This book covers only one aspect of the battle of Midway and covers it well - the destruction of 41 american torpedo bombers without scoring a single hit on an enemy ship. I found it well written and very readable. It covered the political, strategic and tactical level doctrines that made it almost impossible for the very brave men of the torpedo squadrons to be put to best use. The personal stories and histories of many of these men help bring the book to life. Most interesting was the solution put forward to explain what has always puzzled me about midway. Why did two of the three american carriers (enterprize and yorktown) launch strikes that found the enemy fleet, whilst the Hornet strike (launched from the same area) didnt find anything - apart from Waldron's torpedo 8 squadron. Instead many of the hornet planes found nothing and then ran out of fuel and had to ditch or divert to midway. A highly recommended read for any interested in learning something new about this battle.

Now a college professor, the author was, in 1942 a member of the aircrew on the USS Enterprise at the Battle of midway and clearly the loss of his friends in the torpedo squadron in their infamously suicidal attack stayed with him until it flowed out of him into the pages of this work.

The early parts of this book show where the scholar of now blends with the young mechanic of 60+ years ago in detailing the working of a carrier's air group and the now know to be fatal flaws in US torpedos and aircraft.

Unfortunatly he should have stuck with that and either run that theme through the book or have written a shorter book. The second part of the book degrades as Kernan launches his own strike against the CAG (Commander Air Group) of the USS Hornet whom he blames for the destruction of that ship's torpedo squadron and failure of the Hornet's bomber and fighter squadrons to engage at all. The rest of this epic battle is reduced to little more than "you know what followed..." I was reminded of "The midnight Ride of Paul Revre" where it cover's a day's battle as "you know what happened in the books you have read, how the redcoats fired and fled..."

He details that there was a lack of communication between Enterprise and Hornet and that there was a failure to agree between squadron leaders but all squadrons of torpedo planes were decimated in the attack and other leaders don't get the venom that Kernan spreads on the Hornet. As Kernan was on board the Enterprise at the time, it's never clear why he has such a particular ax to grind with the Hornet's command. If the CAG and Captain of the Hornet were praised today as the hero's of the battle you could see this as "setting the record straight," but as the heros are Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance and the commanders of the bomber squadrons from enterprise and Yorktown, this comes accross as just a personal vendetta without explanation. The end result is that the rest of the book, pancakes into sea making it almost as pointless as the torpedo attacks it documents.

one of the first things I noticed upon reading this book was that the author was a 'veteran member of one of the torpedo squadrons" that fought at Midway. I thought it was unlikely that any of the pilots of the few surviving torpedo bombers was still alive, though maybe some of the radio-operator/gunners were.

I was a bit disappointed to read that the extent of Kernan's participation in the torpedo attacks in question was as an ordinanceman for Torpedo 6 aboard the USS Enterprise. I am by no means saying his participation wasn't significant, nor am I saying that I don't think he was just as brave as anyone else. I simply thought (and still believe) that kernan was neither then nor now in a position to second-guess command decisions made by men whose level of responsibility was far greater than his own.

For example, another reviewer correctly pointed out that Waldron, while undoubtedly brave and a fine pilot, committed a grievous military offense in disobeying a direct order from his commanding officer. Disobeying a commanding officer in a combat situation is precisely how to get a lot of people killed, and that is exactly what happened except in this case "a lot" turned out to be "every plane in the squadron." Kernan, however, heaps praise on Waldron's correct guess for the position of the Japanese fleet.

I can't help but believe that Kernan, as an enlisted man, feels or at one time felt a certain jealousy or misguided animosity toward commissioned officers, such as those who flew many of the planes or made some of the command decisions aboard the ships. For example, Kernan points out rather uselessly that among the seven surviving TBD Devastators among all three carrier squadrons, "a high number were enlisted pilots." The clear implication is that the enlisted pilots were more skilled than the Annapolis pilots, who were, in Kernan's view, privileged "ringknockers' and other such members of the good ol' boy fraternity that had excluded him.

Excuse me, but I don't think an Annapolis ring or lack of one counted during the devastators' attack runs, as no amount of flying skill could make a lumbering, 1934 torpedo bomber design escape a Japanese Zero pilot at low level, with a height advantage, and little or no American fighter escort. Ironically, by Kernan's logic, it was only a matter of flying skill that resulted in a torpedo bomber pilot's survival or death during the attack. Waldron, Lindsey, and Massey all died, therefore they must not have been very good pilots. Clearly, kernan didn't intend to say this, so there really wasn't any point to him mentioning that a "high number" of the survivors weren't officers, unless he just wants to get that anti-Annapolis shot in.

