In the preface to COTC, much is made of the fact that few books have been written about the greatest sea batttle in Navy history. Samuel Eliot Morison's official history is mentioned, and then dismissed, as faulty. The implication is that COTC is the answer to the gap in histories of the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

It isn't.

The most glaring gap, as others have mentioned, is that only one map is included, and that map is of such large scale to be nearly useless. Today, with computer graphics and data bases, there is no excuse for military histories not to have maps sufficient to illustrate the major themes of the work.

The structure of the text seems intended to be dramatic, pulling bits and pieces of Tillman's research into a flow that illustrates the background, buildup, and conduct of the battle. The bits and pieces seem intended for the MTV generation--they are short, choppy, and do not always relate well to each other. They are, however, entertaining if not always illuminating.

In trying to cover so many aspects of the battle, COTC flits from topic to topic, uses vignettes to illustrate larger and more complex aspects, and emphasizes drama over content. The drama is fetching, but depth and texture suffer.

In conclusion, there is still a need for a definitive history of the Mariana's Turkey Shoot, but COTC is not it.

Barrett Tillman's Clash of the Carriers is an in-depth study of the fifth -- last, and largest -- carrier battle of World War II: the Battle of the Philippine Sea or better known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot. The book was interesting from the start, read well and was hard to put down.

One of the things I liked about the book was its coverage of all aspects of the battle: war making potential, the leadership on both sides, oil, submarines, logistics, the fleet anchorages, recon floatplanes, shipboard and airborne radar, anti-aircraft guns and escort screen, the aircraft, aircraft carriers, flight deck operations, pilot and aircrew training and experience, carrier operations, what happened to the surviving ships and people, search and rescue, and the Marianas today.

The primary impression I came away with was how overmatched the Japanese were in this battle, only a year and a half distant from the Guadalcanal carrier battles of late 1942, when both sides were evenly matched in terms of aircraft, aircrew and operational quality as well as force size.

The situation was drastically different at the Marianas in June 1944. Of Task Force 58's 15 aircraft carriers, all were 1943 and early 1944 new construction except for 1942 veteran Enterprise. Task Force 58 had twice as many carrier aircraft as the IJN Mobile Fleet and its new Hellcat fighters were superior to the old Zero. American squadrons were sprinkled with combat veterans but even those with no combat experience had 500-700 hours of flight time. Spruance had such air power that he was able to gain air superiority over the Marianas on the first day - June 11, soften up Saipan with bombers prior to the invasion on June 15, temporarily detach seven carriers to beat up Iwo Jima - and then fight the major carrier battle on June 19-20. After the battle, Task Force 58 went back to Iwo Jima and beyond, illustrating the TF 58's staying power.

Furthermore, by June 1944 the U.S. Navy had perfected its air defense system. Flight directors - stock traders had been found to make the best FDOs because they were good at juggling resources quickly while under pressure -- vectored Hellcats onto "bogies" 50+ miles away from the task force by radio based on their radar plots. For close-in defense, the U.S. carriers and their battleships, cruisers and destroyers escorts were bristling with anti-aircraft guns whose fire control radar and proximity fused shells made them four times more accurate than sight-directed guns with "dumb" shells.

U.S. submarines were dominant as well, alerting Spruance that the Japanese were coming, and sinking two of the three big Japanese carriers: Taiho and Shokaku.

The Japanese brought to the fight nine carriers carrying 430 aircraft. But their Zero fighter was the same as what they started the war with - and markedly inferior to the Hellcat. Most of their experienced naval aviators had been lost in the South Pacific meat grinder. The successors had minimal training and little experience.

By this stage of the war, Japanese reconnaissance flights were near suicide missions. FDOs would see them on radar and vector Hellcats to shoot them down. However, if a recon plane didn't return, the Japanese knew there was probably a carrier in the vicinity.

On June 19th, the Japanese got in the first blow. But their attack groups were stunned to be intercepted by swarms of Hellcats 70 miles out from their target and attacked the rest of the way in. The few survivors then had to face a wall of steel from the surface escorts. Finally, the remnants were again attacked by Hellcats when they tried to land on Guam. How lopsided was the battle? The Japanese went into the battle with 430 carrier aircraft. They left with 35.

