Incredible writer! Gertz explains the many faults of America's so called "Intelligence Agencies" and how everybody wants to blame everybody else. Nobody has the guts to take the hit or be blamed for America's worst slip up of the last 30 years. Gertz digs deep and has many legitimate resources. I also recommend his book, the China Threat!

From the opening to the very end, this author writes in a novel-like style that makes this book so very readable.

There is no doubt that the author lays 9/11 at the feet of Bill Clinton - and, a LOT of the blame belongs there. Even more than I thought before reading this.

I do think that much of it lies in the bureaucracy that the FBI, CIA, and military intelligence had to deal with. And will the views of some bureaucrats.

Gertz does a great job of drilling down into some of these organizations and peeling the scab off of some of the intelligence wounds. As I read it, I kept thinking this guy must have INCREDIBLE access to sources and/or his research is just impeccable.

Bottom line - very well written and an easy read. Thank you!

Gertz begins by relating how, prior to 9/11, the CIA failed to help an Afghan leader trying to rally forces against the pro bin Laden Taliban. As a result, he was captured and executed.



Lack of Coordination: In '95, Philippine police investigating a fire and explosion learned the details of plans to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific, as well as to fly a plane into CIA headquarters. The individual involved also admitted having attended several U.S. flight schools. This information was not combined with Phoenix FBI findings that a number of Middle-East men with a hatred of America - one had bin Laden photo on his wall. another made calls to a Palestinian terrorist, still another was asking about airport security, and they had a "fatwah" that commericial airplanes were legitimate targets. Nor was it combined with the Minneapolis' finding that Moussaoui was similarly trying to learn to fly large jets, nor a like finding in Oklahoma City. The CIA did track two 9/11 terrorists to the U.S. (who had taken U.S. flight training) - but failed to even notify the FBI. Worse yet, when Minneapolis FBI agents were frustrated in their efforts to have Moussaoui's computer searched (refused because "no crime had been committed") and tried to notify the CIA - they were reprimanded.



The CIA attempted to prosecute Robert Baer (one of its top operatives) for supposedly trying to assassinate Sadam Hussein, per Iranian intelligence. It then claimed credit for stopping several Millenium attacks (actually accomplished via alert Custom's official), and for "thwarting" terrorist attacks after simply nabbing individuals entering with false documents. Also determined that a small boat attack against a U.S. warship was not possible, prior to the U.S.S. Cole bombing.



Lack of Capable Staff: In the early 1990s, the CIA had nobody in Iraq. Subsequent intelligence buildup involved adding staff attached to embassies who largely stayed inside and filed reports. Prior "housecleanings" had moved away from rewarding staff for recruiting spies, and instead focused on diversity, and avoiding recruitment of those with prior criminal or terrorist backgrounds. Clinton administration further weakened efforts by refocusing counter-intelligence on antii-abortion bombings - despite the FBI believing that Islamic terrorism was a much greater problem.



Sudan offered intelligence on bin Laden, and even to arrest him. Clinton administration did not follow-up, and the offer evaporated upon the erroneous bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.



Former CIA Director Woolsey: Prior to 9/11, several times each year some crazy person would get into a cockpit, and the call would go out to strengthen the doors. NOTHING HAPPENED! (Was the ONE simple action that likely prevented 9/11.)

Gertz begins by relating how, prior to 9/11, the CIA failed to help an Afghan leader trying to rally forces against the pro bin Laden Taliban. As a result, he was captured and executed.

Lack of Coordination: In '95, Philippine police investigating a fire and explosion learned the details of plans to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific, as well as to fly a plane into CIA headquarters. The individual involved also admitted having attended several U.S. flight schools. This information was not combined with Phoenix FBI findings that a number of Middle-East men with a hatred of America - one had bin Laden photo on his wall. another made calls to a Palestinian terrorist, still another was asking about airport security, and they had a "fatwah" that commericial airplanes were legitimate targets. Nor was it combined with the Minneapolis' finding that Moussaoui was similarly trying to learn to fly large jets, nor a like finding in Oklahoma City. The CIA did track two 9/11 terrorists to the U.S. (who had taken U.S. flight training) - but failed to even notify the FBI. Worse yet, when Minneapolis FBI agents were frustrated in their efforts to have Moussaoui's computer searched (refused because "no crime had been committed") and tried to notify the CIA - they were reprimanded.