Kernan also goes to great pains to point out that American fighter pilots might have been afraid to tangle with the Mitsubishi Zero pilots. This suggestion is so insulting that it alone destroyed Kernan's credibility for me. He doesn't question the courage of the American bomber pilots (as well he should not), and yet the fighter pilots are subject to his accusations of cowardice? Kernan must have had a great view of the battle above the Japanese fleet, from the hangar deck of the Enterprise. He wasn't there and yet he has the gall to write as though he was riding in the cockpit, thinking other people's thoughts. Kernan should know that despite the F4F's deficiencies (and there were many), the Mitsubishi A6M also had many deficiencies which American fighter pilots were gradually learning how to exploit through teamwork and a greater understanding of how to make the most of their own plane's strengths. Kernan conveniently forgets from time to time that in June 1942 America had been in combat with the Japanese for only half a year, against an enemy with a [shrinking] numerical advantage and the initiative. considering these things, the F4F pilots performed very well. Needless to say, the American navy had no lack of volunteers for the fighter units, even if the F4F in use at the time was inferior to the A6M in several respects.

All in all, Kernan writes fluidly enough, and the way he presents his case might convince the casual reader that there was some kind of conspiracy to cover up American incompetence at Midway. A more informed reader will be aware that America was new to the war and still learning how fight it, and still learning how to build the weapons to win it. The A6M Zero was designed in response to the Japanese' experience against Seversky P-35s and Russian I-16s in China. The F6F Hellcat was designed in response to the American experience against the Japanese. Kernan should be applauding the navy rather than bashing it.

He seems to really dislike the elitist Annapolis types, and yet it is clear that his position as a Yale professor paved the way for this dreck to reach the book store.

What's good enough for the goose, Kernan. Whatever.

The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons

This book is a very quick and very informative read and offers a very different perspective as to the Midway encounter. I recommend it.

