The author is known for his previous book, "Doomed From The Start" which is the history of the USAAF's fighters' struggles in the Philippines from December 8, 1941 until the surrender of Bataan. It was ground breaking hisotry and is the standard reference on the subject.

This book looks at the results of just one day and asks "why?" Why was the Far East Air Force virtually destroyed on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor when there was plenty of warning about the attack on Pearl Harbor. The answer will surprise and dismay you. It is meticulously researched with numerous references and footnotes, but it is not dry history. There are plenty of first person stories woven into the book. It is well worth the price if you are an aficionado of WWII in the Pacific.

A minor criticism is maps--there are virtually none--one small one that is so small in scale it is almost impossible to read and 50% of the airfields mentioned in the text are not shown. When will publishers learn that if you are publishing WWII history, include good maps that cross-reference the places written about in the text?

Overall, a first class read and sure to be another "standard reference".

This book is a blow by blow account of the Japanese attack on Clark Field on December 8th 1941. Starting even before MacArthur was recalled to day in July 1941, the author tells the story of how the Japanese planned their attack, and how the FEAF was created and reinforced and eventually attacked on December 8th.

The low rating of for the bad analysis and absurd over the top dislike of MacArthur, who is seems was to blame for every mistake. The bad analysis results from the desire of this micro-history to inflate its importance of the Japanese attack, as well as leaving important questions unanswered.

The truth is that the FEAF was "Doomed at the Start", (which BTW, is the title of much better book about the the P-40 fighter pilots in the FEAF from Dec 1941-to May 1942). Given that lack of AAA protection for the airfields, the lack of spare parts or reinforcements, and being outnumbered 3-1, it was never possible for the FEAF to have accomplished anything.

The author never makes clear how 18 B-17s on their first combat mission, flying unescorted to an bomb a Formosa harbor with unknown targets could have accomplished anything significant. MacArthur is blamed for the disaster although he did nothing more than delay the decision to attack till 10am and order a photo recon. The fact is that 18 B-17s were simply too little to have accomplished anything.

An interesting book, with a lot of detail. It is refreshingly free of hero-worship and nationalistic cheerleading.

An interesting book, with a lot of detail. It is refreshingly free of hero-worship and nationalistic cheerleading.

This is a follow up book to "Doomed From the Start" written by William Bartsch. This book takes the extra notes from his earlier work with interviews from both sides and numerous extracts from "Doomed" and Walter Edmonds book "They Fought With What They Had" and forms a very comprenhensive look at the events leading up to and immediately through the attacks on Clark and Iba Air Fields on 8 Dec 1941. The book starts in 1940 when the Air Corps begins modernizing the forces in the Philippines and looks at all the attempts by subordinate personnel to provide adequate forces, defense, and doctrine for the air forces of the far east. The book looks at the development of the Japanese operation plan and shows how junior officers and NCO's proved that the attack on Clark didn't require aircraft carrier support for escorts. This book illuminates enough blame for everyone above the rank of major in the chain up to and including FDR. The book points out a study conducted by Maj Hoyt Vandenburg (later AF Chief of Staff) after listening to briefings by Sir Hugh "Stuffy" Dowding on lessons learned by the RAF from the Battle of Britain which recommended action which if implemented might have delayed the final fall of the PI to a point that would have crippled the Japanese timetable most likely in a fatal manner. IMO a delay in taking Luzon by 6 months would have been fatal to Japanese intentions, a relatively secure Subic and Manila Bay would have provided a staging area for American submarines which would have made southern Japanese expansion untenable.
The largest points to come out of the book may have been obvious before reading but are still worth noting:
1. American fighter aircraft and pilots were not up to the task of intercepting the Japanese even if suffecient numbers had been available for the intercept, most of the Americans never got above 18,000 feet, the Japanese bombed from 21,000.
2. MacAurthor or his chief of staff Sutherland was criminally negelent in releasing the Air Force to conduct offensive operations against Formosa...these may not have prevented the strikes against Clark but would have severely restricted future Japanese operations from there after repairs to the bases. Additionally it would have preserved the B-17's lost on the 8th.

Overall this is an excellent book for those interested in delving into the formulation of a disaster that was 8 December1941. It left me screaming inside "IDIOTS, do un to others BEFORE they do un to you!"

Well what can I say, another masterpiece from Bill Bartsch. "December 8, 1941" and his other book: "Doomed at the Start" has answered many quesitons on the early air operations in the Philippines. Again wish I could personally congratulate you on this Mr. Bartsch..

Tony Feredo
Philippines

On December 8, 1941, a scant ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, a large force of Japanese bombers and fighters crippled the largest force of four-engine B-17 bombers outside of the United States, as well as many of their P-40 support fighters. This sudden blow allowed the Japanese to rule the sky over the Philippines, removing the only effective fighting force that might have opposed them in Southeast Asia.

How was this attack allowed to happen? Why didn't General Douglas MacArthur, commander of all military forces in the Philippines, have his planes in the air, or even better, why wasn't he launching an attack against the Japanese bases on Formosa? These questions have been asked almost as much as who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack, but what makes the Philippine disaster much worse is that MacArthur had ten hours' warning that the Japanese were probably going to strike but he failed to act!

General Brereton, MacArthur's air chief tried repeatedly to get clearance from MacArthur to launch an attack against Formosa, but each time he was told by MacArthur's chief of staff General Sutherland to stand by and not to use the B-17s offensively or even for reconnaissence without first obtaining Sutherland's permission. By the time Brereton was finally allowed to mount a reconnaissence mission against Formosa, it was too late, the Japanese were already winging their way toward Clark Field. The B-17 attack against Formosa never occurred.

What happened on December 8, 1941 can only be described as a huge derelection of duty by Sutherland and MacArthur. MacArthur should have sought out Brereton himself and devised a plan to attack Formoosa as soon as news of the Pearl Harbor attack was known, or, at the very least, Brereton should have been allowed to speak to MacArthur instead of receiving the run-around he got from Sutherland.

The results of the Japanese attack were devastating. Almost half of the B-17 force in the Philippines was destroyed on the ground as well as many of the P-40 pursuit planes. The Japanese, as at Pearl Harbor, suffered only minor losses.

I found this book to be a fascinating read. Mr. Bartsch describes American involvement in the Philippines from the build-up (and Washington's fatal decision to put their faith in a long-range bomber force as a deterrant to Japan) right through to the attack on Clark Field. Japanese and American viewpoints are presented, and the Epilogue solidifys Bartsch's case against MacArthur and Sutherland. I highly recommend this fine book. This subject has never really received the coverage it deserves, but this book describes in great detail one of the most destructive attacks against the United States. The ironic part is that it all could have been prevented if MacArthur and his staff had reacted differently.

A wonderful, masterful account of the disaster that befell the Phillipines the day after Pearl Harbor. This book is more a vast ciritque of the total failure of `I shall return' Macarthur then it is a history. This book includes wonderful personal experiences with military analysis of a total defeat for American arms. On December 8th the Americans at Clark Field and other locations should have been ready for attack by the Japanese but General `old soldiers never die' Macarthur simply ignored reports and claimed the Japanese could not strike his fortress of the Phillipines. This book is a study in Hubris that covers an oft ignored segment of World War Two. You will not be disappointed, this is a wonderful read!!!