On the second day, June 20th, TF58 launched an attack on the retreating Mobile Fleet at maximum range knowing their planes would have to land in the dark. The book portrays well American planes attacking the Japanese fleet at sunset, scores of planes running out of gas and ditching, and pilots desperately trying to land on any flight deck they could find in the dark.

The hand-writing was on the wall after the battle. The Japanese knew B-29 bombers based out of the Marianas would be within range of the homeland. Their carrier air force was finished. The U.S. did not know it, though, and only a mistake at Leyte Gulf would allow the Japanese to engage the one decisive weapon they had left -- their battleships and cruisers - and come near to achieving a victory. The Japanese should have surrendered after the Marianas, but didn't, and hundreds of thousands died and Japan was bombed to rubble before the inevitable surrender.

Tillman supports Spruance's decision to stay with the transports and absorb the first strike as opposed to going after Mobile Fleet.

All in all, the book does a great job of informing the reader on all aspects of the largest carrier battle ever fought: the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Barrett Tillman's Clash of the Carriers is an in-depth study of the fifth -- last, and largest -- carrier battle of World War II: the Battle of the Philippine Sea or better known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot. The book was interesting from the start, read well and was hard to put down.

One of the things I liked about the book was its coverage of all aspects of the battle: war making potential, the leadership on both sides, oil, submarines, logistics, the fleet anchorages, recon floatplanes, shipboard and airborne radar, anti-aircraft guns and escort screen, the aircraft, aircraft carriers, flight deck operations, pilot and aircrew training and experience, carrier operations, what happened to the surviving ships and people, search and rescue, and the Marianas today.

The primary impression I came away with was how overmatched the Japanese were in this battle, only a year and a half distant from the Guadalcanal carrier battles of late 1942, when both sides were evenly matched in terms of aircraft, aircrew and operational quality as well as force size.

The situation was drastically different at the Marianas in June 1944. Of Task Force 58's 15 aircraft carriers, all were 1943 and early 1944 new construction except for 1942 veteran Enterprise. Task Force 58 had twice as many carrier aircraft as the IJN Mobile Fleet and its new Hellcat fighters were superior to the old Zero. American squadrons were sprinkled with combat veterans but even those with no combat experience had 500-700 hours of flight time. Spruance had such air power that he was able to gain air superiority over the Marianas on the first day - June 11, soften up Saipan with bombers prior to the invasion on June 15, temporarily detach seven carriers to beat up Iwo Jima - and then fight the major carrier battle on June 19-20. After the battle, Task Force 58 went back to Iwo Jima and beyond, illustrating the staying power of the TF 58's massive force.

Furthermore, by June 1944 the U.S. Navy had perfected its air defense system. Flight directors - stock traders had been found to make the best FDOs because they were good at juggling resources quickly while under pressure -- vectored Hellcats onto "bogies" 50+ miles away from the task force by radio based on their radar plots. For close-in defense, the U.S. carriers and their battleships, cruisers and destroyers escorts were bristling with anti-aircraft guns whose fire control radar and proximity fused shells made them four times more accurate that sight-directed guns with "dumb" shells.

U.S. submarines were dominant as well, alerting Spruance that the Japanese were coming, and sinking two of the three big Japanese carriers: Taiho and Shokaku.

The Japanese brought to the fight nine carriers carrying 430 aircraft. But their Zero fighter was the same as what they started the war with - and markedly inferior to the Hellcat. Most of their experienced naval aviators had been lost in the South Pacific meat grinder. The successors had minimal training and little experience.

By this stage of the war, Japanese reconnaissance flights were near suicide missions. FDOs would see them on radar and vector Hellcats to shoot them down. However, if a recon plane didn't return, the Japanese knew there was probably a carrier in the vicinity.

On June 19th, the Japanese got in the first strike. But their attack groups were stunned to be intercepted by swarms of Hellcats 70 miles out from their target and attacked the rest of the way in. The few survivors then had to face a wall of steel from the surface escorts. Finally, the remnants were again attacked by Hellcats when they tried to land on Guam. How lopsided was the battle? The Japanese went into the battle with 430 carrier aircraft. They left with 35.

On the second day, June 20th, TF58 launched an attack on the retreating Mobile Fleet at maximum range knowing their planes would have to land in the dark. The book portrays well American planes attacking the Japanese fleet at sunset, scores of planes running out of gas and ditching, and pilots desperately trying to land on any flight deck they could find in the dark.

