into this volume is first-rate and Why Air Forces Fail represents an excellent series of case studies that deserve serious attention from all those who see air power as a panacea for international problems. The eleven essays are:

* "Poland's Military Aviation, 1939: It Never had a Chance," by Michael Peszke: A good essay in which the author looks at the dilemmas facing a small power air force that lacks the resources to successfully accomplish its missions. One point the author fails to mention: the Polish Air Force continued to fight and win after 1939 - it did not cease to exist.

* "L'Armee de l'Air, 1933-40: Drifting Toward Defeat," by Anthony Cain: This essay examines the doctrinal, organizational and technical reasons that led to French defeat in 1940. Disunity of command, vague doctrine and poor choice of aircraft were major factors in the debacle that followed.

* "The Arab Air Forces," by Robin Higham: This is the weakest essay in the volume, marred by misspellings, mistakes (e.g. Iranians are not Arabs), several dubious contentions and some glib assertions. The author contends that the Egyptian Air Force has reached parity with the Israelis by 2003, that the Royal Saudi Air Force is an elite, professional force (ha, ha - good joke) and that Arab air forces have consisted of "simple Koranized mechanics." Skip this essay.

* "Defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian Air Forces in the Great War, 1909-1918" by John H Morrow Jr.: This author argues that the Germans wasted too many resources on Zeppelin construction (which he never proves in any statistical fashion) and had not developed a sufficiently robust aviation industry to sustain four years of attrition warfare. A bit contentious, but well written.

* "Downfall of the Regia Aeronautica, 1933-1943," by Brian Sullivan: An excellent essay that discusses how Italy's attempt to build a force in line with Douhet's theories of strategic bombing - but for which they lacked the resources - led to the development of a weak air force that was incapable of accomplishing virtually any mission. Poor technological and labor decisions also led to too few, too poor-quality aircraft. This is a great essay about how an air force can be totally disrupted by a few bad decisions.

* "The Imperial Japanese Air Forces," by Osamu Tagaya: Another great essay, that pins the blame for Japanese defeat on a divided force (army and navy aviation) that essentially fought their wars separately. After building a great fighter like the Zero, the Japanese failed to produce a successful replacement and their aircraft were undermined by lack of radios and radar. Failure to train enough replacement pilots also contributed greatly to defeat.

* "Defeat of the Luftwaffe, 1935-45," by James S Corum: A good essay that blames doctrine (failure to develop a naval air component to cripple England's economy), poor management of the aircraft industry and inadequate forward repair capabilities as the primary causes for German defeat.

* "The Argentine Air Force versus Britain in the Falkland Islands 1982," by Rene De la Pedraja: The author stresses that the Argentine Air Force did not prepare for this war but it had to carry the lion's share due to the pathetic performances of the army and navy. The author contends that the Argentine Air Force could have won with a more aggressive effort to repair the Port Stanley airfield.

* "From Disaster to Recovery: Russia's Air Forces in the Two World Wars," by David R Jones: This essay tries to cover too much ground and skims over WW1 a bit, through the Soviet build-up in the 1930s, then to disaster in June 1941. The Red Air Force was a `phoenix' because it harnessed the Soviet Union's industrial power to outbuild the Luftwaffe and come back to regain air superiority. This essay focuses a bit too much on the Soviet-superiority-through-numbers approach, which ignores other factors that helped the Red Air Force (like depth, that allowed them to pull back out of range of attacks, when necessary).

* "The United States in the Pacific," by Mark Parillo. A good essay that looks at the disasters at Pearl Harbor in the Philippines. The author makes good points that US leaders up to Roosevelt had false illusions about the military capability of small numbers of B-17s in the Pacific. There is also a point made here about military forces forward deployed for deterrent value, but which lack the logistic support to conduct actual military operations when the balloon goes up.

* "Defeats of the Royal Air Force: Norway, France, Greece and Malaya, 1940-42," by Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris: The authors view the RAF's key weaknesses as a bomber-centric philosophy at the start of the war and poor operational intelligence about enemy capabilities. The succession of disasters in these early expeditions apparently didn't teach the RAF too much.