The CIA attempted to prosecute Robert Baer (one of its top operatives) for supposedly trying to assassinate Sadam Hussein, per Iranian intelligence. It then claimed credit for stopping several Millenium attacks (actually accomplished via alert Custom's official), and for "thwarting" terrorist attacks after simply nabbing individuals entering with false documents. Also determined that a small boat attack against a U.S. warship was not possible, prior to the U.S.S. Cole bombing.

Lack of Capable Staff: In the early 1990s, the CIA had nobody in Iraq. Subsequent intelligence buildup involved adding staff attached to embassies who largely stayed inside and filed reports. Prior "housecleanings" had moved away from rewarding staff for recruiting spies, and instead focused on diversity, and avoiding recruitment of those with prior criminal or terrorist backgrounds. Clinton administration further weakened efforts by refocusing counter-intelligence on antii-abortion bombings - despite the FBI believing that Islamic terrorism was a much greater problem.

Sudan offered intelligence on bin Laden, and even to arrest him. Clinton administration did not follow-up, and the offer evaporated upon the erroneous bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.

Former CIA Director Woolsey: Prior to 9/11, several times each year some crazy person would get into a cockpit, and the call would go out to strengthen the doors. NOTHING HAPPENED! (Was the ONE simple action that likely prevented 9/11.)

Gertz begins by relating how, prior to 9/11, the CIA failed to help an Afghan leader trying to rally forces against the pro bin Laden Taliban. As a result, he was captured and executed.

Lack of Coordination: In '95, Philippine police investigating a fire and explosion learned the details of plans to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific, as well as to fly a plane into CIA headquarters. The individual involved also admitted having attended several U.S. flight schools. This information was not combined with Phoenix FBI findings that a number of Middle-East men with a hatred of America - one had bin Laden photo on his wall. another made calls to a Palestinian terrorist, still another was asking about airport security, and they had a "fatwah" that commericial airplanes were legitimate targets. Nor was it combined with the Minneapolis' finding that Moussaoui was similarly trying to learn to fly large jets, nor a like finding in Oklahoma City. The CIA did track two 9/11 terrorists to the U.S. (who had taken U.S. flight training) - but failed to even notify the FBI. Worse yet, when Minneapolis FBI agents were frustrated in their efforts to have Moussaoui's computer searched (refused because "no crime had been committed") and tried to notify the CIA - they were reprimanded.

The CIA attempted to prosecute Robert Baer (one of its top operatives) for supposedly trying to assassinate Sadam Hussein, per Iranian intelligence. It then claimed credit for stopping several Millenium attacks (actually accomplished via alert Custom's official), and for "thwarting" terrorist attacks after simply nabbing individuals entering with false documents. Also determined that a small boat attack against a U.S. warship was not possible, prior to the U.S.S. Cole bombing.

Lack of Capable Staff: In the early 1990s, the CIA had nobody in Iraq. Subsequent intelligence buildup involved adding staff attached to embassies who largely stayed inside and filed reports. Prior "housecleanings" had moved away from rewarding staff for recruiting spies, and instead focused on diversity, and avoiding recruitment of those with prior criminal or terrorist backgrounds. Clinton administration further weakened efforts by refocusing counter-intelligence on antii-abortion bombings - despite the FBI believing that Islamic terrorism was a much greater problem.

Sudan offered intelligence on bin Laden, and even to arrest him. Clinton administration did not follow-up, and the offer evaporated upon the erroneous bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.

Former CIA Director Woolsey: Prior to 9/11, several times each year some crazy person would get into a cockpit, and the call would go out to strengthen the doors. NOTHING HAPPENED! (Was the ONE simple action that likely prevented 9/11.)