The hand-writing was on the wall after the battle. The Japanese knew B-29 bombers based out of the Marianas would be within range of the homeland. Their carrier air force was finished. The U.S. did not know it, though, and only a mistake at Leyte Gulf would allow the Japanese to engage the one decisive weapon they had left -- their battleships and cruisers - and come near to achieving a victory. The Japanese should have surrendered after the Marianas, but didn't, and hundreds of thousands died and Japan bombed to rubble before the inevitable surrender.

Tillman supports Spruance's decision to stay with the transport and absorb the first strike as opposed to going after Mobile Fleet.

All in all, the book does a great job of informing the reader on all aspects of the largest carrier battle ever fought: the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

This book is a fantastic read. There are two points that make it very interesting. The first is that you can see the agony of decision at every level. The second is the fair portrayal of the courage and determination of the Japanese Navy. As names and equipment parade thru the book, it is loaded with details. You will enjoy this book from front to back. Remember, this book is not simply a recitation of facts. It's a picture of a time and place where carriers clashed.

Maybe I went in with unrealistic expectations. Tillman's writing style is very dry and dare I say it, boring. That may be due to his subject matter. I can't fault the awesome compilation of facts and detailed information here. It's obvious he researched the subject thoroughly, but I wish his writing was more kinetic and lively in nature. For example, I like the presentation of 'Flags of our Fathers' and 'A Bridge Too Far' much better than this. And, as other reviewers have suggested, battle maps would have been a huge plus.

The book was very well written and easy to follow. Additionally, other books that I have read substantiate the information provided in this book.

The Battle of the Phillipine sea is one of the most interesting battles of WWII, however, this book while still a decent read is not up to the subject. There is virtually no discussion or illustration (as another reviewer pointed out why no maps?) about the various strategies and decision making processes that went on before and during the battle. Admiral Spruance is criticized by some historians for not being more agresive. After reading this book I find it hard to comprehend why given the facts as presented but there was at most about 2 paragraphs that described Spruance's critics and the validity of their claims, and no discussion that I remember about any ongoing decisions made by Spruance or his staff during the battle.

In place of such discussion there is a lot of detail I don't care about on what happened to the major ships in the battle (this one was scrapped, that one was turned into a museum, that one should have been turned into a museum but unfortunately its supporters couldn't raise the money, etc., etc.) There was also a completely tangential discussion of the author's politics at the end -- what does the fact that Bill Clinton was anti-military (acording to the author) have to do with the Battle of the Phillipine sea?

In spite of all its flaws though I must admit it is still a decent read if you are into military history. There are lots of stories about the experiences of individual pilots which while not very insightful from a historical perspective are fun to read.

I'd have given this book 5 stars if it only had detailed maps. There is only a single map, in front of the prologue, spanning an area 2500 miles wide. Considering how the story hinges on where each fleet was, and where their search planes were, at key points, the lack of maps diagramming those things is just impossible to understand. That said, the narrative is excellent, bringing a unique depth to the story. I recommend finding maps elsewhere to refer to as you read, in order to make sense of it all.

The polite version is that, by now, it should be obvious that Barrett Tillman knows some "stuff" about Naval Aviation and World War Two history. Clash of the Carriers proves that the hundreds of interviews the author has done with aviators of different services and countries gives him a virtual Doctorate on the mind and technique of the military pilot. In this age of magic Sidewinder missiles, the overhead passes and deflection gunnery described in this book are guaranteed to make the reader want to charge guns and go hose something. As in all Tillman's work, historical and technical details are absolutely correct. The charge that he "made up" the preference of professional dive bomber pilots trying to hit the pack of airplanes on the Japanese carrier flight decks is the completely bogus sneering of another reviewer. Such a tactical decision and execution is well within the capabilities of this reviewer, who was a dive bomber in a different war. If Barrett Tillman is a Naval Aviation Groupie, then anyone with an advanced degree, equivalent or otherwise, can also be so diminished by that term. Tillman's histories ring true with the immediacy of the "Been there, Done that!" interviews and research of the actual participants, albeit the survivors of the Turkey Shoot are mostly American. Jingoism is empty bragging; there are a lot more accounts by the winners of this particular conflict than the losers, the once awesomely capable Japanese aviators, who had lost the cream of their pilots in actions from the Battle of Midway onward. It was not called a Turkey Shoot for nothing. Finally, like it or not, identifying the Year Group of Naval Academy participants is important, since those officers formed the hard leadership corps of the Navy, and various year groups truly stand out in producing successful leaders. Even this reviewer, who got his commission from another source (and is proud of it), understands this. If a reader wants to know how it was to be a participant in a great military victory for this country, he can do no better that Barrett Tillman's Clash of the Carriers.

