As one who reads lots of books about WWII aviation, and B-17s, in particular, I was excited to see the cover of this book and to think that it would be a great oral history of the bomber boys. Well, yes and no. The book was very good about discussing the strategic air war in analytic terms - what worked; what didn't; getting started in England; building bases; the different treatment of the blacks and whites while serving in England; and much much more. Many of these stories were supported, to a degree, by the veterans oral histories which made for a wonderful read.

However, I wrongly assumed that this book was a complete oral history of the air war as told by the bomber boys...and that was not the case. Therefore, my disappointment with the book.

Another item of the book I did not like was the author's apparent wondering away from the subject (the air war) to discuss prison captivity in Switzerland; being captive in the German POW camps (that particular chapter read like a rehash of "The Great Escape"); the devasting effects of the bombing of Dresden as told from a few German citizens. Although these stories were interesting, I found myself thinking, "What's this to do with the air war?" These stories seemed like side tracks to the overall picture, although they were part of being a bomber boy. It just didn't seem to fit and would have been better suited to another book.

But, still worth one read.

This is history writing at it's best. Just an outstanding piece of work. Everyone who is interested in World War II should read this book.

Miller's book is a masterpiece. Without too much effort, one can make the case that American Army Air Force generals were incompetent and reckless. I was appalled of the losses sustained by aircrews and the ineffectiveness of bombing in many cases. Miller points out that little targeting was done for German electric grid, although the RAF bounced some bombs into dams, which was not mentioned in the book. The mistakes made were colossal and include the following:
1. Not engaging in anti-submarine warfare in the Battle of the Atlantic (described as a minority opinion).
2. Not defining "round the clock bombing" -- like, what happens if the bomber force doesn't re-target for days or weeks because of inclement weather or replenishing the wings.
3. Not using fighter escorts to their operational range limits because the slaughter for Regensburg-Schweinfurt ball bearing and Ploesti oil raids were unacceptable without escort. That is, it took Doolittle to improve fighter performance and this should have occurred earlier.
4. Hap Arnold's Aphrodite (new to me) was bizarre to say the least.
5. Not going nighttime adopting the British area bombing approach since daylight results did not indicate any degree of precision.
6. A question of war crimes against Brits and American leaders for Dresden, Berlin and other complete destruction of the populace. Civilian or collateral damage should have been minimized, but it's easy to say this in hindsight when the author described painstakingly the difficulty and risks involved in making the final bomb run.
7. Oil and aircraft plants were high priority but unbelievably, it took some time to racket up for synthetic oil (eg Bergius) and transportation (railroad hubs, bridges, etc). It also makes one wonder why the German use of coal to make petrol is not part of our energy program now -- that is, coal to liquid (CTL) instead of ethanol.
8. Galbreath's bombing assessment survey pointed out other problems. I think the answer is somewhere between the military enthusisasm and the assessment. Speer's comments are very worthwhile.

I think deploying the fighters more earlier in the conflict would have been a sounder policy. Air superiority is always a tenet of war. I would think that not bombing might have given the Germans reason to not manufacture as many flak armaments, possibly catching them short at later target defenses.

This is an excellent book. Read it critically and see the American mentality that "we know better" and how we pay for its consequences. All options should have been on the table; that is, how do we prosecute the war to minimize our losses and get good solid results? Our generals just seemed to think get more heavies and aircrews and take on the Luftwaffe in their strongholds. Just imagine if the strategy was better coordinated. On the first attack, the Brits with Lancasters level Hamburg suburbs indiscriminately at 11 pm and the Yanks show up at 7am to do Norton-sighted bombing. The next night, US planes hit the military targets as best as possible but leave the Brits to show up at dawn to drop some really big bombs on the U-boot pens. That is effective round-the-clock bombing. Didn't happen according to Miller.

Finally, what ever happened to Gen Barnwell Rhett Legge for his miserable service of poorly monitoring POW conditions in Switzerland?

Thoroughly enjoyed this large collection of personal stories of the 8th Air Force during WW II. History buffs will enjoy this as it gives a very detailed inside look at how we grew our air force and the men who ran it.

I cannot praise this book too highly. Professor Miller has told the story of the Mighty Eighth bringing together in clear and concise prose the factual, personal and even moral aspects of the air campaign against the Axis. The air crews of the 8th were boys - Miller calls them "the bomber boys". They were civilian soldiers led by generals, some good, others not so good. Jimmy Doolittle comes off as a respected, compassionate and moral leader nevertheless not afraid to make very hard decisions. Hap Arnold, on the other hand, is portrayed as being distant, emotionally volatile and ambitious. The generals were developing strategy as the campaign evolved before they finally got it right. All at a horrific cost; the 8th suffered a staggering 26,000 fatalities. The stories of the crews is heartbreaking.

I think the most important of the many critical observations made by Professor Miller was whether the decisions of what to bomb and how to bomb was best left to the generals or civilians. Not all the civilians were on the mark, either.

This book is daunting scholarship and a very human and real story.