This was a informative book that outlined what Gertz thought was the reason Sept 11th happened. Though these were problems left over from countless decades of neglect to the intellgence community Gertz seems to protray this as the cause of failure. It is a combination af manyy things and to point your finger at one aspect of the pie is ludicris. The book does make a good point on how politics get in the way of policy. "It is what you do and not what you say, if your not part of the future than get out of the way." Stop pissing around and playing favorites and get the job done!

both the CIA and FBI. Mr. Gertz, the excellent correspondent for the excellent (meaning not anti-Bush/republican NY Times/Wash. Post/CNN/CBS/ABC,etc.) Washington Times does an excellent job in explaining how 9.11 could have been prevented. Examples include the lack of adequately trained translators, CIA apprehension in "penetrating" al-Qaeda, and the 1970 era of anti-CIA political machinatiions that decimated the US intelligence. Also, Mr. Gertz details the lack of attention paid to the intelligence community during eight years of Bill/Hillary/Madeline/fat Al Gore/Sandy stolen documents Berger/et al. Binny struck in 93, 95, 96, 98, and 2000 (and many aborted/thwarted attacks) and all we got from that administration was some cruise missiles and an exploded milk factory in Sudan (while cowardly running from Somalia). This all led to the tragedy of 9.11 (and now the madman Kim Jong-il.)
Mr. Gertz does offer many solutions to the problems with many quote from senior intelligence officials (thank you, James Woolsey).
Thank you for the great work Mr. Gertz.

"Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11" by Bill Gertz provides an operational history of America's spy community.

While his credentials and writing ability are beyond reproach, Gertz fails miserably by simplistically concluding that politics ruined our intelligence gathering system. Without mentioning the bloody, destabilizing covert actions that compelled legislative intervention, Gertz blames congressional panels "packed with liberal Democrats who assumed that U. S. intelligence agencies posed a threat to American democracy and engaged in wide criminal activity."

To agree with Gertz, one must ignore scores of corporate-friendly coups supported by the CIA in the last half century. For a more complete examination of intelligence misdeeds, read "Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World" by Jonathan Kwitny.

By taking a partisan stance to draw a political conclusion, Gertz fails to put the blame where it belongs; on the hubris ridden, bureaucratic Boys Club that the intelligence service has become. Sycophancy and conformity cross party lines, and smother the creative thinkers in our nation's intelligence community.

"Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11" by Bill Gertz provides an operational history of America's spy community.

While his credentials and writing ability are beyond reproach, Gertz fails miserably by simplistically concluding that politics ruined our intelligence gathering system. Without mentioning the bloody, destabilizing covert actions that compelled legislative intervention, Gertz blames congressional panels "packed with liberal Democrats who assumed that U. S. intelligence agencies posed a threat to American democracy and engaged in wide criminal activity."

To agree with Gertz, one must ignore scores of corporate-friendly coups supported by the CIA in the last half century. For a more complete examination of intelligence misdeeds, read "Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World" by Jonathan Kwitny.

By taking a partisan stance to draw a political conclusion, Gertz fails to put the blame where it belongs; on the hubris ridden, bureaucratic Boys Club that the intelligence service has become. Sycophancy and conformity cross party lines, and smother the creative thinkers in our nation's intelligence community.

A few days before writing this, Congress approved the 'Intelligence Reform Act of 2004'. I thought this book might be useful for understanding the exceptionally difficult issues involved. Unfortunately, it only covers the preliminary ground work.

Unless you have been living in a cave for the last 5 years, you are well aware that Congress, the FBI, the CIA and the NSA (and thus the President of the United States) had a variety of warnings which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. This book reviews the warnings, using a chapter for each agency, the Congress and the Presidency.

While interesting, these reviews are poor narratives. The story line becomes very familiar, 1) agent 'X' was suspicious of 'Y' and wrote a 'warning memo'. 2) Unfortunately, a Democratic party functionary was running the agent's office and hid the warning. 3) If one looks into the office politics, it becomes obvious that the Democratic party functionaries were uninterested in Muslim terrorists. Instead, they favored activites that protected bureaucratic positions, maintained elected office, expanded a social service or played to the 'we hate the US military' crowd.