This book is an invaluable addition to the historiography of World War II in the Pacific. Not only does it provide the details of the famous tactical victory of the Marianas Turkey Shoot, but addresses strategic & operational considerations surrounding the June 1944 naval air battle.

Tillman discusses 5th Fleet commander Spruance's concern with a Japanese "end run", a worry also shared by IJN leaders and planners. From today's vantage, it's amazing that Spruance expected more of a surface engagement, because IJN carriers hadn't been seen since Santa Cruz in October 1942. However, Lee, commanding USN battleships, did not feel confident in a gunfight. His battleships hadn't been able to train for that contingency owing to their antiaircraft role for several months, at least, and he recognized Japanese superiority in night fighting. Strategic discussion devolved into a meleeist vs. maneuver dilemma until the eve of battle when Spruance and (to a lesser extent) the staff of fast carrier force commander Mitscher saw it would be a standoff aircraft fight.

Spruance was criticized by the aviators for "letting the Japanese carriers get away", much as he had been after Midway. But Nimitz' priorities were correct: in both cases he told Spruance that Job One was to guard the amphibious vessels, a critical task that, in Tillman's judgment, Halsey neglected when the threat actually did arise four months later.

From fighter cockpit to battleship CIC to flag bridge, from swabbie to admiral, "Clash of the Carriers" views the epic Philippine Sea campaign from both American and Japanese viewpoints, providing a much needed single volume on this critical conflict.

As Stephen Coonts notes in the preface, very few books have been written about the Marianas battle. Barrett Tillman's book immediately rises to the top of the field. The other reviewers that knock this book are mostly complaining about style, not subtance. I found Clash of the Carriers to be very readable, comprehensive, and factually correct. There were quite a few little tidbits in this book that I had never read in other books. Although the book is detailed, instead of extensively footnoting, Tillman lets the narrative flow.

Barratt Tillman has been writing about naval aviation for over 30 years. He is the son of a World War II naval aviator, and has grown up with naval aviation his entire life. He has gotten to know the surviving pilots, and he has played an important role in writing down their stories for future generations. As it so happens, I read this book back to back with Gerald Astor's Wings of Gold, a book that while broader, covers some of the same ground. The reviewers of that book got it right, Astor's book has an astonishing number of inaccuracies. A day after finishing Tillman's Clash of the Carriers, I can't think of anything that Tillman got wrong.

Purchasing note: A year and a half after Tillman published this book, it is no longer available new direct from Amazon in hardcover. Amazon has the softcover for a reasonable price, and the hardcover is available if you hunt for used from Amazon. If you like this book you will also like J. Parshall's book, Shattered Sword; the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway.

Author Tillman has done it once again- he's produced a superb work on the biggest carrier action in history. This work covers both sides although the winning side, not surprisingly, gets the lion's share of the ink. A very nice piece that fits nicely with Mr. Tillman's other works.

Somebody else here described the author, Barrett Tillman, as a "US Navy groupie." Whoever wrote that hit the nail on the head. This is a book aimed squarely at a nostalgic, generally politically right-wing Americans who enjoy hearing stories of how brave their boys were, how great their weapons were, how great the odds were, how great their sacrifice was, and how sweet the victory was. It is a true life adventure sotry for people whose concept of history is closely related to knowing unit histories and aircraft variants. Scholarly, insightful, and deep, it ain't.

Now, don't get me wrong - the boys were brave (very much so) and the weapons were cool and so on and so forth. And there is very much a place in the world (I guess) for a book that very conspicuously goes out of its way to name virtually every possible named American sailor and airman, knowing full well that this could lead to a sale by the sailor or airman's family, extended family, and so forth. Such people deserve this sort of book - they deserve our eternal honor, respect, and thanks.