At the beginning of World War II the author was an 18-year old enlisted aviation ordnanceman who subsequently served on several carriers in the Pacific. Readers would hope that he would leverage this experience to provide a unique and original viewpoint of war on a carrier. Unfortunately, Kernan strays far outside his expertise. Many of his comments and some of his facts are dead wrong; some of his comments and many of his interpretations can seem to be creditable on a superficial level, but are also either dead wrong or one of the breed of insidious half-truths that have a life of their own and are hard to squash. This book will be cited in future works, so another cottage industry has been created to correct the horde of myths and inaccuracies that will trickle down into Naval history from this book. To crown this achievement, Kernan creates a new "conspiracy theory" about the Battle of Midway.
Any good conspiracy theorist needs to first establish his personal credibility. This Kernan attempts in a few introductory chapters where he talks about military history, carrier aviation, ship design, and aerial torpedoes. His believability dies quickly. Specifically, I count 20 substantive or interpretive errors or half-truths in the book's first 25 pages.
There are errors where his facts are just dead wrong:
* "The USS Oglala was hit by four torpedoes ..." No, she was not hit by any torpedoes - she sustained underwater damage from a single torpedo hit on a light cruiser that was moored inboard of her. Because she sank without taking any direct hits herself she was later known as The Ship that Was Frightened to Death;
* The Japanese had not "stalemated the Russians in Manchuria," actually the Japanese were soundly beaten at Nomonhan, the 23rd Division being nearly annihilated with 76% casualties. The only reason the Soviets halted was because they had Poland to invade and then the Germans to repulse;
* The US Navy had radar "courtesy of the British." No the first USN radar was on a ship in April of 1937, and the first production radar, the CXAM, began installation in May of 1940. Exchange of radar information with the British did not happen until the Fall of 1940;
* Carriers to launch wanted 30 knots of wind over the deck, not "30 knots [of ship's speed] plus the wind."
... and many other factual errors.
There are errors where his proffered opinions are either only half right or misleading. For example, his comments on the placement of islands on carriers, boiler and engine room subdivision, and stack numbers and placement are superficial and uninformed, and generally half-truths. Tonnage limitations and how the disposal of stack gasses effect turbulence in the landing area is never mentioned. He thinks that early US carrier designs had arresting gear at both ends of the ship because "depending on the wind, the carriers were as likely to launch and land planes while going backward as forward" - no, Alvin, the arresting gear at both ends was for emergency recoveries without having to break the deck spot, or in the event of battle damage.
Even more egregiously, he does not understand the distinction between belt armor and a ships torpedo protection system, mixing them up in his discussion and then laughably coming to the conclusion that carriers succumbed to enemy torpedoes "because they were not armored enough." He uses technical terms improperly: for example, a ship's propeller shafts are referred to as "drive shafts," equating a carrier's propulsion system with that of a 1941 Chevrolet roadster.
After thus establishing his credibility, Kernan then goes on to collect some of the reasons why so many of the US torpedo bombers were lost at Midway. Most are straightforward, collected from other secondary sources dealing with the battle, and are presented in a workmanlike manner. However, when he moves to original material he reveals his true roots, not those of a Navy aviation ordnanceman, but of an English Professor from an Ivy League school. What he really wants is to talk about racism and class barriers in the wartime Navy. Racism he could work in only for a sentence, since it is clearly irrelevant to the story. Classism, however, becomes the centerpiece of the only "original" analysis in the book. Kernan contends that there was a conspiracy among the Navy high command to confuse or suppress the facts surrounding the attack of Torpedo 8 in order to protect the career of the Commander Hornet Air Group (CHAG), Commander Ring.
The bare facts are the following: the enemy carriers were located inexactly. Ring and Waldron have an argument before launch on the flyout course to use to find the enemy, but Ring is unconvinced by Waldron's arguments. Ring, as CHAG, gathers his squadrons and heads out. 30 minutes after launch Waldron again argues over the radio with the CHAG, then, on his own hook, departs from the formation with his squadron of torpedo bombers. Waldron finds the carrier, attacks, and his entire squadron is shot down, inflicting no damage. Ring does not find the target and returns to the Hornet.
Waldron is Alvin Kernan's hero. He dedicates the book to him.
In Kernan's view, Waldron is the self-sacrificing hero and Ring is the goat for not agreeing with him, and subsequently for not finding the targets when presented with the "correct" course by Waldron. This is exactly 180 degrees out, and where Kernan displays a lamentable ignorance of how military organizations work. Waldron was obligated to present his views to his commander; however, he was equally obligated to follow the orders of his commander afterwards. Kernan spends a lot of ink explaining why the Devastator was a poor aircraft and inadequate to the task; how, then, can he make Waldron out as a hero for disobeying orders and leading his squadron on a suicide attack in such an inadequate aircraft? If the TBD was unlikely to penetrate to the target without fighter support and the diversion of a dive bombing attack, points all well made by Kernan, how can Kernan subsequently praise him for doing just that?
Waldron was guilty of disobeying orders, and should have been court-martialed; the real "conspiracy" was that the Navy gave him a Navy Cross for getting himself and his people killed.
Examine what could have been: if Waldron had followed his commander's orders, he would have arrived at the point of no return and turned back, undoubtedly with a great big "I told you so" expression on his face. But then, his torpedo squadron would have been back on the Hornet and available for subsequent strikes, including those against Hiryu and against the Japanese cruisers on the 6th, after the Zeros were gone and the TBD had a reasonable chance of getting hits. Had he acted appropriately, his combat power would have been preserved for later, instead of senselessly thrown away. These points totally evade Kernan as he obsesses with his conspiracy theory.
The evidence that Kernan presents to support his idea that there was a Naval Academy Alumni Association conspiracy to "save" Ring career is that Ring did not submit an after action report (rather, that Kernan could not find an after action report in the archives, quite a different thing), and that Mitscher's after action report was inaccurate as it supposed that Ring passed to the south of the target carriers, when he evidently actually passed to the north. Kernan does not understand that the after action reports, submitted only days after a battle, sometimes reflect the very real confusion of the battle. Considering that Torpedo 8 and Fighting 8 were lost in toto, Mitscher was writing a report based on limited inputs and not a full picture. Often only an exhaustive after-action review is able to get the facts sorted out. From this slim reed - the lack of a report, and an inaccurate report - Kernan claims a conspiracy to protect Ring. That's the jist of Kernan's argument. There is no other evidence, no corroborating testimony, no other facts, just Kernan's perception of class jealousy manifested into a conviction of a conspiracy.
One wonders if Kernan's research in the field of English is held to the same standard of evidence.
One should buy this book if one would like to see a collection of secondary source information regarding the US torpedo bombers at Midway. He has some quotations from works that are not easily located, and collects faithfully most of the arguments against US torpedoes and the Devastator torpedo bomber that are located in disparate sources. One should not buy the book for clear charts or graphics - "minimalist" is the style, so minimalist as to be nearly incomprehensible. One should also purchase this book if one wants to be entertained when the real naval historians go into damage control mode to stamp out all the disinformation spread by this book.
One should not buy this book if you are less than an expert in the field, for you are likely to be misled by what is known in the Navy as "bum gouge."
Dr. Alan D. Zimm, CDR USN (ret) (By the way, NOT a USNA grad).