While interesting, the stories fail to argue for any general understanding of bureaucratic dynamics, the mind of Muslim terrorists or US politics. It is useful to know the specifics of various available warnings, but the simple moral tales were unconvincing. As a whole, the details are just details. The sum is less than the parts. In particular, there is no balance-of-powers governmental principle elucidated. Balance-of-power is the bedrock of US politics.

After these reviews, a set of recommendations were offered.
1. New clandestine service replacing CIA directorate of Operations and DIA Defense HUMINT. The goal is to create a service that relies on American diversity to place Americans in the front lines of intelligence collection.
2. Create a new Counter intelligence service outside the FBI.
3. Abolish the DIA and return its responsibilities to the Military.
4. Have CIA redesigned to support military.
5. Set up small Military 'special ops' force.
6. Upgrade technical abilities for collecting intel.

Two of these are non-controversial: #1 and #6, largely because they are so vague. Who would be against gritty 'real world' spies with technology James Bond would be proud to use? #3, #4, and #5 argue for giving more of the intelligence role to military officers, but the book has not made a case for trusting the military over 'spy bureaucrats', only against Democratic functionaries running spy agencies. #2 is the traditional 'new bureaucracy' temptation solution, which is as empty as #1 and #6. Thus, we are left with a simple analysis: turn counter terrorism over to the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Gertz and I probably agree that the Carter and Clinton administrations represent 20th century low points in US foreign policy, but the arguments and recommendations need to stand on their own merits. On their own, the case makes no sense. This probably explains the irrelevance of the book when used to inform opinion regarding the 2004 Intell Reform Act. The public debate over this measure revolved around two issues:
1. National driver's license standards
2. Congressional vs. Executive authority over 'real time' field level surveillance satellites.

The book makes no issue of driver license standards, nor the immigration issues that confuse the debate. The second issue is a 'balance of congressional and executive power' question, which the book never addresses.

In conclusion, while useful for summarizing the pre-9/11 warnings, the book is useless for making sense of 'how intel failed' and allowed 9/11 to take place. Since no theory of bureaucratic politics is offered, we end up with little more than 'my politics are better than yours' and 'another layer of bureaucracy will solve everything'.

A few days before writing this, Congress approved the 'Intelligence Reform Act of 2004'. I thought this book might be useful for understanding the exceptionally difficult issues involved. Unfortunately, it only covers the preliminary ground work.

Unless you have been living in a cave for the last 5 years, you are well aware that Congress, the FBI, the CIA and the NSA (and thus the President of the United States) had a variety of warnings which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. This book reviews the warnings, using a chapter for each agency, the Congress and the Presidency.

While interesting, these reviews are poor narratives. The story line becomes very familiar, 1) agent 'X' was suspicious of 'Y' and wrote a 'warning memo'. 2) Unfortunately, a Democratic party functionary was running the agent's office and hid the warning. 3) If one looks into the office politics, it becomes obvious that the Democratic party functionaries were uninterested in Muslim terrorists. Instead, they favored activites that protected bureaucratic positions, maintained elected office, expanded a social service or played to the 'we hate the US military' crowd.

While interesting, the stories fail to argue for any general understanding of bureaucratic dynamics, the mind of Muslim terrorists or US politics. It is useful to know the specifics of various available warnings, but the simple moral tales were unconvincing. As a whole, the details are just details. The sum is less than the parts. In particular, there is no balance-of-powers governmental principle elucidated. Balance-of-power is the bedrock of US politics.

After these reviews, a set of recommendations were offered.
1. New clandestine service replacing CIA directorate of Operations and DIA Defense HUMINT. The goal is to create a service that relies on American diversity to place Americans in the front lines of intelligence collection.
2. Create a new Counter intelligence service outside the FBI.
3. Abolish the DIA and return its responsibilities to the Military.
4. Have CIA redesigned to support military.
5. Set up small Military 'special ops' force.
6. Upgrade technical abilities for collecting intel.