However, the Marianas Turkey Shoot / Battle of the Phillipine Sea deserves a more adult and balaced treatment. It also deserves better writing than this 8th grade-level stuff.

The good news is that Barrett Tillman has taken a bunch of good detail and anecdotes, mixed it in with a bunch of bravado and nonsense, and has produced something that future historians can build upon. The bad news is that those of us expecting a "Shattered Sword" or "Fire in the Sky" caliber analysis will have to wait until somebody picks up the mantle.

Oddities and absurdities:

- The book features a Rush-Limbaughesque intro by Steven Coonts where he rails about NAFTA and wonders who will build America's LSTs when the next World War 2 comes about since our manufacturing jobs have been shipped to China for low low WAL*MART prices. The introduction is embarassing to read.

- One of the reviews, by Henry Sakaida, lauds the book for it's "balance and fairness." I wonder if that guy even read the book. There are maybe a dozen total pages that deal with the Japanese side of things, and they are mostly general background. Clearly, Tillman has been surpassed elsewhere by writers who actually speak Japanese or could be bothered to collaborate with somebody who does, as his bibliographical sources dealing with the Japanese side of things is shallow and out of date. As i skipped a few pages here and there I could not swear to this 100%, but I don't think Tillman interviewed a single - NOT ONE - Japanese associated with the battle.

- The book's seethes of jingoism. Pilots on all sides over-estimated and over-claimed aerial victories ("kills"). When describing American over-claims, Tillman not unreasonably excuses young and excited pilots for their overeagerness. When descriving Japanese overclaims, however, the prose is full of sarcastic, sneering quotation marks. The contempt Tillman has for the Japanese (or at least, the contept he portrays in order to play to the sensibilities of a certain demographic of book buyer) is obvious.

- In a giant aerial battle such as the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the very least one expects from a serious history is a comparison of killed claims vs actual losses. Mind-numbingly, this is basically nowhere to be found in the book. However, there are literally dozens of paragraphs that go like this: "Lt Joe B. Smith of Little Rock, AR saw four Zekes and with his wingman, Lt Robert F Jones of Missoula, MT took three scalps in a space of five minutes while the last one scurried away into the cloud cover." No attempt is made to verify such events, link them to the faceless Japanese pilots, or even, for the most part, provide good technical analysis of the air combat.

That said, here and there Tillman has included interesting anecdotes, stories, and technical details that are a testament to his many years of research and experience. Unfortunately, a lot of it is also complete BS. Besides the expected stuff that has filtered through from his interviews of veterans and their occasionally over-vivid memories, there's some technical nonsense that Tillman has simply made up. For example, in describing dive bombing attacks on aircraft carriers, he suggested that SBD pilots would aim to drop their bombs on the stern (as opposed to the center of the flight deck, the normal preferred aim point) if they happened to see parked and fueled planes there. This is all well and good in theroy - in practice, this never happened and, for all practical purposes, never could happen. It's simply an example of Tillman basically making something up that sounds technically plausible but actually simply does not reflect historical, operational reality.

Should you buy this book? It depends. When I was 14 I ate these kind of books up (the one that comes to mind is "The Fighting Lady", a book about the USS Yorktown CV10 that I read when I was about 10) because I didn't know any better. They helped me imagine that I was there and ignited an interest and a passion in the subject. Then I grew up and my desire for insight and balance grew. Therefore, I personally found this book quite unsatisfying. I think in general it's just very, very average.

I highly recommend this book! This was probably the most overwhelming victory in US naval history and there are almost no books that review it. It is about time a book comes out and studies this battle, on a day by day basis. The author manages to weave a wealth of information in a very easy to read manner. I couldn't put it down.

This account of the greatest carrier battle is as good as it gets because it's actually two fine books in one. It's likely to remain the definitive account of the Philippine Sea engagement, but it's also a "deck plate" look at the workings of naval air warfare in WW II. In that regard, it's both operational history and the history of technology, from submarines to refueling to radar and aircraft. I read a lot, and I've never seen a book quite like it.

Tillman is an award winning author and an acknowledged master of naval aviation history. It's obvious that he not only knows the subject but the people as well. His sources include dozens of aviators, sailors, and submariners who were involved in the "Marianas Turkey Shoot", Japanese as well as Americans. We can be thankful that he wrote this book when he did, since so many WW II veterans are dying every day. Therefore, "Clash of the Carriers" probably could not have been written in another couple of years.