Two of these are non-controversial: #1 and #6, largely because they are so vague. Who would be against gritty 'real world' spies with technology James Bond would be proud to use? #3, #4, and #5 argue for giving more of the intelligence role to military officers, but the book has not made a case for trusting the military over 'spy bureaucrats', only against Democratic functionaries running spy agencies. #2 is the traditional 'new bureaucracy' temptation solution, which is as empty as #1 and #6. Thus, we are left with a simple analysis: turn counter terrorism over to the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Gertz and I probably agree that the Carter and Clinton administrations represent 20th century low points in US foreign policy, but the arguments and recommendations need to stand on their own merits. On their own, the case makes no sense. This probably explains the irrelevance of the book when used to inform opinion regarding the 2004 Intell Reform Act. The public debate over this measure revolved around two issues:
1. National driver's license standards
2. Congressional vs. Executive authority over 'real time' field level surveillance satellites.

The book makes no issue of driver license standards, nor the immigration issues that confuse the debate. The second issue is a 'balance of congressional and executive power' question, which the book never addresses.

In conclusion, while useful for summarizing the pre-9/11 warnings, the book is useless for making sense of 'how intel failed' and allowed 9/11 to take place. Since no theory of bureaucratic politics is offered, we end up with little more than 'my politics are better than yours' and 'another layer of bureaucracy will solve everything'.

A pretty good synopsis of what's hampered our intelligence services, but a bit too harsh when passing blame. There's no doubt that our intelligence capabilities were proven to be in need of repair after the failures of 9/11 and the Iraq War. Gertz examines those failures, plus others, and lays the blame where he sees fit. He has excellent chapters on the organizational cultures of such intelligence agencies as DIA, CIA, NSA, and the FBI. I believe he has correctly captured the internal dynamics of those agencies, the arrogance, rigidity, disagreements, and even agenda-based analysis that defeats production of good assessments for the policy-makers. However, I felt he was unfairly critical when attacking people like ex-CIA Chief George Tenet. He's ultimately responsible for the failures, but it doesn't mean they were of his making.

Gertz should know that intelligence analysis is an art, not a science, no matter what politicians or societal pundits want to believe. (To better understand this argument, I'd recommend readers look at the book by John Hughes-Wilson, "Military Intelligence Blunders") I sense Gertz' severe critique of Tenet is colored by the latter's service for, and under, Democratic politicians. Nevertheless, the author is right-on when he disassembles the various agencies, and more importantly, when he details how Congressional Democrats, especially in the 1970s, systematically destroyed our ability to collect intelligence. He also does a fine job of laying out the Presidential Administrations responsible for undermining our intelligence community.

In the end, Gertz offers some well though-out recommendations for improving intelligence capabilities. This is a revealing book, which should be read by those interested in better understanding the political and military challenges in the War on Terror.

This is an important book about some major problems with our nation's intelligence community and intelligence infrastructure. Author Bill Gertz takes no prisoners and certainly points fingers in this book. He is abundantly clear in his assertions that intelligence failures failed to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that had our intelligence folks been doing their job that those horrendous attacks would have been prevented.

One chapter is devoted to Osama Bin Laden and what U.S. intelligence forces knew about him and what they did and what they didn't do about him before 9/11. Other chapters deal with the FBI, the CIA and the DIA, respectively. Gertz also delves briefly into the history behind the problems with our intelligence agencies. He levels a great deal of criticism at the Church and Pike Committees, which ravaged our nation's intelligence in the 1970's. In addition, Gertz lays much blame at the foot of the Clinton Administration and looks more favorably upon the current Bush Administration. Nonetheless, he still criticizes many Republicans for failing to provide proper performance-based oversight over the intelligence agencies, since he concludes they felt it their duty to protect those agencies from further attacks.

Gertz's charges that the CIA was overcautious in the years leading up to 9/11 and was averse to doing counterintelligence, that the FBI had all but ceased its counterintelligence activities, that worries about lawyers had come to dominate national security, that our intelligence agencies were under-funded, that agencies did a poor job communicating with one another. He also claims that the bureaucracies in these agencies were too frequently concerned with political correctness, protecting their image in the media, and guarding their turf.

Interestingly, in the prologue of the paperback edition, Gertz states that both the Joint Select Committee and the 9/11 Commission were not given adequate time to investigate and prepare their reports. The 9/11 Commission Report had not yet been issued when the paperback edition of this book was published, so he does not provide any analysis or critique of the Report. (Interestingly, Gertz puts much stock in Czech accounts that 9/11 terrorist Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi officials in Prague, whereas the 9/11 Commission does not consider such accounts particularly reliable.)

Granted, this reviewer is not an expert on national security, and does not have the knowledge to provide in-depth critiques of all the author's assertions and conclusions. But this book does contain some very interesting and extremely startling information about our nation's intelligence apparatus. And according to Gertz, if we are going to truly be protected, some serious changes must take place.

At the time of this review, Breakdown's paperback edition is still more than a year old. Thus, it is not the most current publication. But if you are an American citizen who is concerned about our national security and have invested the time in reading the Joint Select Committee's Report and/or the 9/11 Report, then this is certainly one you will want to read.

More than 3 years after Osama Bin Laden and his gang attacked us we still are having to deal with his threats. We need a president who will not lose sight of our true enemies. After losing so many of our young men and women and spending so much money we are no safer than we were on 9/11!

What was the point?

Please vote for John Kerry.

While Bill Clinton was busy turning the oval office into a sewer and Hillary was busy preparing to be the next Evita Peron, the radical Islamic terrorists were busy waging war on the U.S.

I don't think "the unusally good liar" (quote attributed to Bob Kerrey) met with the CIA director more than two times.

Clinton pin-prick bombed Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, but these were totally useless dog and pony shows.

The Clintons are of the McGovernite generation that held the Church committee hearings that weakened our spies and made sure weak intelligence chiefs were in charge.

Too many desk jockeys and not enough trained, professional killers who knew how to infiltrate terror networks and kill them.

True, it's easy to say all this now. The elite media, however, hates the pentagon and reports their leftist pre-conceived notions rather than the perspective of men working to defend the nation.

Gertz does not try to sandbag our defenders of freedom and therefore gets better sourcing.

We need the mentality of Bill Donovan and Bill Casey.

The principal premise of best selling author Bill Gertz's book Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, is that there was a monumental screw up of the intelligence community in Washington.

There are certainly many revelations of the book that are nothing more than a rehashing of various news stories presented over the past year by the media. Nevertheless, the synthesizing of this information definitely helps the reader to better understand the root causes of the breakdown.

Gertz provides the reader with impressive evidence to support his contention that Sept 11th could have been prevented, if the intelligence community had worked together in harmony. In order to defend his case, the author relies heavily on information gleaned from congressional hearings, court documents, classified memos, foreign governmental reports and letters, speeches and personal interviews with some of the former employees of the intelligence services.

Each chapter examines a different branch of the US intelligence apparatus and how they were all guilty of incompetence. He further adds that even Congress was a partner and should likewise share the blame, and its oversight of intelligence-or lack of it, or wrong use of it- is a prime cause of the intelligence breakdown that led to September 11.

No doubt the reader will find some of Gertz's findings lethal. For example, he refers to the Phoenix Memo, where special agent Kenneth Williams from his Phoenix office wrote to FBI headquarters on July 10, 2001 that they should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the world. More than a year before Williams was involved in investigating some of the students attending this civil aviation universities and colleges. The FBI never took his warning seriously, and as mentioned in the book, "it did not get analyzed, and it was not shared with other intelligence agencies or even other FBI field offices, except New York."

Although at times the wealth of information may be difficult to immediately digest, there is no doubt a bitter aftertaste left in one's mouth once you ponder over some of the author's findings. This information packed book is nevertheless a welcome and discussion-provoking addition to the growing body of literature on this important subject matter.

Norm Goldman Editor of Bookpleasures.com