I would have liked to see more photos, but several that are included apparently have not been published before. But that's a small point. More important, the author's writing style is easy to follow, often engaging, and strikes an excellent balance between readability and "nuts and bolts" references. Serious naval buffs will appreciate the enormous depth of information in the appendices, especially the orders of battle which are the most complete yet compiled.

In conclusion, a hearty "Well done!"

This book is sadly deficient in writing quality, a fact that is perhaps more apparent to me right now because I've just finished reading two other World War II histories, both superbly written: "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway," and "Flags of Our Fathers," about the six Marines who raised the flag at Iwo Jima. While the factual material here is worthwhile, you'll have to wade through considerable cliched verbiage to get to it. I'm gritting my teeth and doing it so far, but it's not an enjoyable effort. You might want to try a different book on this subject.

Amazon presented an interesting juxtaposition by offering this book and Shattered Sword together. The latter is serious history. Clash of the Carriers seems to be lightweight vignettes in comparison. Tillman is obviously not a historian. His trying to count each kill by each American pilot doesn't count as history. Maybe as traffic or weather reporting.

This is an adequate description of the famous battle; especially interesting is the story of the aftermath - all the pilots trying to get back to their ships. The author's obvious status as a Navy groupie, however, leads him to make silly and undocumented statements that detract mightily from his book. Two examples of throwaway lines will suffice - "Harry Truman was the most anti-navy president of the twentieth century", thus maligning a president who tried to end rivalries and bring some order to our defense establishment by making it sound as if he was "against" the navy. The second example refers to the Tailhook "withhunt", as if there were not legitimate reasons to discipline those yahoos. The index is totally inadequate (the words Truman and tailhook are not to be found). There must be better histories of the Marianas battle available.

After their stunning defeat at the battle of Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy went into hiding, fearing the prospect of having to face a much larger U.S. Navy that had a new fighter that was superior to their own Zero. This fighter was called the Hellcat, and it became legendary during a few days in June, 1944, when it virtually destroyed the remaining Japanese carrier aircraft. This battle became known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, and for all intents and purposes, the end of the Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force.

Seeing their inner ring of islands threatened by the advancing Americans, the Japanese had no choice but to sortie their remaining ships in the hope of stopping the huge American task force. The target of the Americans was the Marianas islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. The Americans intended to use these islands as bases for their new B-29 Superfortress long-range bombers. If these islands were to fall, the road to Tokyo would be wide open, and the Japanese home islands would be within range of the new B-29s. Japanese Admiral Ozawa set sail with a force of nine carriers plus various escorts to meet the mighty American task force 58, commanded by Midway hero Admiral Raymond Spruance. Described as a man of caution, Spruance was still aggressive and longed to destroy the last of the Japanese fleet.

American submarines drew first blood in the battle, sinking two of Ozawa's prized flattops. However, the Japanese still packed a powerful punch, and after discovering the American fleet, he launched a massive attack. However, the Americans were ready, thanks to their radar and fighter vectoring capabilities. The Japanese were no match for the Americans, both in terms of quality of aircraft and pilot. In the span of a couple of days, American carrier pilots shot down over 300 Japanese planes. Another Japanese carrier went to the bottom, bringing the total to three, but the greatest losses were in aircraft and experienced pilots. Although the Japanese Navy sortied once more during the American invasion of the Phillipines, this battle effectively ended the effectiveness of the Japanese Navy.

Author Barrett Tillman has done a masterful job of describing this key battle of the Pacific war. Not only does he describe each phase of the battle, from the opening shots to the final Japanese withdrawl, he also describes the planes, ships, and tactics used by each side. This additional insight made the book that much better. I've read many books on the Pacific war, and I would rate this book as one of my favorites. The story is told in glaring detail, and the accuracy is precise, right down to the number of losses on each side. The appendicies in the back of the book are very helpful reading tools for the reader to refer to.

I give this book my highest recommendation. Read it and learn about the final destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

In the words of my friend and WWII Navy night Carrier Pilott George Franklin, "This is the finest book on WWII Carrier Action I have ever read." I want to add my same feelings as I write this review. Mr. Tillman has captured a time that will not come again. As the men who lived this experience pass from this life I am made proud by the telling of their story. America often faces fierce enemies, and never does so alone. It is good to learn from those who faced those ememies succesfully, and remind us we need to work together to defeat those wo would end our way of life given the chance.Thank you Mr. Tillman for your wonderful work.

For over a generation, readers have come to expect high-quality naval aviation history from the hands of Barrett Tillman, and this book does not disappoint. The Marianas Turkey Shoot put paid to Japan's last hope of achieving a military victory over the Allies, and Tillman does full justice to the story, blending a clear mastery of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, an airman's and seaman's insight into aircraft and ship operations, and keen analytical and writing skills. As "the greatest generation" give way to a generation of kids in combat who are no less great themselves, it is good to have this book--and to ponder on the courage it took for young men navigating by guess and by God to fly hundreds of miles, attack and sink an opposing fleet, and then return in fuel-starved airplanes to the pitching, heaving deck of their carriers. Tillman does 'em proud!

This book was written by Barret Tillman with a short forward by Coonts. Tillman has a writing style that makes him seem like he's trying to be a macho literary. He uses phrases like "on the morrow" in an attempt to add drama but it ends up sounding lame. The way he puts things seem to trivialize the sacrifices on both sides. He wrote that some Japanese pilots were spared the trouble of a return flight. Oooh... clever!

If you can get past Tillman's style, it's a good story but it has been better told within other books. If I remember correctly, both Clash of Titans and Clash of Wings cover this action pretty thoroughly and without the lame writing style and title stealing.

When this author produces a naval history you get it all --- the sights, the sounds, the workings of those radial-engined carrier warplanes, and the sense of what it was like when great ships turned into the wind to wage the fight. A really good history mixes people, machines, tactics, and strategy. It uses research, interviews, and first-hand knowledge. "Clash of the Carriers" does all of these things and introduces new findings about a battle that needed more coverage. "Clash" is also a great read. The people are real. The aircraft are real. The fighting seems authentic. I particularly appreciate the author's insights into some of the men who led the fast carriers in battle---Spruance, Mitscher, Clark, and others.

This book covers all the basics of a little-known but important battle, but it fails to take the reader beyond the facts and provide a useful interpretation. This is a two-dimensional nuts and bolts popular history for those fascinated by WWII aircraft. The prose is over-wrought and unashamedly politically partisan, which may be OK for an American audience, but undoubtedly will only serve to confuse foreign readers. This is especially apparent in Stephen Coonts foreward, which verges on jingoism. In many ways this book informs us more about the world view of 21st century American warhawks than about World War II. In sum, Tillman's politically partisan approach forgets a fundamental fact of aviation: carrier aircraft have two wings for balance, not just a right wing.

One of the few books to cover the last great carrier battle fought in WWII, Clash of the Carriers is a wonderful book for anyone that has an interest in the Pacific War. Barrett Tillman does a wonderful job of not only giving the reader an idea of what it was like to be there, but also gives a glimpse into the stories of the major players involved.

What was it like for the FDO's directing Hellcats into the incoming raids? What was going through the pilots' minds as they searched for their carriers in the dark of night? This book answers those questions and more without getting too caught up in the minutia.

If you have an interest in World War Two, the naval war in particular, this book would make an excellent addition to your library.

This is an excellent book that not only documents a great, but not well known, battle, but also documents a past time for us. A time when, as mentioned in the preface, "carriers had decks that were straight, Grummans had tail hooks, and Pratt and Whitneys had props". It tells the story of the largest carrier battle of World War II... yes, the largest, and the third largest naval battle ever in terms of ships employed (behind Leyte Gulf and Jutland). When 15 US carriers met 9 Japanese carriers in the middle of the Philippine Sea, thousands of miles from the US mainland and above a trench that goes to 30,000 feet in depth. The battle described in the pages, quite eloquently, tells how the US fleet routed the Japanese, sinking one third of their carriers and shooting down 90% of their aircraft, out of the sky... like turkeys. And, in the process, the author describes what it was like to operate an aircraft, an anti-aircraft gun, a submarine, land aircraft as part of a team, and the importance of radar. This is a well-written, eloquent book that goes beyond accurately telling the story of this great battle to giving us a glimpse, yes, just a glimpse, but well worth it, of being there.